

Mission and Globalization

ed. by Tiziano Tosolini



Asian Study Centre

Xaverian Missionaries – Japan

MISSION AND GLOBALIZATION

Asian Study Centre Series

FABRIZIO TOSOLINI. *Esperienza Missionaria in Paolo*. 2002.

SERGIO TARGA, FABRIZIO TOSOLINI, TIZIANO TOSOLINI. *To What Needs are Our Cultures Responding?* 2003.

SERGIO TARGA, FABRIZIO TOSOLINI, TIZIANO TOSOLINI. *Culture and Alterity*. 2004.

SERGIO TARGA, FABRIZIO TOSOLINI, TIZIANO TOSOLINI. *Experiences of Conversion*. 2005.

FABRIZIO TOSOLINI. *The Letter to the Romans and St. Paul's Grace and Apostleship: Towards a New Interpretation*. In collaboration with Fu Jen Catholic University Press, Taipei, Taiwan. 2005.

TIZIANO TOSOLINI. *Controstorie dal Giappone*. 2006.

SERGIO TARGA, FABRIZIO TOSOLINI, TIZIANO TOSOLINI. *Faith and Money*. 2006.

TIZIANO TOSOLINI ed., *Women in Context*. 2007.

Published by

Asian Study Centre

Ichiba Higashi 1-103-1

598-0005 Izumisano (Osaka), JAPAN

Private edition, 2009

PRINTED IN TAIPEI (TAIWAN ROC)

Mission and Globalization

EDITED BY
Tiziano Tosolini

Asian Study Centre
Xaverian Missionaries – Japan

Contents

Introduction	3
GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIETY	
<i>Bangladesh</i> – SERGIO TARGA	7
<i>Indonesia</i> – MATTEO REBECCHI	20
<i>Japan</i> – TIZIANO TOSOLINI	30
<i>Taiwan</i> – FABRIZIO TOSOLINI	38
GLOBALIZATION AND RELIGIONS	
<i>Bangladesh</i> – SERGIO TARGA	49
<i>Indonesia</i> – MATTEO REBECCHI	59
<i>Japan</i> – TIZIANO TOSOLINI	73
<i>Taiwan</i> – FABRIZIO TOSOLINI	80
GLOBALIZATION AND CHRISTIANITY	
<i>Bangladesh</i> – SERGIO TARGA	91
<i>Indonesia</i> – MATTEO REBECCHI	101
<i>Japan</i> – TIZIANO TOSOLINI	119
<i>Taiwan</i> – FABRIZIO TOSOLINI	126
Conclusion	137
Cumulative Index	143

Introduction

S. TARGA, E. PULCINI

Globalization, one of the new jargons of the post-modern world, is virtually on everybody's lips. For some a curse, for others a blessing, globalization is taken as a buzzword to explain away most, if not all, of the modern world's phenomena. Its etymological simplicity contrasts strongly with a notional complexity which is structurally multidimensional in nature. The attempts at defining it in a comprehensive yet synthetic way have been many and often have fallen short of the mark. Beyond and above terminological and notional disquisitions, globalization is indeed a phenomenon which, like it or not, is moulding our present reality. A new world order is taking shape under our very eyes, affecting all dimensions of our lives. Driven by stunning innovations in both information technology and transportation, globalization has reshaped our perceptions of time and space and thus influencing the way we experience the world. As a result, the new global village the world has turned out to be appears, or is made to appear, as if in a sort of perpetual vortex, rapidly revolving on itself at

breath-taking speeds and flying to soaring heights without however having clearly set its destination. Such a hectic movement hardly hides economic profit as the understated aim of globalization's frantic dynamism.

Globalization in short is a dimension of our times which we cannot escape from or avoid. This is a time of great changes and quests, a time of great hopes and of dramatic threats to life. Globalization is in fact the new context of mission; a time in which we are called to live enlightened by the gospel, searching for a word, an action, a spirituality truly responding to our Christian faith.

This latest publication of the Asian Study Centre wishes to explore what challenges globalization is raising for the mission of the Church in Asia today. It has done so describing for each of the four countries under study—Bangladesh, Indonesia, Japan and Taiwan—how globalization has gained its foothold in each of the countries and the kind of influence it has exerted on society, religions in general and Christianity in particular. Actually globalization, although being a relatively new phenomenon, does maintain a sort of continuity with earlier stages of humankind's history. This however does not forecast analogous developments in the actual deployment of globalization in each of the countries. Bangladesh, Indonesia, Japan and Taiwan react differently to globalization depending on the kind of perceived economic benefits occurring to their respective societies. Their reaction is similar when globalization threatens instead cultural and religious identities. However, while Japan and Taiwan in their globalizing role appear to guide or attempt to guide globalization, and thus try to correct its possibly nefarious outcomes, Indonesia and particularly Bangladesh appear instead in a more passive role, mere objects and not subjects of globalizing forces.

Globalization in as much as it promotes a secularist, materialistic and consumerist culture is generally frowned upon by all religious traditions well aware that such influences could fracture their very traditions and ways of life. Religious radicalism or defensive counter-universalism may be an outcome of their resistance to these forces.

Generally speaking the book shows that the attitude of Christianity, despite variations related to the cultures of each country, is more open to globalization and to the opportunities of great importance it offers for that Church which prides herself on the name Catholic. As believers we are called to think of globalization not only economically but also ethically and particularly theologically so to draw a figure, a model of Church able to dwell in this "global era" in a wise, prophetic, courageous and missionary way. In line with this, the present publication hopes to contribute insights to missionary activity here and now so that the challenge of globalized reality may be met without fear and be humanised according to the divine plan of Salvation.

The authors wish to thank several friends (John Fagan sx, Steve McKend sx, Jim Heisig, Alberto Bertozzi, Brian Reynolds and Gerardette Philips RSCJ) who in different countries have helped by correcting and editing the material. We further wish to thank Xaverian Missionaries in our mission countries, particularly those working in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Japan and Taiwan. They have been our inspiration throughout this work.

Globalization and Society

BANGLADESH

SERGIO TARGA

It has become fashionable nowadays to talk of globalization. The term has become a sort of buzzword used and misused to justify and explain a great number of processes or events which characterise the present modernity, or postmodernity. While universities and academics strive to analyse its dynamics, anchormen, religious leaders, politicians, human rights activists etc. use it either as a sort of wonder cure for the evils of today's world or point at it as to the mother of all evils. Even in Bangladesh, the term globalization is well known not only to the enlightened and educated elites of Dhaka, the capital city, but also to the less educated and, supposedly, less enlightened people of the countryside. Whereas for many terms of modern parlance Bengalis use and like to use English words, the term globalization is used directly in Bengali: *bisshayon*. This, as such, does not mean much. However, as a matter of speculation I take this usage as a sign of the kind of impact globalization processes are having on Bangladeshi society, a society which, by

all measurements, is quite peripheral to the political, economic or cultural interests of today's world.

The present paper wishes, therefore, to assess the impacts of globalization on Bangladeshi society, particularly in its socio-economic gains and costs. A brief theoretical introduction will set the context for such an assessment.

It is said that there are as many definitions of globalization as the number of people who wrote about it. This, once again, points at the slippery and ambiguous nature of the term and of what it signifies. For the limited purpose of this paper I propose the following working definition of what globalization is: globalization "speaks... to the complex mobilities and interconnections that characterize the globe today. The picture is that of an increasingly interconnected world... a world where borders and boundaries have become increasingly porous, allowing more and more peoples and cultures to be cast into intense and immediate contact with each other."¹ More specifically, it is the constant mobility or flow of "capital, people, commodities, images and ideologies through which the spaces of the globe are becoming increasingly intertwined."²

This all happened because of tremendous technological advances and innovations in both the fields of transportation and telecommunications. Modern information technologies have literally shortened time and its perception while new forms of transport have likewise shrunk distances. Indeed this intricate net of multifaceted interconnections has transformed the world into a "global village".

This rather bucolic expression hides however a less harmonious reality. It may not be necessarily true that the world is being experienced as shrinking by everybody and everywhere. If transportation and information technology are the means of the processes of globalization, it becomes apparent that only those, be they individuals, groups or institutions, who have actual access to those means may have a share in a globalized world. What is more, if free trade and the market in general are the ultimate ends towards which globalization is geared, it is not too hard to imagine that places and communities which do not offer guaranties of sound profit, economic or otherwise, may be just left out *tout court*. But even this is not as simple as it seems. To be left out from globalization basically means to be left out from its benefits, but not necessarily from its costs. The network of interconnections that globalization is all about is in fact "an awkward and uneven process, for the very processes that produce movement and linkages also promote immobility, exclusion and disconnection."³

Furthermore, if we agree to consider the economy and its spasmodic and insatiable search for and creation of a trans-national environment for an unfettered movement of capital as the prime mover behind most of globalization's processes, globalization as such

1. J. X. Inda and R. Rosaldo, eds., *The Anthropology of Globalization: A Reader* (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 4.

2. *Ibidem*.

3. *Ibid.*, 6.

is indeed nothing completely new.⁴ In an historical perspective, globalization turns out to be just the last updated version of world-capitalism.⁵ In fact foreign direct investment (FDI) is considered one if not the most important driving force behind globalization processes. In this respect it may be considered that global “FDI inflows in 2006 were 38% higher than in 2005, approaching the peak of \$1,411 billion reached in 2000.”⁶ However, compared to its past historical realisations, the modern brand of global capitalism stands out because of its utter speed, flexibility and reflexivity of operation, the latter characteristic intending to signify the kind of pervasive and structural impact global capitalism exerts on every and each aspect of the life of individuals and societies alike. The remainder of the paper will attempt an assessment of these impacts on Bangladesh.

Since the late '70s Bangladesh has experienced a slow but continuous opening up of its socio-economic as well as political boundaries to the influx of globalization forces. After a difficult start in 1971, Bangladesh had to cope right from its inception with great difficulties among which recurrent natural disasters, a swelling population and scarcity of resources. Dubbed by Henry Kissinger, the then US Secretary of State (1973–1977), as a “bottomless basket case,” Bangladesh could not but become the recipient of huge international aid and of the political and socio-economic prescriptions which necessarily came with it. However, in the context of the cold war, Bangladesh managed to survive relatively harmlessly the influence of foreign aid and counselling, managing somehow to strike a balance between a strong nationalist ethos, common to any emerging nation, and its absolute necessity of international help.

Born as a Socialist Republic, Bangladesh from the beginning sided with the Soviet Union and then with the Chinese Republic. The scar of British colonialism was not old enough to be forgotten right away; and the wounds of neo-colonial experience under the Western wing of Pakistan from partition to independence (1947–1971) was too fresh and still bleeding to be done away with *sic et simpliciter*. Thus, in ideologically charged times, Bangladesh was extremely wary of external political and economic influences, at least in the rhetoric of its successive governments. This was particularly true when Multinational Corporations, the driving force behind globalization, were involved. Indeed, up until the late '80s, “Bangladesh maintained a considerably regulated environment for Multinational Corporations’ operations.”⁷ Things changed considerably from the fall of president Ershad, a military dictator, on December 6, 1990. The reestablishment of parliamentary democracy and the election of Khaleda Zia as Prime Minister (1991) coincided on the

4. See G. Arrighi, *Globalization, State Sovereignty, and the “Endless” accumulation of Capital*. Revised version of a paper presented at the Conference on “States and Sovereignty in the World Economy,” University of California, Irvine, Feb. 21–23, 1997.

5. I acknowledge that globalization may not be reduced to an “economicist” view only. However, in this paper I wish to accomplish a twofold purpose: first, to extract globalization from a nebulous, ambiguous and mythic setting which, second, impedes a practical analysis of globalization’s impact on peripheral countries like Bangladesh.

6. UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2007* (New York, Geneva: United Nations Publications, 2007), 3.

7. A. Bhardwaj and D. Hossain, *Globalization and Multinational Corporations in South Asia: Towards Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development* (Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic, Policy Studies 20, 2001), 70.

international scene, with the final demise of the Soviet Union and the consequent end of the Cold War. This last happening apparently had a magnifying effect on globalization processes. Freed from its long standing bipolarity, the world was seemingly becoming a neutral and huge space where free financial flows could go about unrestrained.⁸ The new international scenario could not but influence the re-emergent Bangladesh democracy.

The fall of the Iron Curtain and its ideological constructs forced Bangladesh to abandon the kind of autarchic and anti-imperialist rhetoric of previous military regimes in favour of an open approach to the possibilities created by the new international situation. From the first Khaleda Zia government onwards, it may be surmised, Bangladesh has more and more been experimenting with and experiencing globalization in an attempt to reap its promised benefits. Through an Act of Parliament in 1980 the Bangladesh Government established the Bangladesh Export Processing Zones Authority (BEPZA), an *ad hoc* organism whose objectives are stated as: “Promotion of foreign (FDI) & local investment; Promotion of export; Diversification (*sic*) of export; Dev. of backward & forward linkages; Generation of employment; Transfer of technology; Upgradation of skill; Development of management; Promotion of int’l marketing skill/access.”⁹ All this was to be accomplished or hoped to be accomplished by luring foreign investors in industrial enclaves with incentives such as tax havens, financial security, particularly favourable legal arrangements etc. However, despite this effort Bangladesh has been unable to lure much needed FDI.¹⁰

Even though the first months of the 2008 seem to be promising in terms of foreign direct investment,¹¹ the amount of money flowing into Bangladesh through EPZs reaches, at best, only 1% of the GDP of the country, certainly not enough to finance Bangladesh’s huge development needs. Corruption, lengthy and troublesome bureaucracy, political instability, social unrest and Islamic radicalism are some of the causes highlighted to justify Bangladesh’s low performance in the sector.¹² In fact the logic pushing Multinational Corporations (MNCs) to invest abroad is pretty much simple: “Faced with stagnant demand and sharp rise in production costs in home countries MNCs are shifting their production bases to foreign countries, where the domestic markets of goods and services are growing and production costs are much lower, as raw material and labour are very

8. *Ibid.*, 19.

9. See the BEPZA official web site at <<http://www.epzbangladesh.org.bd/bepza.php?id=BEPZA-Obj>>.

10. Bangladesh FDI inflow in million US \$: FDI Total Inflow—460.4 (2004); 845.3 (2005); 792.5 (2006). This data has been worked out from statistics of the Board of Investment, Bangladesh Government, “FDI in Bangladesh in 2005” and “FDI in Bangladesh in 2006” at <www.boi.gov.bd>. It is indeed difficult to obtain reliable statistics. The UNCTAD statistics as far as FDI inflow to Bangladesh is concerned reports 460, 692 and 625 million US \$ for the year 2004, 2005 and 2006 respectively. As a comparison the same statistics for the year 2006 reports 16,881 million US \$ for India and 4,273 million US \$ for Pakistan. See UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2007* (New York and Geneva: United Nations Publications, 2007), 253.

11. See J. U. Khan. “Record Levels of Foreign Investment in EPZs,” *The Daily Star*, April 1, 2008.

12. See A. Rahman, “Why FDI is Not Flowing into Bangladesh?” *The Daily Star*, January 30, 2004.

cheap.”¹³ Accordingly Bangladesh does qualify to become a recipient of FDI, if it were not for its socio-cultural and political drawbacks.

Be that as it may, from the experience gathered so far, the EPZs experiment has not delivered what it had first promised. In the official objectives stated by BEPZA and mentioned above, the EPZs should have favoured the development of the country, by facilitating transfer of know-how, enriching the skills of local entrepreneurs etc. As a matter of fact, however, the transfer of technologies involves only 4% of the FDI inflow.¹⁴ The nature of FDI in Bangladesh in fact has got to do basically with labour intensive production. An increase in employment opportunities in fact is what Bangladesh really benefited from. It is estimated that around two million people of whom more than 80% are women have found employment in the garments and textile industries. This, which indeed is good news, hides however a number of less positive aspects.

Employment has indeed been created by globalization forces but with it they have created a circle of semi-enslavement where workers are over exploited and chained to a system of low salaries. What is more, to maintain the *status quo* of investments and the privileged status of export oriented industries the government is all too ready to trample upon the rights of workers. The ban on strikes of both workers and management in the EPZs that has recently been renewed for another two years, expiring on October 31, 2010¹⁵ clearly bears this out.

The question is that liberalisation of national economies together with the setting up of particularly favourable conditions for foreign investments have nowhere contributed to the development of a country, as the painful experience of Latin America bears out. This region has experienced the operations of MNCs at least 20 years before South Asia. Yet, the spectres of poverty, underdevelopment, marginalization etc. are still to be defeated. What in fact MNCs have accomplished in the context of globalization is the creation of a world super class of people who concentrate in their own hands huge financial resources and consequently power.¹⁶ And this is what is happening to Bangladesh as well. Indeed in the last years Bangladesh has sustained a real GDP growth rate of more than 6%.¹⁷ This has surely diminished abject poverty in the country but it has also increased the gap between the poor and the rich. Social equity and equality do not seem to be the final aims of globalization neither in Bangladesh nor anywhere else in the world.

The need to attract investments to further increase the GDP growth rate and thus sustain development activities has pushed the government of Bangladesh to turn a blind eye

13. A. Bhardwaj and D. Hossain, *Globalization and Multinational Corporations in South Asia: Towards Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development*, *op. cit.*, 34.

14. See R. Sadrel and M. A. Rashid, “Foreign Direct Investment: Problems and Prospects,” M. G. Quibria, ed., *Bangladesh Economy in Transition* (Dhaka: The University Press, 1997), 193.

15. See J. U. Khan, “Export zone strike ban extended for two years,” *The Daily Star*, April 20, 2008.

16. See D. Rothkopf, “The superclass and the inequity of globalization,” *The Daily Star*, May 18, 2008.

17. See Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Year Book Bangladesh 2007*, 10. At <http://www.bbs.gov.bd/dataindex/pb_wb_page.pdf>.

on a number of issues involving the operations of local and multinational companies. The curbing of workers' rights, already mentioned, may just be an example of this. The degradation of the environment is another. The government dependence on hard currency and the companies' drive to maximise profit meet at the expense of the environment. The latter pollution and degradation are the additional costs of globalization. Perhaps the worst environmental disaster which occurred in Bangladesh at the hands of a multinational corporation is the gas explosion at Magurchara, (Moulovibazar) gas field in 1997. The Occidental International Exploration and Production Company (USA), while drilling the first well caused a devastating explosion. The fire it originated lasted for several weeks and the environmental and economic damage to Bangladesh were extensive. A whole gas field calculated at 700,000 million cubic feet was completely lost. 700 acres of reserved forest were destroyed and the fertility of the soil lost for at least 50 years. 400 Khasi people lost their homestead and had to be relocated. 50 acres of their cultivated land were heavily damaged.¹⁸ Apparently the responsibility for all this was Occidental's hurry, its lack of skill and its flouting of Bangladesh environmental legislation.

Foreign and local investments in Bangladesh are basically confined to four sectors: garments and textile industry, gas-oil exploration and extraction, shrimp cultivation and chemical-pharmaceutical industry. Water pollution is a serious problem linked to both garments and pharmaceutical industries, while salinisation of land to provide for shrimp cultivation is a huge problem in the coastal regions of Bangladesh. "Within the last decade, more than 350,000 acres of agricultural land in coastal districts of Bangladesh have been turned into shrimp farms."¹⁹ This has implied flooding the land with marine water which causes degradation and loss of fertility of soil to the extent that not even grazing remains possible. Small farmers have been evicted often under threat of violence in case of non compliance, and transformed into low paid manpower to man these cultivations. The big earnings of this export oriented aquaculture go to fatten the already thick pockets of owners living outside the area. The once self employed farmers and petty artisans either work on these farms at a subsistence level or are forced to migrate to cities, particularly to Dhaka, and swell the already swelling slums.

Indeed as the Secretary of State for International Development (UK) remarked in his speech on December 12, 2005: "The question is not about being for or against globalization. It is about making it work for social justice—to increase prosperity for everyone."²⁰ To accomplish this, both local and international agents should be alerted and responsive to the concept of sustainability. Multinational and local companies cannot certainly be

18. A. Bhardwaj and D. Hossain, *Globalization and Multinational Corporations in South Asia: Towards Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development*, *op. cit.*, 73.

19. M. Rahman and R. West, "Context and Trends of Globalization in Bangladesh: Towards a Critical Research Agenda." In Matiur Rahman ed. *Globalization, Environmental Crisis and Social Change in Bangladesh*. (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2003) 15.

20. *Making Globalization work for Bangladesh*, speech delivered on 12-12-2005 by the Secretary of State for International Development. At <<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/speeches/globalization-bangladesh.asp>>.

or become charitable institutions but they can pay attention to the concept of sustainable development as a long term strategy to do better business in the foreseeable future. After all it was not only Bangladesh which incurred huge damage in the Magurchara gas field disaster; but also Occidental itself which had to pay a huge amount of money to compensate for the damage caused. And nobody, not even the most powerful trans-national corporation may reap any benefit, in the long run, from the irrational overexploitation of the environment or in the disruption of social order due to the exacerbation of socio-economic inequality in a given host country. There surely is “the necessity of driving home to MNCs their social responsibility while doing business in developing countries like Bangladesh.”²¹

There is another aspect in need of consideration while reviewing the economic dynamics set in motion by globalization processes, that of labour migration. In fact globalization positively “has had important implications for international labour migration, acting as a ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factor,” and negatively “the failure of globalization to create new jobs where people live is a prime factor in increasing migration pressures.”²² It is calculated that from 1976 to 2003 more than three million Bangladeshi people migrated overseas in search of employment opportunities.²³

This work force has contributed and is contributing to the development of Bangladesh in at least two ways. The first: in a country where one third of the working age population is considered unemployed or underemployed, the migrants helped ease unemployment pressure at home. Second: the migrants with their remittances in hard currency constitute the single most important source of income in Bangladesh’s national budget. “The contribution of remittances to GDP has risen sharply from a measgre 1% in 1977–1978 to 5.2% in 1982–1983. During the 1990s, the ratio hovered around 4%. However, if one takes into account the unofficial flow of remittances, its contribution to GDP would certainly be much higher.”²⁴

No doubt, therefore, the economic forces unleashed by globalization have contributed and are contributing to Bangladesh’s GDP’s growth. However the costs of this economic development are yet to be clearly mapped and understood particularly in its socio-political and anthropological consequences. If it is true for any nation-state that globalization is eroding the traditional spaces in which politics from the nineteenth

21. A. Bhardwaj and D. Hossain, *Globalization and Multinational Corporations in South Asia: Towards Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development*, op. cit., 74.

22. International Labour Office, *International Labour Migration and Development: The ILO Perspective*. 61st General Assembly, New York 14–15 September 2006. ILO Geneva 2006, 2. At <<http://www.solidarnosc.org.pl/migracje/dokumenty/ilo/dokumenty/ILO%20Intern%20Migr%20Persopectives%202006.pdf>>.

23. See T. Siddiqui, *Migration as a Livelihood Strategy of the Poor: The Bangladesh Case*. Paper presented at the Regional Conference on Migration, Development and Pro-Poor Policy Choices in Asia. 22–24 June 2003, Dhaka. At <http://www.livelihoods.org/hot_topics/docs/Dhaka_CP_5.pdf>.

24. Ibid., 3. According to statistics provided by the IMF (IMF Country Report 07/229, June 2007, 34. At <<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cro7229.pdf>> in the year 2005/6 the total flow of remittances amounted to 4,802 million US \$ which would correspond to 7.9% of that year GDP (my calculation).

century onwards were the sole and absolute arbiters,²⁵ this is particularly true of states like Bangladesh where statehood is a recent achievement, and where political, financial and military bargaining weight is negligible. The creation of a free global market in fact cannot but be the offspring of international organisations of the likes of the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the UN and its affiliated organisations, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) etc. Nation-states, particularly the more powerful, do have a say in all this, but it is becoming obvious that globalization is de-territorialising the global economy and that Multinational and Trans-national corporations are taking over what used to be states' prerogatives. In this respect, Arrighi speaks of "semisovereignty and quasi-statehood as the outcome of long term trends of the present modern world system."²⁶ Of course, globalization will unlikely put an end to nation-states worldwide, but it will certainly and constantly erode their freedom of operation. Nation-states will become more and more akin to police forces mainly geared to guarantee freedom of operation to international capital in their respective territories. In this sense "nation-states will continue as agents of corporate capital."²⁷

Bangladesh is no exception. Its integration within the global markets in the last two decades has provided Bangladesh with a degree of visibility on the international scene. At the same time, this integration has come with the loss of independent policy making and at the cost of a stricter control on its population at home. Three examples will bear this out. Computer technology and cellular telephony has made it possible for the government to put under surveillance a population of more than 140 million people.²⁸ The government's ongoing effort to provide all its citizens with Identification Cards and the re-registration drive of all cellular SIM (i.e. subscriber identification module) cards sold before February 2002 with passport size photographs and thumb impression, are cases in point. The very declaration of the state of emergency (January 11, 2007), still in place at the time of writing this paper, can be seen in this line of thought. It is certainly significant that the state of emergency was gladly acknowledged by the international community beyond and above its rhetoric of democratic values and freedoms.

Yet, the costs of globalization, still unforeseeable in their full extent, are being paid by Bangladesh at the socio-cultural level. As mentioned above the greatest benefit Bangladesh reaped in its drive towards a rapid industrialisation occurred in the field of employment. Around two million people in fact find employment in the garments industry alone. Most of these are women, in the same way as most of the people employed in

25. See Z. Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). For the erosion of nation-states' prerogatives see particularly pp. 55-76.

26. G. Arrighi, *Globalization, State Sovereignty, and the "Endless" accumulation of Capital*, *op. cit.*, 10.

27. M. Rahman and R. West, "Context and Trends of Globalization in Bangladesh: Towards a Critical Research Agenda," *op. cit.*, 9.

28. Obviously, this refers to a trend, something which has just started and whose extent does not compare in the least with the kind of societal control and policing put up by so called Western advanced democratic states.

the seafood industry are. This is causing radical changes at the level of social structure and relations. In an agricultural society, traditionally conservative and patriarchal like Bangladesh, the massive movement of women outside their traditionally sanctioned roles of housewives and child bearers is creating havoc. On the one hand, for some this becomes a sign of women's empowerment, a way to recover their freedom and a due place in society;²⁹ on the other, this is interpreted by others as social disruption, loss of traditional values, corruption of morals etc.³⁰ In all cases, the employment opportunities opened up by globalization, for both men and women are creating commoditisation of labour over and against the traditional non-wage labour ethics of agricultural production. What is more, employment opportunities lure small farmers and petty landholders to try their luck in industrial plants thus crowding cities and towns and basically swelling the number of unemployed or underemployed people. Even the hard currency earned by Bangladeshi workers abroad does not come without a heavy human cost. Bangladeshis often must go through unbearable hardships while working in foreign countries. Racial discrimination, sub-human conditions of life, exploitation by unscrupulous employers, persecution by law enforcers are some of the situations most Bangladeshis abroad have to endure.³¹ It is not by chance that usually this kind of migration is short-lived, covering normally between 2 to 5 years at most. The stories of many returnees are not always joyful and these too contribute to the creation of a sense of alienation that being Bangladeshi sometimes might imply.

All these phenomena considered together, are affecting the family structure (from extended to nuclear), are increasing the violence, domestic and other, against women and are generally posing a threat to social security and stability. This situation of insecurity is magnified by other aspects of globalization not yet touched upon here. The spread of computers and internet connections and particularly the widespread use of satellite television which has infiltrated even the remotest corners of Bangladesh, contribute to quicken and deepen a process of cultural transformation already set in motion by economic forces. Against the belief and the accusation that Western television channels are invading Bangladesh destroying its culture and replacing it with Western cultural models, it is Indian channels in particular that people constantly watch. And it could not be otherwise: India is culturally akin to Bangladesh, and thus its programmes readily understandable and absorbable by its people. The floods of images and correlated ideologies that they transmit contribute to the creation of a sense of frustration that ordinary Bangladeshis might experience when confronting the glittering and dream-like reality of television and their own dispirited economic condition.

29. See for instance F. A. Chowdhury, "The Bangladeshi Women: Globalization and Modernisation." *The Independent*. March 28, 2008.

30. See for instance A. T. M. Abdullahel Shafi, *Globalization and the Constraints to Development of Third World: Lessons Learned from Bangladesh Society* (Dhaka University, 2006). Unpublished manuscript.

31. Local media often deal with the plight of migrant workers. See for instance, Staff Correspondent, "700 Bangladeshi workers unpaid for six months," *The Daily Star*, June 28, 2008.

But globalization has yet another ugly face to be considered here. For the last couple of years, the world has been going through a deepening food crisis. The situation was and is so difficult that in April the head of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, called an emergency meeting in which among other things he urged “countries to provide the minimum 500 million dollars immediately sought by the World Food Program in the mounting food crisis.”³² In one year alone food prices have globally shot up by 40%. This has caused immense suffering to the world’s poor. While this trend has affected even the developed world, the fact remains that while a family in the US or in the EU spends between 10 to 20% of its budget on food, in the developing world this percentages rise to 60–90%. The food crisis, apparently, has been determined by a demand which is higher than the actual supply. A number of structural factors are to blame.

An improvement in the diet of countries like China, India, Indonesia³³ who now require more food than they used to; a constant increase of oil and fertilizer prices which has triggered a domino effect on the costs of agricultural production etc. But there are other factors less structural and more political in nature. In many countries, particularly in the developing ones, large stretches of land have been switched to produce export-oriented cash crops instead of staple food for local consumption. What is more, the ever increasing price of oil is determining a huge increase in the demand for bio-fuel. Large areas both in developed and developing countries are been taken up by bio-mass production. Take for instance the USA: in 2007, one third of US corn production has been eaten up by bio-fuel production. And if we consider that 54% of world corn is produced in the USA, these are staggering figures.³⁴ Jean Ziegler, the UN special rapporteur on the right to food, said that what we are witnessing nowadays is “a silent mass homicide,” accusing globalization and the West for it.³⁵

Bangladesh has been hard hit by this global food crisis.³⁶ To make things worse extensive flooding and a devastating cyclone in 2007 compounded the problem. So much so that the government had to sell rice at subsidised prices at special outlets around the country to meet the demand of the poorer section of society. So far Bangladesh has not been involved in the production of bio-fuel but the argument has recently been gaining space and interest in the local media.³⁷ Indeed there is a piece of disturbing news which refers to the possibility of Japanese giant Honda Denki Co. Ltd. to invest 1 billion us dol-

32. AFP, “World Bank to Meet as Rising Food Prices Spark Unrest.” (April 13, 2008). At <http://business.maktoob.com/NewsDetails-20070423147912-World_Bank_to_meet_as_rising_food_prices_spark_unrest.htm>.

33. A diet based on meat requires 5 times the area needed for a diet based on cereals.

34. See A. McMullen, “Forget Oil. The New Global Crisis is Food,” *Financial Post*, January 7, 2008.

35. Staff Reporter, “L’ONU: l’aumento dei prezzi del cibo ‘è un silenzioso omicidio di massa’.” *Corriere Della Sera*, April 21, 2008.

36. See Staff Reporter, “In Bangladesh a 2 kg Bag of Rice Consumes a Family’s Half of Daily Income,” *The Daily Star*, April 12, 2008.

37. See for instance A. Baten, “In Praise of Bio-Fuel,” *The Daily Star*, May 11, 2008. B. Dawla, “Biofuel Production Hits Food Security?” *The Daily Star*, April 22, 2008.

lars in the Bangladesh bio-fuels and sugar sectors.³⁸ It is hoped that if this proposal comes to realisation, it will not be at the expense of local food consumption.

Indeed, apart from intervening during natural disasters to offset the consequent food problem, there is nothing much else the Bangladesh government can do to offset the global food shortage. The only thing left to it is to subsidise, as it actually did, the selling of staple food to the poor and in so doing depleting the hard-earned currency needed to fire up the country's development programme. And this is globalization. The frustration referred to above cannot but be deepened by a sense of helplessness in front of a global situation just beyond the grasp of 140 million people. It is at this level that globalization unites as much as it divides, interconnects as much as it disconnects and it de-territorializes in as much as it localises issues.

As reminded above, it is not a question of being against or in favour of globalization. The issue is to try and make it work for the well-being of humankind. "We believe that the truly and relevant policy questions today are about who benefits and who does not; how the benefits and the costs of these processes can be shared fairly; how the opportunities can be maximized by all; and how the risk can be minimized."³⁹ A short cut solution to globalization's contradictions would be to institutionalise emergency help⁴⁰ as a normal way to offset globalization's often nefarious consequences around the world. This would not solve problems though, but in the long run, deepen and complicate them further. For a start, better global governance is needed to face globalization challenges. Yet, better global governance will not be able to achieve much if it does not first try "to de-link consumption from growth, and growth from development."⁴¹ Easier said than done, but peace and the survival of mankind may just depend on it.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BAUMAN, Zygmunt

1998 *Globalization: The Human Consequences*. New York: Columbia University Press.

AFP

2008 "World Bank to Meet as Rising Food Prices Spark Unrest." <http://business.maktoob.com/NewsDetails-20070423147912-World_Bank_to_meet_as_rising_food_prices_spark_unrest.htm>.

38. Biopact Web Site, "Japanese Company to Invest us \$ 1 Billion in Bangladesh Biofuels and Sugar Sector (*sic*). At <<http://biopact.com/2007/07/japanese-company-to-invest-us1-billion.html>>.

39. A. Najam, D. Runnalls and M. Halle, *Environment and Globalization: Five Propositions*. (Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2007), 5.

40. See for instance the \$ 500 million requested by the WB above to offset food shortages.

41. A. Najam, D. Runnalls and M. Halle, *Environment and Globalization: Five Propositions, op. cit.*, 22.

ARRIGHI, Giovanni

- 1997 *Globalization, State Sovereignty, and the “Endless” Accumulation of Capital*. Revised version of a paper presented at the Conference on “States and Sovereignty in the World Economy,” Irvine: University of California, 1–20.

ABDULLAHEL, Shafi

- 2006 *Globalization and the Constraints to Development of Third World: Lessons Learned from Bangladesh Society*. Dhaka University. Unpublished manuscript.

BANGLADESH BUREAU OF STATISTICS

- 2008 *Statistical Year Book Bangladesh 2007*. Dhaka: Bangladesh Government. At <http://www.bbs.gov.bd/dataindex/pb_wb_page.pdf>.

BATEN, Abdul

- 2008 “In Praise of Bio-Fuel.” *The Daily Star*, May 11.

BEPZA

- 2008 Official web site at <<http://www.epzbangladesh.org.bd/bepza.php?id=BEPZA-Obj>>.

BHARDWAJ, Arjun and Delwar, Hossain

- 2001 *Globalization and Multinational Corporations in South Asia: Towards Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development*. Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCCS). Policy Studies 20.

BIOPACT WEB SITE

- 2007 “Japanese Company to Invest us \$ 1 Billion in Bangladesh Biofuels and Sugar Sector.” At <<http://biopact.com/2007/07/japanese-company-to-invest-us1-billion.html>>.

BOARD OF INVESTMENT

- 2006 “FDI in Bangladesh in 2006.” Dhaka: Bangladesh Government. At <www.boi.gov.bd>.
2005 “FDI in Bangladesh in 2005.” Dhaka: Bangladesh Government. At <www.boi.gov.bd>.

CHOWDHURY, Fariha Akhter

- 2008 “The Bangladeshi Women: Globalization and modernisation.” *The Independent*, March 28.

DAWLA, Bayezid

- 2008 “Biofuel Production Hits Food Security?” *The Daily Star*, April 22.

IMF

- 2007 “IMF Country Report 07/229.” At <<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cro7229.pdf>>.

INDA, Jonathan Xavier and Rosaldo, Renato eds.

- 2002 *The Anthropology of Globalization: Reader*. London: Blackwell Publishers.

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE

- 2006 *International Labour Migration and Development: The ILO Perspective*. 61st General Assembly, New York 14–15 September 2006. <<http://www.solidarnos.org.pl/migracje/dokumenty/ilo/dokumenty/ILO%20Intern%20Migr%20Perspectives%202006.pdf>>.

KHAN JASIM, Uddin

- 2008 “Export Zone Strike Ban Extended for Two Years.” *The Daily Star*, April 20.
2008 “Record Levels of Foreign Investment in EPZs.” *The Daily Star*, April 1.

McMULLEN, Alia

2008 “Forget Oil. The New Global Crisis is Food.” *Financial Post*, January 7.

NAJAM, Adil, Runnalls, David, and Halle, Mark

2007 *Environment and Globalization: Five Propositions*. Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development.

RAHMAN, Atiur

2004 “Why FDI is Not Flowing into Bangladesh?” *The Daily Star*, January 30.

RAHMAN, Matiur and West, Raymond

2003 “Context and Trends of Globalization in Bangladesh: Towards a Critical Research Agenda.” M. Rahman ed., *Globalization, Environmental Crisis and Social Change in Bangladesh*. Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 3–32.

ROTHKOPF, David

2008 “The Superclass and the Inequity of Globalization.” *The Daily Star*, May 18.

SADREL, Reza and Rashid, M. A.

1997 “Foreign Direct Investment: Problems and Prospects,” in M. G. Quibria ed. *Bangladesh Economy in Transition*. Dhaka: The University Press.

SIDDIQUI, Tasneem

2003 *Migration as a Livelihood Strategy of the Poor: The Bangladesh Case*. Paper presented at the Regional Conference on Migration, Development and Pro-Poor Policy Choices in Asia. 22–24 June 2003, Dhaka: DFDI and Dhaka University. pp. 1–23. At <http://www.livelihoods.org/hot_topics/docs/Dhaka_CP_5.pdf>.

STAFF REPORTER

2008 “L’ONU: l’aumento dei prezzi del cibo ‘è un silenzioso omicidio di massa’”. *Corriere della Sera*, April 21.

STAFF CORRESPONDENT

2008 “700 Bangladeshi Workers Unpaid for Six Months.” *The Daily Star*, June 28.

2008 “In Bangladesh a 2 kg Bag of Rice Consumes a Family’s Half of Daily Income.” *The Daily Star*, April 12.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

2005 “Making Globalization Work for Bangladesh.” Speech delivered on 12–12–2005, Dhaka. At <<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/speeches/globalization-bangladesh.asp>>.

UNCTAD

2007 *World Investment Report 2007*. New York and Geneva: United Nations Publications.

INDONESIA

MATTEO REBECCHI

Tanah Air kita”, our land and sea: this is how Indonesians call their country. More than 13000 islands spread between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, a large number of different cultures, traditions, religions and ethnic groups, a huge land stretched across 5000 Km from Aceh to Papua. Taking into account this simple data, it is easy to understand that interdependence and interrelations are not only a global, but also an internal matter and a special vocation of Indonesia, a country that has tried to harmonize its differences since its foundation, with quite positive results to some extent. It is not a coincidence that the motto chosen for the symbol country is *Bhinneka tunggal ika*, which means “unity in diversity”. The internal problem of the cultural and political unity concerned the founders of the Indonesian nation; modern globalization¹

1. A simple definition of the concept of globalization could be: “The intensification of economic ties between national economies, to a point where the horizon of economic activities and of the market coincide always more frequently with the entire world, reducing the sovereignty of individual states and creating an increas-

has delivered new problems and challenges to Indonesian society. A simple overview of Indonesian history leads us to the realization that a kind of globalization *ante litteram*² has accompanied the destiny of this country down through the centuries, with good and bad effects.

SINCE THE BEGINNINGS

Anthropologists think that the first groups to give birth to the Malay race reached the Archipelago during the Mesolithic era from two different origins: the first one came down from today's Vietnam and Southern China, whilst the other one arrived via Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. The result of the encounter between the local and incoming races gave birth to the Austronesian race, which became dominant in the whole Archipelago.³

It has also been shown that the Chinese Dongson culture became the starting point for the spreading of the bronze and iron culture in Indonesia (sixth century BC), showing how intense the relationships were between the Archipelago and the continental land.⁴

The first Sanskrit epigraphs, possibly dated to the fifth century BC, were found in Kalimantan, showing that Hindu-Buddhist culture, most probably imported straightaway from India, had already started its influence in Indonesia. The Hindu-Buddhist period (fifth century BC–fifteenth century AD) produced significant evolution in culture, leaving some of the greatest monuments still visible in Indonesia,⁵ and giving birth to great kingdoms, such as the Hindu Tarumanagara (fifth–sixth century) in Java; the Buddhist Sriwijaya⁶ (seventh–fourteenth century) in Sumatra, controlling trading routes within Indonesia, India and China; and the most shining and magnificent: the Majapahit (1293–1528) which became the highest point of Indonesian supremacy in South East Asia. The anthropologist Mulder asserts that “to protect its commerce, or just fired by the imperialistic drive, the kingdom was, for a while, able to impose its sway over vast tracts of maritime Southeast Asia. This fact is still celebrated in current Indonesian historiography,

ing interdependence among nations”, in A. Ferrucci, *For a Global Agreement Towards a United World, Genoa Declaration* (Roma: Città Nuova Editrice, 2001), 30.

2. There is not convergence of opinions on globalization's chronology. It is commonly said that globalization is a recent phenomenon started in the 80s. Nevertheless some scholars make it start much earlier: Manfred Steger asserts that “globalization is as old as humanity itself”; see A. G. Reception, *God's Global Household, a Theology of Mission in the Context of Globalization* (Naga City: Agnus Press, 2007), 9.

3. Cf. R. Soekmono, *Pengantar Sejarah Kebudayaan Indonesia*. Vol. 1. (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1973), 44–61.

4. *Ibid.*, 69–71. Soekmono comes to the conclusion that most probably the main migrations from the North were two, the first during the Mesolithic era (2000 BC), the second around the VI century during the Bronze era.

5. Some of the monuments left by Hindu and Buddhist culture are the magnificent Dieng Temple (ninth century), Borobudur (counting 505 Buddha's statues, 4 Km of relief walls telling the story of Buddha, and considered the biggest Buddhist monument in the world), and Prambanang Temple (ninth century). Cf. R. Soekmono, *Pengantar Sejarah Kebudayaan Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, 44–46; 80–123.

6. Chinese Buddhist book *I-tsing* reports of a monk who stopped over in Sriwijaya kingdom with the purpose of studying Sanskrit language before moving to India for further religious studies, showing that Sriwijaya was considered an important center of Buddhist world. Cf. R. Soekmono, *Pengantar Sejarah Kebudayaan Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, 38.

which declares Majapahit to be the predecessor state of the present united archipelagic Republic.⁷⁷ There is evidence that the first Arabs reached Aceh during the seventh–eighth century, but only in the thirteenth century did traders from India develop their business in the Archipelago and introduce Islam, which lately would be able to take over the Hindu-Buddhist culture. The Islamic influence started along coasts and harbor cities, but since the seventeenth century it penetrated interior lands too. In the sixteenth century Bahasa Melayu, the Malay language, which would become the Indonesian Language in modern times, was already well known and considered the *lingua franca* for commerce in the area.⁸

For those reasons, the area was already experiencing a sort of cultural unity when the first European ships (the Portuguese first and then the Dutch), reached the area. It is undeniable that they did not find a politically united land under the sway of a large empire because the archipelago was still constituted by small kingdoms. Nevertheless, according to Hefner, the Malay-Indonesia was already a pluralistic center and a meeting point of civilizations, a kind of crossover of cultures, religions and goods.⁹

It was foreign interests, control of trade in the area and greed for Indonesian richness that pushed the Netherlands to start and keep their influence in the Archipelago. It must also be added that in some way the political unification realized under colonial power made its contribution towards the growth of the sense of national identity from Aceh to Papua. Nevertheless, because of the reasons mentioned previously, according to Hefner, the colony was not the first and the main factor of unification across the Archipelago, which was already in some way tied by commercial and cultural links, even if it had not yet found political unity.

On the contrary, Holland's rulers, also because of implementation of a *divide et impera* policy, mostly were unable to promote harmony and pluralism in the area. This happened especially with respect to the relationship between the Chinese and the local Malay people, the so called *pribumi*. By entrusting the Chinese with special deals in agriculture and giving them privileges, the Malay people became more and more aware of their identity and anti-Chinese feeling increased and resulted, after Independence, in discriminative measures against the Chinese.¹⁰

Unlike Great Britain's colonial policy in Malaysia, after the Diponegoro rebellion in Java (1825–1830), the Dutch power did not rely on local aristocracy for ruling the colony, except in Bali. Colonial power got close to traditional Islamic schools (*pesantren*) instead,

7. N. Mulder, *Mysticism in Java, Ideology in Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2005), 76.

8. The Islam imported from India was influenced by Sufism, which is a kind of Islam oriented to mysticism. For this reason the penetration of Islam in Indonesia took place, all in all, in a peaceful way. It is believed that Islam has been brought to Indonesia also by Chinese traders, especially in Java. Cf. R. Soekmono, *Pengantar Sejarah Kebudayaan Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, 43 and R.W. Hefner, ed., *Politik Multikulturalisme, Menggugat realitas kebangsaan* (Yogyakarta Impulse-Kanisius, 2007), 30–32; 38.

9. R.W. Hefner, *Politik Multikulturalisme, Menggugat realitas kebangsaan*, *op. cit.*, 34.

10. *Ibid.*, 39; 51–54. The presence of the Chinese in Indonesia has a long story, but the migration has significantly increased since the nineteenth century.

which were considered less dangerous and less frightening regarding freedom and nationalistic issues. As a matter of fact, after Independence, sultanates had already lost most of their power and moral authority, except the one in Yogyakarta which played an important role in the struggle for freedom.¹¹

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the policy of colonial power made the choice of a more ethical system of governance, the so called “*etische politiek*.”¹² One of the main points was the attempt to increase access to Western education, which brought to the surface new ideas and dreams of democracy and freedom. In 1908, a group of medical students in Java founded the *Boedi Oetomo* group, which is still remembered and celebrated as *Hari Kebangkitan Nasional* (National Rising Day).

In 1928 the *Sumpah Pemuda* (Youth Oath) took place at a meeting of young intellectuals, which gave the first shape to national unity by stating three points: one nation, one people and one language, namely *Bahasa Indonesia*, that basically is the Malay language spoken in Riau, Central Sumatra. Actually, at that time, the most wide-spread language in the whole Archipelago was Javanese, but the choice fell on Malay, which was supposed to become the instrument of national unity: Malay was the spoken language of traders in the whole Archipelago, and, as the *lingua franca*, it would have not expressed a particular ethnic identity, thereby avoiding the danger of supremacy of one ethnic group over the others.¹³

AFTER THE COLONY. THE PANCASILA

Independence was declared by president Soukarno on August 17, 1945 when Indonesia was under the sway of an exhausted Japan, which had taken power in Indonesia during World War II, but very soon the fight for freedom erupted once again against Holland which tried, for the last time and without success, to re-conquer its former colony.

The ideological foundations of the new born nation were collected in the Pancasila principles,¹⁴ namely the foundations of the Indonesian Constitutions. Since the struggle for independence needed the contribution of any element of Indonesian society, Pancasila expressed an inclusive and pluralist ideology, avoiding any kind of religious or ethnic discrimination.¹⁵ Even the attempt to create an Islamic state failed, in favor of a more pluralistic vision of Indonesian society. Five main religions were approved by law, namely Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Christian Protestant Churches and the Catholic Church.¹⁶

11. *Ibid.*, 49–51.

12. R. Soekmono, *Pengantar Sejarah Kebudayaan Indonesia*, vol. 3, *op. cit.*, 115–16.

13. I. Kleden, “Bersumpahlah untuk Indonesia.” *Tempo*, November 2, 2008, 68–9.

14. In brief the Pancasila points are: belief in one supreme God; humanitarianism; nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia; consultative democracy; and social justice.

15. R.W. Hefner, *Politik Multikulturalisme, Menggugat realitas kebangsaan*, *op. cit.*, 54.

16. Traditional religions were formally not allowed anymore and their worshippers were compelled to choose one of the authorized religions, even though traditional beliefs, rites and ceremonies have not been concretely forbidden.

In his study on Javanese mysticism, Niels Mulder shows how the Pancasila is well rooted in the Javanese spiritual tradition of *Kebatinan* (Javanese mysticism), which is a system of values that tends towards the construction of cosmic harmony, which must reflect itself in a civilized society. Moreover, Soukarno and also his successor Suharto, were able to make the Pancasila one of the main points of their propaganda in order to strengthen national unity, mostly by means of education in schools and political indoctrination, according to the intention to create a sort of javanization of the country.¹⁷ In any case, Mulder attests that, all in all, the “Pancasila was a great invention. Along with the mandatory Flag, Anthem, Constitution, Declaration of Independence, and stories of resistance, it has evolved into the prime emblem of the nation... As such the invention of the Pancasila was felicitous: it became an effective tool for nation building and, sometimes, the envy of certain fellow Southeast Asians who are conscious of not being in possession of such a powerful myth of nationhood”¹⁸

On the basis of the Pancasila, democracy began to be implemented, but since the '50s the separatist movement was raised in Sumatra, Northern Sulawesi, Southern Sulawesi and Eastern Java. In order to avoid the disintegration of the Nation, the Government moved towards a more centralistic policy, the so called *Demokrasi Terpimpin* (Guided Democracy), which lasted until 1965. Separatism groups were back under control, but disintegration was still threatening national unity.

In order to keep his power, Soukarno tried to divide Islamic groups, the army and communists. This policy brought about discontent, disorders and rebellions. Chinese groups, labeled as communist supporters, were attacked in Bandung in 1963. After a tentative *coup d'état* in 1965, during the following repression, some 500.000 (but maybe more) people, alleged to be communist, were killed in only 10 months. These facts demonstrate on their own that Pancasila's ideals of unity were still threatened by divisions inside the country. The events of 1965, which have still not been completely clarified, gave General Suharto the opportunity to seize power and become president. Power was handed over through a letter, the so called *Supersemar*, which has never been found, but gave formal legitimacy to Suharto.

Suharto's government tried to keep the country united by exalting the idea of *kebhinnekaan*, harmony in diversity. He made all kinds of efforts to reduce, or even cancel, differences and any form of dissent. All activities which were thought to be potential threats against national unity were banned, namely social or political activities with a

17. See N. Mulder, *Mysticism in Java, Ideology in Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, 93–123. On the function of Pancasila as a tool of unity across the archipelago the author states: “There is little ‘natural’ about the unity of the far-flung archipelago. According to the founding father, it was the deep-seated desire to be together, a wish born from the suffering of colonization that bound the various populations together. What they shared, what they had in common, had largely to be invented. Indonesian culture would consist of the best each local ethnic group had to offer, which means that it was thought to be an amalgam, a composition. Yet, there must also be an underlying commonality. It was the Soukarno's genius to formulate the Pancasila, and to make people believe that it was its five principles they shared—since time immemorial,” 93–4.

18. *Ibid.*, 124.

religious, ethnic, tribal or group membership (the so called SARA activities). Dissidents were arrested or even killed, and many tragic events that happened during the Suharto regime are still waiting to be clarified. Special organs of propaganda were set up for the indoctrination of the Pancasila and any values were considered useful for the purpose of strengthening national unity and the regime.

Before the second half of the '90s Suharto never appeared as a devout Muslim, but as a *kebatinan* worshipper instead. Only at the end of his regime did he try to get close to Islamic groups, which were supposed to support him against pro-democracy movements.¹⁹ The financial crisis in 1997 triggered demonstrations in Indonesia in which students were calling for reform. Some of them were kidnapped, most probably by members of special corps of the army, and never seen again.²⁰ Students kept on demonstrating in several universities in Jakarta and other main cities. After the killing of 4 students in Trisakti University, in Jakarta, on May 12, 1998, mass protest could no longer be prevented. Disorder exploded in Jakarta and other main cities: shops were set on fire, hundreds of people lost their lives and 4000 buildings were seriously damaged. During the riots, Chinese women were gang raped, most probably with the connivance of the Army, which at any rate did little to avoid the disorder.²¹ Finally, after ruling the nation for more than 30 years, Suharto resigned on May 21, 1998.

Unfortunately, the fall of Suharto did not put an end to the violence, thereby showing that the differences among ethnic, political and religious groups were still far from the goal of harmony and mutual respect. Most of these tragedies were triggered by trivial events, they were most probably created on purpose, and resulted in mass killings and persecutions.²² Moreover, these events show that even Suharto's strong power was unable to find wise and long lasting solutions in this respect.

GLOBALIZATION TODAY

The Asian financial crisis of 1997 badly damaged the Indonesian economy and proved to be one of the causes of Suharto's fall. Indonesia, one of the Asian Tigers, was threatened with bankruptcy, and unable to react and recover quickly, revealing its weakness and vulnerability. During the '80s, Suharto's government started a new-liberal program

19. See R.W. Hefner, *Politik Multikulturalisme, Menggugat realitas kebangsaan, op. cit.*, 60; 480; cf. also "Soedjono dan 'Orde Dhawah'", *Tempo*, February 10, 2008, 97-100.

20. For these kidnappings strong allegations are addressed to Gen. Prabowo, by that time in charge of Army Special Corps, and son in law of the president. Cf. Hefner, *op. cit.*, 481-82. For an overview of Suharto's fall events see also *Tempo*, February 4-10, 2008, 36-47; 86-92.

21. R.W. Hefner, *Politik Multikulturalisme, Menggugat realitas kebangsaan, op. cit.*, 482-83.

22. *Ibid.*, 487-92. This happened in Banyuwangi among different Islamic groups, where some hundreds people died; in Jakarta (Jl. Ketapang) among Christians and Muslims, where some people were killed and others wounded, in Moluccas ('99), where 5000 people were killed; in Kalimantan among ethnic groups of Dayaks and Madura; conflicts in Aceh and Papua, where most of the Army members are Javanese; the war in East Timor after the referendum in 1999.

under pressure from organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Bank (WB). Along with this new policy, it implemented political actions in accordance with the new-liberal theory of the free market, with some modifications, so that it would still be under the control of the government.²³ Consequently, Indonesia's borders became more open to the globalized world of the free market. The results were to some degree positive, though some contradictions and unsolved problems remained.

Here we can only give some examples of those implementations. In 1998 the IMF imposed the removal of taxation on rice (but also on corn, soya and wheat flour...) importation as an act of deregulation, so that prices would be determined by the free market. Huge amounts of rice were imported, surpassing the real needs of the country and causing a dramatic reduction in the price of rice. Another example is the privatization of Jakarta's Water Company, which took place in 1994 under the instructions of the president, so that the absolute monopoly of the water supply for a city with 12 million inhabitants fell in the hands of two foreign companies for the following 25 years.²⁴

It is already clear that this new-liberal program gave the opportunity to Suharto's entourage and family to exert more control and exploit the national economy: most of the largest infrastructural projects were entrusted to companies that had some connections to Suharto's family. Perhaps also because of the bad examples given by government officials, corruption has become so common that Indonesia is now numbered among the most corrupt Nations in the world.

The director of the Institute for Global Justice in Jakarta, Bonnie Setiawan, explains some examples of the negative consequences of the mixture of new-liberal policies in Indonesia, bad governance and foreign influences and interests. One of these he calls the "biggest Central Bank monetary scandal in the world:"²⁵ under the proposal of the IMF the Bank of Indonesia granted credit (BLBI) to banks under government guarantee. The result was that the insolvency of 48 banks laid an enormous burden on the national budget. Bonnie Setiawan points out that this unwise decision was most probably the effect

23. For an overview of neo-liberal theories and their effects on Indonesian economy, see B. Setiawan, "Globalisasi dan pengaruhnya terhadap ekonomi Indonesia dan kritiknya," <<http://www.icrp-online.org/wmview.php?ArtID=170>>. The author speaks of the main points which New-liberal economic theories try to achieve, namely: free market (deregulation), free mobility of capitals (liberalization) and free investments (privatization). According to Bonnie Setiawan new-liberal economic theories—elaborated by Von Hayek and Milton Friedman, since the '80s—became the strategic option of transnational organizations, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization, which, since then, imposed those policies along with their developing countries supporting programs. New-liberal economy relies on the idea that free market, with its intrinsic rules, is the main and most efficient instrument of regulation of the economy, and therefore the most reliable engine of development and solution for social problems. For this reason State interventions should be kept at a minimum, except for supporting implementation of a new-liberal economy. See also F. Flavio, "Mercato e globalizzazione," *Zenith*, 22 May, 2008.

24. Cf. Setiawan, "Globalisasi dan pengaruhnya terhadap ekonomi Indonesia dan kritiknya," *op. cit.* The author remarks that privatization of a public utility company is against the Constitution (UU 45, art. 33).

25. *Ibidem.*

of bad governance and collusion between the government and the Bank of Indonesia's officials, but not only that. In this and in other cases, it was not only an internal matter, but also the consequence of an undeniable involvement of the IMF.

If we take a more general look at today's situation after the '97 crisis, there are already signs of recovery and we hope that the new world financial crisis will not cause a regression to former levels. Recent World Bank statistics seems to show that, after the crisis which followed a period of remarkable economic growth, "Indonesia has started to regain its footing"²⁶ again and poverty has been brought back to a pre-crisis level. Nevertheless, this still means that "about 40 million people are living below the national poverty line". Moreover, the "national poverty rate masks the large number of people who live just above the national poverty line. Close to 42 percent of all Indonesians live between the US \$1 and US \$2-a-day poverty lines"²⁷ so that a large amount of Indonesians are still vulnerable to poverty. Moreover, the World Bank data points out that achievements in social welfare do not seem to be well distributed across the Archipelago, resulting in different rates of growth within Indonesia. By way of example, the poverty rate in Bali-Java is 15.7%, whilst in Papua it stands at 38.7%. If we look at the map of poverty, we can easily see that it is much higher in Eastern Indonesia and in the more remote areas.²⁸

The unbalanced distribution of wealth, along with the dream of the city paradise brought to the masses by the media, is driving the poor towards the large cities, especially Jakarta, creating new kinds of poverty that are still waiting for solutions. Besides human degradation and poverty, urbanization forces people to leave behind their local cultures, traditional lifestyle and the atmosphere of the enlarged family formerly experienced in villages, that is, all those invisible but essential values that are connected with human relationships. The economist Benedetto Gui says that "by looking through economics' spectacles today one doesn't see these as values. Consequently, our economic choices disregard, or worse, destroy perhaps by merely trying to achieve small improvements in terms of those other goods, those that we can easily measure."²⁹

At the end of this paper, we may say that globalization has not only consequences on social matters and the economy, but that it affects the natural environment too. The 2007 UN Bali Conference on Climate Changes pointed out that Indonesia could face the problems of deforestation, illegal wood trading and CO² emissions as a result of setting forests on fire to clear land for commercial plantations. Furthermore, Indonesia is currently struggling in its development, therefore most of the expensive ecological measures

26. The World Bank Office Jakarta, *Making the New Indonesia Work for the Poor. Overview* (Jakarta, 2006), 9.

27. *Ibid.*, 9–10.

28. *Ibid.*, 12. Some scholars speak of *glocalization* on account of that unbalanced concentration of freedom, capital and resources, which comes along with globalization. The result is that some areas are globalized whilst others, the localized ones, have limited access to the same chances. Cf. Z. Bauman, *Globalization, the Human Consequences* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1998), 70.

29. B. Gui, "Five Questions about Globalization," A. Ferrucci, *For a Global Agreement Towards a United World, Genoa Declaration, op. cit.*, 46.

to prevent pollution seem difficult, if not impossible, to implement because their cost is beyond the means of factories. Moreover, the government has already planned its nuclear energy program in order to deal with the global and internal energetic crisis, even though Indonesia is not really experiencing a shortage in natural resources. Nevertheless, in addition to other concerns, many people are not so optimistic about the advisability of building nuclear stations in a land that is very prone to powerful earthquakes.

In the field of Biotechnology, Indonesia has already opened its doors to genetically modified crops.³⁰ Besides the fact that it has as yet to be shown that these organisms are absolutely safe for human health, this issue also has an economic and social importance. Will Indonesian farmers one day be forced to plant only genetically modified rice produced by an American Transnational Company and use the same company's pesticide, which is suitable only for that kind of rice? Furthermore, what will be the destiny of the weaker and less productive local varieties and genotypes, when compared to the ones produced by a Transnational Company such as the American Monsanto?

CONCLUSION

Drawing some conclusions from what has been said so far, we could point out that, since its beginnings, Indonesia has been a cross-roads of cultures, religions and trades, almost as if it had a special vocation in the field of pluralism and a certain harmony among differences, both inside and outside its borders. This original pluralism shows that, since the beginning, a form of globalization *ante litteram* has been experienced in this South East Asian area, which since then has had to deal with influences, both positive and negative, from abroad. For these reasons, the colonial power, even though it did manage to contribute somehow to the creation of national identity and political unity across the country, was not the main driving force behind ethnic and cultural unification; on the contrary, colonial power directly caused divisions among some ethnic groups in the Archipelago.

After independence, Pancasila became the main instrument of unification of the Indonesian people. Pancasila can be seen as a product of Javanese culture, but the rulers of the newly founded Republic were able to transform it into a shared ideology across the whole country, even though the aim of a real *kebhinnekaan* (harmony among differences) was far from being fully accomplished.

Today, globalization and the new-liberal economic policies are giving good results along with the limits of blind trust in a global free-market, even though this system seems to have become the only international yardstick used to measure economic progress and social development. Nevertheless, it seems that globalization cannot be avoided, halted, or even slowed down and, therefore, we should take advantage of it. All problems already have a global dimension and call for global solutions. As the economist Benedetto Gui points out, "it is necessary to clear the field of ideological debate for or against markets

30. B. Setiawan, "Globalisasi dan pengaruhnya terhadap ekonomi Indonesia dan kritiknya," *op. cit.*

and concentrate in making sure that the on-going transformation processes truly uphold the needs of everyone, starting from the poor.”³¹

In today’s globalization, as well as in the implementation of the Pancasila ideology during Indonesian history, it seems there is still something missing, namely, the idea of fraternity as the aim and ideal environment in which politic and economic strategies can create not only a globalized world, but a real globalized family, in which everyone is important and distinct, but also interdependent on others.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BAUMAN, Zygmunt

1998 *Globalization. The Human Consequences*. New York: Columbia University Press.

BONNIE, Setiawan

2006 “Globalisasi dan pengaruhnya terhadap ekonomi Indonesia dan kritiknya.” At <<http://www.icrp-online.org/wmview.php?ArtID=170>>.

FELICE, Flavio,

2008 “Mercato e globalizzazione,” *Zenith*, 22 May.

FERRUCCI, Alberto, ed.

2001 *For a Global Agreement Towards a United World, Genoa Declaration*. Roma: Città Nuova Editrice.

HEFNER, Robert W., ed.

2007 *Politik Multikulturalisme, Menggugat realitas kebangsaan*. Yogyakarta: Impulse-Kanisius. (Trans. by H. Bernardus *The Politics of Multiculturalism, Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia*. Honolulu: Hawai’i Press, 2001).

KLEDEN, Ignas

2008 “Bersumpahlah untuk Indonesia,” *Tempo*, 2 November.

MULDER, Niels

2005 *Mysticism in Java, Ideology in Indonesia*. Yogyakarta: Kanisius.

RECEPCION, Andrew Gimenez

2007 *God’s Global Household, a Theology of Mission in the Context of Globalization*. Naga City: Agnus Press.

SOEKMONO, R.

2008 “Edisi khusus Soeharto, Setelah dia Pergi,” *Tempo*, 4–10 February.

2008 “Edisi Khusus Kebankitan Nasional 1908–2008,” *Tempo*, 19–25 May.

1973 *Pengantar Sejarah Kebudayaan Indonesia*. Yogyakarta: Kanisius.

WORLD BANK OFFICE JAKARTA

2006 *Making the New Indonesia Work for the Poor. Overview*. Jakarta.

31. B. Gui, “Five Questions about Globalization”, *op. cit.*, 40–2.

The phenomenon of globalization is marked by a loosening of the cultural, temporal, economic, and political barriers that separate countries from one another and an increase in relationships on all fronts. Given its special history of international relations, the way globalization is viewed in Japan is somewhat peculiar. On the one hand, it seems fair to say that since modern times Japan fostered an attitude of profound sympathy, curiosity, and receptivity towards the scientific discoveries, political systems, religious practices, linguistic patterns, economic principles, and intellectual orientations of other countries. On the other hand, it is also true that Japan has exhibited a degree of refusal and rejection, of xenophobia and intolerance that is not always easy to reconcile with its generally welcoming attitude. It is as if novelty and diversity are acceptable only to the degree that they can be filtered and modified—at times, even transformed beyond recognition—to conform with Japan's own worldview. Opposition to things strange and unorthodox seems to occur whenever the perception is that the alien

and the unknown could irreparably upset national identity or the supposed homogeneity of its culture and spirit.¹ This swing of attitudes between embracing and excluding anything and anyone that is “other” than itself is crucial for understanding, or at least trying to understand, Japan’s present-day relations to the tidal wave of globalization that have been washing across economies, cultures, and societies of the world.

In the pre-modern period Japan first adopted a deliberate policy of refusing foreign influence. Many bureaucrats of the Tokugawa era (1603–1898) were aware of the need to yield to the mounting pressures by Western powers to open itself up to international markets and to the military, cultural, and religious influences of the world at large. Aware of the threat this posed to national security but at the same time sensing their own impotence to stop the process, the shoguns opted for isolationism, turning Japan in effect into a “closed country” (*sakoku* 鎖国) for over two centuries.

In 1624 they expelled the Spanish and in 1638, the Portuguese. Citizens were forbidden to travel abroad without permission from the central government. In 1640, an edict was issued to expel all foreigners from Japan except for a small trading station in Nagasaki where the Dutch and Chinese were allowed limited residency and trading rights.² Many contemporary scholars think that this policy contributed to an isolationist mentality which, combined with a strong sense of exclusiveness and parochialism, left its mark not only on the country’s political and economic relations with other countries but also on the worldview and ways of thinking of individual Japanese.³

When on 8 July 1853 Admiral Matthew Perry reached the Uraga bay with four American Navy warships behind him, the commodore found a land hopelessly divided, weak, and unprepared—a pale image of the long period of peace and prosperity that had characterized Japan throughout most of its voluntary isolation. In no time the Japanese government was forced to sign peace treaties and commercial agreements resulting in the opening of the Shimoda and Hakodate harbors to the American fleets. For the first time in its history a committee of representatives from across the country decided how to conduct negotiations with the American government. At the same time, Japan was divided into two incompatible factions, each bent on clinging to its own stance. On the one side

1. As Marilyn Ivy suggests: “The image of Japan as the great assimilator arises to explain away any epistemological snags of historical confusions: Japan assimilates, if not immigrants and American automobiles, then everything else, retaining the traditional, immutable core of culture, while incorporating the shiny trappings of (post)modernity in a dizzying round of production, accumulation, and consumption.” M. Ivy, *Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 1.

2. R. Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan. Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

3. Chalmers Johnston, an expert in Japanese political economy, calls the psychological barriers to an economic internationalization “cartels of the mind”. He argues that such barriers insulate the Japanese from the outside world, preserving their traditional attitude and way of thinking (in C. Johnston, “Artificial Cartels of the Mind Justify Distrust of Japan,” *International Herald Tribune*, June 16, 1993). Mayumi Itoh seems to share this opinion in *The Globalization of Japan: Japanese Sakoku Mentality and U.S. Efforts to Open Japan* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).

were the traditionalists who rallied under the slogan “Venerate the emperor, expel the barbarians” (*sonnō jōi* 尊王攘夷), to advocate a continuation of the policy of *sakoku* and a restoration of the imperial power that for nearly a thousand years had played only a symbolic role. On the other were the reformers, who continued to support the Tokugawa regime and favored Japan’s opening (*kaikoku* 開国) to the outer world.

Ill will toward the “Southern barbarians” were common throughout the population. The casual attitudes of the foreigners in commercial dealings left the Japanese uncomfortable and numerous incidents flared up across the nation. The shoguns were strong enough to withstand the onslaught, however, and in 1867 the sixteen-year old Matsushito, later known as Meiji, ascended to the throne.

In 1868 the energetic shogun Yoshinobu Matsushito tendered his resignation, which was immediately accepted, and in that same year the emperor issued his Five Charter Oath, putting an end to the system of class stratification, encouraging the study of Western sciences, and initializing a dismantling of the power structure of the Tokugawa leadership and the feudal system itself.⁴ By this time even the fiercest opponents to Japan’s opening had realized that there was no longer any way to keep its doors shut, but they were resolved to prevent the wild kind of colonization to which China and other East Asian nations were being subjected. Japan was going to open its gates to the world, but on its own terms.

It comes as no surprise, therefore, to see the politics of the Meiji government—aptly captured in the motto “Enrich the country, strengthen the army” (*fukoku kyōhei* 富国強兵)—aimed at creating a strong and unified state, thus modifying the political, social, and economic structure of the country (all of which followed a Western pattern and concentrated chiefly on the government and the legal system), and simultaneously trying to counterbalance these foreign borrowings by insisting on the uniqueness of the Japanese spirit. The import of the famous saying, “Japanese spirit, Western sciences” (*wakon yōsai* 和魂洋才), was precisely to convince the people that it was possible to imitate and absorb from the Western world whatever was useful to the revival and consolidation of the country, all the while reassuring them that nothing would change in the way Japan perceived itself.

Fukuzawa Yukichi, one of the best known intellectuals of the Meiji period and a strong supporter of Japan’s modernization, viewed events in terms of the same phases that characterized the cultural and social evolution of the Western world: civilization, progress, and development (*bunmei kaika* 文明開化).⁵ Despite his advocacy of Western civilization,

4. For a study of this historical period, see the magisterial work by M. B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002); for a succinct presentation of the Five Charter Oath, cf. D. Keene, *Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852–1912* (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2005), 138–42.

5. By “civilization” Fukuzawa meant a nation’s linear headway toward its inevitable development: “Now, civilization is a relative thing and it has no limits. It is a gradual progression from the primitive level... It thus describes the process by which human relations gradually change for the better and take a definitive shape. It

Fukuzawa was equally concerned with achieving political and cultural independence from the West and preserving the National Essence (*kokutai* 国体), which he understood as “the grouping together of people of one race who share pleasures and pains; the creation among them of a sense of separateness from peoples of other countries; the fostering among them of warmer feelings toward one another than toward foreigners and the greater willingness to exert themselves on behalf of one another than on behalf of foreigners.”⁶

Obviously, the “peoples,” “foreigners,” or “strangers” to whom Fukuzawa referred belonged not only to the Western world. Other Asian nations as well were turned into mere territories on which Japan felt the right to exercise its mission as a “civilizing country.” Supported by the awareness of its military, economic, and spiritual superiority, the Japanese were able to defeat China (1894–1895) and take over Taiwan, thus gaining the upper hand in the control of the region, and in 1904–1905 they engaged in war with the Russians by sinking the Russian fleet. This phase of “liberal imperialism,” which was itself an imitation of the way the West justified its colonial escapades as a “civilizing mission,” continued throughout the Taishō period (1879–1926). During these years the Japanese empire expanded further into the Asian continent, earning itself official recognition as one of the great international powers of the new world order.

This display of power by Japan was perplexing to the countries of Europe and bred mistrust among the other Asian countries, feelings that grew deeper and more widespread as time went on. Not even the moderate efforts at popularizing a pan-Asian ideology (summed up in the motto “Asia is one”⁷) that portrayed Japan as an authentic champion of the Asian traditions and values, and a bulwark against the West, helped to alter the perception that the Japanese occupation and colonization were any more nobler than their European counterparts. When the last attempts at persuading the Asian nations that only a Great Japan (*dai nippon* 大日本) could save them from Western imperialism had failed, Japan did not hesitate to escalate its use of brute force and violence against its neighbors. The same ambiguity that surrounded the opening and closing of its borders—natural as well as psychological, social, and cultural—and the same attitude

is a concept of a unified nation in contrast to a state of primitive isolation and lawlessness.” In Y. Fukuzawa, *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization* (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1973), 35. This view was in accordance with the nineteenth-century Euro-centric vision of civilization, which perceived development as a unilinear progression from the non-civilized non-West to the civilized West.

6. G. Healey, “Kokutai,” in *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1983), 263.

7. The slogan belongs to the pan-Asian ideologue Okakura Kakuzo (1863-1913), who used it as the opening words of his book, *The Ideals of the East* (London: J. Murray, 1903): “Asia is one. The Himalayas divide, only to accentuate, two mighty civilizations, the Chinese with its communism of Confucius, and the Indian with its individualism of the Vedas. But not even the snowy barriers can interrupt for one moment that broad expanse of love for the Ultimate and Universal, which is the common thought-inheritance of every Asiatic race, enabling them to produce all the great religions of the world, and distinguishing them from those maritime peoples of the Mediterranean and the Baltic, who love to dwell on the Particular, and to search out the means, not the end, of life.” <<http://www.sacred-texts.com/shi/ioe/ioeo3.htm>>.

of acceptance or rejection of elements coming from the outside continued to characterize Japanese politics after the war. The end of the American occupation (1952) saw two groups competing for national and international attention: the liberal faction of Yoshida Shigeru (1878–1967) and the conservative faction of Kishi Nobusuke (1896–1987). Both sides shared the same views on economic development and favored an alliance with the United States. But while Yoshida was convinced that the primary task of the time was to rebuild Japan and expand its economic influence by transforming it into a kind of “market country” (*shōnin kokka* 商人国家) by entrusting its military security to the United States, Kishi tried to take advantage of the Cold War and Japan’s reliance on America for its military security in order to bargain for an increase in Japan’s military capabilities and regional power. Kishi’s plan for the development of Southeast Asia, proposed as a way to make amends for the wrongs inflicted during the war in the form of capital and consumer goods produced by the Japanese industries, was not met with an enthusiastic response by the receiving countries. The memory of the Japanese occupation was still too vivid for them not to think that Kishi’s plan was anything more than a ruse for Japan to worm its way into their national economies.

After a political interval during which prime ministers Ikeda Hayato (1960–1964) and Satō Eisaku (1964–1972), both members of the Yoshida’s faction, led Japan to the threshold of the world’s third largest economy, Nakasone Yasuhiro (1918–) took it upon himself to revitalize Japanese nationalism during and after his years as prime minister. Examples of this are his 1985 visit to the Yasukuni Shrine (after the controversial decision to enshrine fourteen Class A war criminals was made in 1978) and his declaration that the economic success of Japan was due to the absence of the kind of ethnic minorities that are such a prominent feature of the American scene. For Nakasone the question of Japan’s identity had to be addressed by replacing the “Yoshida Doctrine” with a “new liberal nationalism” grounded in a transformation of identity and national consciousness. His calls for internationalization (*kokusaika* 国際化) in practice meant that Japan should actively pursue a global role both in Asia and elsewhere around the world, something the Yoshida Doctrine was ill equipped to foster.

In a 1984 speech to the Japanese Parliament Nakasone stated that Japan’s peace and prosperity could not exist without achieving world peace in a deeply independent international society, and that consequently Japan needed to assume a greater role in keeping with its rising status in international society and the growing expectations of other countries toward Japan.

Many of Nakasone’s critics did not share the view that his embrace of nationalism amounted to a liberal and cosmopolitan ideal. They saw his turn to *kokusaika* not as an opening to international cultures but as a cover for three other goals to be pursued simultaneously: a reinforcing of Japan’s self-esteem and self-confidence with respect to its relations with the world (relying particularly on its economic power), a suppression of any alterity that could mar its image as a homogeneous nature, and an active promotion not only of Japanese-made products but also of the distinctive elements of its superior

culture and civilization.⁸ As Ivy writes, “Instead of opening up Japan to the struggle of different nationalities and ethnicities, the policy of internationalization implies the opposite: the thorough domestication of the foreign and the dissemination of Japanese culture throughout the world.”⁹

In the years that followed the Nakasone government, there is little to suggest an authentic approach to the other, an encounter not motivated by the will to impose or defend an imagined, useless, and ultimately sterile idea of superiority. On the contrary, as Mayumi Itoh claims,¹⁰ although it was in Japan’s own interest to achieve internationalization and thereby escape a self-imposed isolation from the rest of the world, Japanese culture and history impeded changes to *sakoku* policies and practices.

To this day, she asserts, those isolationist policies and practices are still so deeply rooted and widespread among the population that they affect not only Japan’s relations with the rest of the world, but also the social system that regulates its own public life. Thus, for example, to protect the country’s job market, Japanese immigration law bans foreigners from engaging in unskilled labor. Nevertheless, changes in international economics has meant an increase in the number of illegal foreign workers from Third World countries entering Japan with tourist visas who are not only underpaid but also perform many of those menial activities indicated with a “triple κ”: *kiken* (危険 dangerous), *kitusi* (きつい hard) and *kitanai* (汚い dirty). Local governments still ban foreigners—including Korean residents—from assuming managerial positions in the public sector.

Until 1987, no foreign lawyers could practice in Japan; only Japanese lawyers who had passed the national bar examination could register with the Japan Bar Association. News sources are controlled by about four hundred press clubs (*kisha kurabu* 記者クラブ) in government agencies, political parties, or big-business groups, and foreign journalists are given information only from those who are members of these clubs. The Japanese edu-

8. As John Clammer affirms: “Under the new conditions of the production of cultural knowledge Japan is ‘everywhere’: people in London eat Japanese foods, teenagers in Bangkok read Japanese comics, children in Malaysia watch Japanese TV programmes, adults in New York drive Japanese cars, women in Singapore Paris and Rio wear Japanese fashions and people just about everywhere listen to their music, take their photographs or watch images on their televisions by way of Japanese technology. It is actually Japan as much or more than everywhere else in the world that is promoting cultural flows, especially of images, technologies and people. Isolationism is then clearly ideological rather than a reflection of any empirical reality, and is fueled by the fact that Japan is no longer trying, in material terms at least, to catch up with the West, but has in many ways surpassed it, without however desiring or being able to enter the international political arena in any significant sense.” In J. Clammer, *Japan and Its Others: Globalization, Difference and the Critique of Modernity* (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2001), 46.

9. M. Ivy, *Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan*, *op. cit.*, 3. Ivy’s thesis is indirectly supported by a study of Koichi Iwabuchi that revamps the old pan-Asian idea by adapting it to modern times: popular Japanese culture floods the Asian markets precisely because Japan, unlike the United States, is ancestrally in harmony with all the peoples of Asia. Cf. I. Koichi, *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002).

10. M. Itoh, “Japan’s Abiding Sakoku Mentality—Seclusion from Other Countries—Economic Myths Explained.” <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0365/is_n2_v40/ai_18338848/pg_1>.

cational system has failed to bring greater diversity and pluralism to the country because the academic institutions are insulated from the larger society. Moreover, despite the promise made in 1983 by the Nakasone administration to increase the number of foreign-exchange students to Japan to 100,000 by the end of the century that number had only reached 56,000. Even the Japanese professional baseball association applies a strict quota to foreign players, despite the fact that Japan imported baseball from the United States in 1874. Currently the number of registered *gaijin* (foreign) players is restricted to three per team, only two of whom can play at any given time. Or again, as of 20 November 2007 foreign nationals who apply for entry into Japan are required to be fingerprinted, photographed, and interviewed by immigration officers—reducing the *Yōkoso! Japan*” (Welcome to Japan!) tourist campaign to an empty slogan.

These and other examples show how the old symptoms of an isolationist and closed mentality are silently but inexorably resurfacing. Historically, Japan opened its doors to the outer world only under pressure from the outside (*gaiatsu* 外圧), and today, despite many an occasional speech about its internationalization, Japan seems to feel more and more incapable of demonstrating international leadership abilities and of earning international respect.

The inevitability of globalization—a thesis that no serious scholar would question today—seems to dash against the shores of these islands only to meet ideological cliffs that perpetuate the myth of impenetrability and indifference to anything not “made in Japan.” “What is in store for Japan?” asks Kamei Tatsuo, the former editor of the influential opinion journal *Shincho* 45, with an ironic smile. “We will go back to *sakoku* of the Edo period. We Japanese like it that way.”¹¹

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BURUMA, Ian

2004 *Inventing Japan. 1853–1964*. New York: The Modern Library.

CLAMMER, John

2001 *Japan and Its Others. Globalization, Difference and the Critique of Modernity*. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.

EADES J.S., Gill, Tom and Befu, Harumi, eds.

2000 *Globalization and Social Change in Contemporary Japan*. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.

JAPAN ECHO INC.

2008 *The Bumpy Road to Globalization*. Tokyo: Japan Echo Inc., 35/1.

KERR, Alex

2001 *Dogs and Demons. The Fall of Modern Japan*. London: Penguin Books.

11. Quoted in A. Kerr, *Dogs and Demons. The Fall of Modern Japan* (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 370.

KOICHI Iwabuchi

- 2002 *Recentering Globalization. Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

IVY, Marilyn

- 1995 *Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

MAYUMI Itoh

- 1998 *The Globalization of Japan: Japanese Sakoku Mentality and U.S. Efforts to Open Japan*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

STIGLITZ, Joseph

- 2006 *Making Globalization Work*. London: Penguin Books.

TOBY, Ronald

- 1984 *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan. Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

TAIWAN

FABRIZIO TOSOLINI

In order to get an idea of the present features of the phenomenon of globalization and of the impact it has on Chinese world (China and Taiwan), it may be helpful to go back to history. What now is called globalization, in ancient times might have had other names, e.g. invasion (or, more recently, imperialism): an expansion of a human group into territories belonging to other groups. The group which was expanding could feel that such an increase of its power was an opportunity, or even a necessity; the other side could perceive it as an oppression to which to react, or just simply be oppressed to the point of disappearing from history. A difference with respect to the present situation would be the fact that now such an expansion takes place less through groups physically entering other peoples' countries (this indeed happens, but it is almost a globalization in reverse) and more through the extension of one pattern of life all over the world, an extension which, besides other, more traditional factors, is powered by the media in a distinctive way.

In turn, this unique pattern is functional to the growth of the market, and to the flow of riches toward the source of investment. People then follow the flow of riches, affecting in the long run the whole process. If we at least provisionally accept such an equation (globalization as expansion of somebody's power), we can explain the ways peoples living in Chinese territories historically acted and interacted with their neighbors; how they lived situations which can be seen as forerunners of globalization and how they presently relate to it (we should recognize, however that in ancient times great distances were not overcome as easily as now and consumption of exotic goods interested only a fraction of the population; therefore commercial exchanges did not substantially affect the patterns of life of far away countries).

During the Han Dynasty (206 BC–220 AD) there were tributary states to the Central Kingdom, learning and accepting at least elements of Chinese culture. Besides this, there were attempts to dispatch missions to the West, as far as Rome. Some Roman imperial envoys reached Luoyang in 166 AD; goods exchanges such as Chinese silk, African ivory, Roman incense and glassware increased the contacts between East and West.

The Tang Dynasty China (618–907) was cosmopolitan, with communities of foreigners living in every big city of the Empire. The exchanges through the Silk Road and maritime commerce flourished; Chinese merchants were sailing to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf on large junks with capacities up to 600–700 passengers. In Tang Dynasty times such exchanges deeply affected Chinese culture. Muslims and Christians established communities and places of worship; Buddhism knew its greatest expansion; in every field of cultural life the encounter with foreign civilizations enriched Chinese life.

After the Tang Dynasty, the political forces which were expression of traditional Chinese culture were not able anymore to effectively control the territories North of the Yellow River and West of Chang An (Xian). The reasons for this fact are basically geoclimatic and, because of this, ethnic and cultural as well. The cold and windy northern steppes do not lend themselves to agriculture and to the settled kind of life typical of the Chinese. Flocks and herds thrive there, together with nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples. Their numbers were not very high, but in times they were able to create strong, mobile and irresistible military forces, based on cavalry, against which the Chinese armies from the centre and the South of the country had not many chances.

Thus, after the Tang, while the South was under the Song Dynasty (960–1279), the North fell first under the Liao (907–1125), then the Jin (1125–1271) and the Mongols (Yuan, 1271–1368); the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) retook it and restored it to Chinese tradition, only to surrender it again to the Manchu Qing Dynasty till the beginning of the last century (1644–1911), the Mongols and the Manchu controlling not only the North but the whole of China.

By studying the ways the foreign rulers of part, or of all Chinese territory related to the population, we can have an idea of the forms the interaction between other cultures and China assumed in history. Unavoidably, these forms influence the present, when they do not simply keep coming up in ways that are very similar to the past. The decisive factor

in this interaction is that *China lost many wars and battles, but it has always won peace*. None of the foreigners who dominated the Chinese people has been able to produce deep changes in their cultural tradition; on the contrary, the conqueror who originally had defeated the Chinese, was won back and absorbed into Chinese culture, even to the point of becoming its defender and propagator. The Liao tried to maintain a clear separation between themselves and the people they governed; their inability of lingering on power resulted from their inferiority in numbers and their nomadic culture. Their dynasty lasted 209 years.

The Jin Dynasty adopted a different strategy: complete fusion with the Chinese they ruled. They were overcome by the Mongols after heroically defending their new motherland. The solution the Yuan adopted to govern China was closer to the policies of the Liao than to the Jin; however, the result was the same. After 97 years a Chinese Dynasty retook control of parts of the North and tried to repopulate it with families brought in from the South of China, settling them around Beijing. It is with the Ming that this city, for the first time, and perhaps even in a fortuitous manner, became the center of power of a Chinese Dynasty. It may be interesting to notice that in the epoch of the Ming (somehow in a way similar to the Song), there was a practically complete shutdown to any foreign influx, differently from the preceding dynasties, which had tried to get a legitimization of their power also through their opening to trans-cultural influences. The Ming, on the other side, tried to use the sea as one of the ways to their expansion. In doing this, they repeated some of the choices of the Han and Tang Dynasties.

When the Manchu Dynasty took control of the Empire, it tried to create forms of administration through which its different peoples could cooperate, under the umbrella of the imperial power. However, in the long run they showed their inability to manage at the same time the huge Empire, the necessary transition toward more modern forms of state and the relationships with the colonial powers, which forced China to open its market to their trade. This led to the revolution of the beginning of the twentieth century, which was also expression of the will of doing away with foreign domination. It is not by chance that Nanjing was again chosen as the capital, as it was at the beginning of the Ming. This could be interpreted as a willingness to propose again the political and cultural ideals of that Dynasty.

The second half of the nineteenth century is probably a key epoch in order to understand the subsequent evolution of China, till the present days. The opium wars opened the eyes of many Chinese, who realized the scientific and technologic backwardness of their country and tried to catch up on their lost time. As a result of this awareness, students were sent abroad, in order to learn how to build the navy, lead industrial projects, establish forms of cooperation in political and social matters.

In this context some of the students sent to Europe came to know Marxism and the Communist Parties; they saw in these doctrines the most efficacious way to free their country from feudalism. With the help of the Bolsheviks they created the Nationalist Party (Guomindang), and in 1926 the Communist Party (Gongchandang) by a splitting:

two parties which structurally are similar to each other. On the one side it appeared clearly that the past autarchic models had no future; on the other side nobody was willing to let China become a prey to foreign countries. This explains the political, social and cultural developments of last century China.

After the Second World War and the rise of the Communist Party, China advances on the road towards modernization, in order to reach the level of development of the Western powers. This process however shows some peculiarities, the most important of which is the pursue of the fullest autonomy at the political and cultural levels. A strong sense of national identity and belonging has been built on the feeling of shared suffering and hardships; it has been channeled towards the promise for self-liberation through the means and models proposed by the Party.

The Communist Party exercises its power in complete autarchy and moulds the cultural life by selecting in Chinese tradition the elements most functional to its management of the country and its own legitimization, while at the same time maintaining a great openness to all scientific and technologic improvements. Everybody can see that such an operation is highly successful: China appears as one of the most solid political structures on earth; even if many lament deficiencies at the level of individual freedom and human rights, the imposing economic results and modernization make up abundantly for them. If there is an evolution the actual form of globalization has wrought in the self-awareness of the present and future of the Chinese nation, this is the universal dimension: games are being played at an absolutely global level.

China has the advantage of a huge amount of people naturally full of resources, accustomed to suffering, ready (whether willing or not, it does not matter) at the service of the political designs of their ruling group. Such a situation is not present in any other state of the world. China has a mass sufficient to manage the phenomenon of globalization, not only inwardly, by preserving the peculiarities of Chinese tradition in the frame of a gradual opening piloted by the centre, but also outwardly, by exporting, together with its products and its people, also an ideological model—the Confucian ideal of harmony—that is thought to have all the necessary requirements to become the basic cultural parameter—going beyond the individual rights of the French Revolution—of the next incoming global Middle Age.

It is also possible to see the figure of an “imperialism with Chinese characteristics” looming through a set of phenomena, in some ways different from the Western way of creating empires. Past imperialisms had the advantage of superior technology, at all levels (military, social, educational, political), while now Chinese expansion treasures, on its side on the mix of sheer numbers of human resources, endurance in front of all kind of adversities,¹ the will of power of their rulers² together with a religious/absolute sense

1. The Chinese (low-quality) goods which are conquering the markets worldwide are cheap because of the oppressive conditions of the workers in China's Special Economic Zones, whose salaries barely allow them to survive and where protests are not tolerated and immediately dispersed by the police. Conquering the

of the mission of Chinese civilization; and on the side of others, on the greed of the ruling classes, the rule of law of their states and the economic burdens created by welfare policies. These people sell out their countries to Chinese economic expansion; Chinese groups migrate overseas where they create wealthy communities, able to climb the social ladder while always remaining in contact and at the service of the motherland.

This economic expansion is also turning political at a global level: the recent meeting of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) in Yekaterinburg shows the project of creating a power group alternative to other Western industrialized countries, led by the US.³ While this happens abroad, the Central Kingdom remains sealed to any foreign attempt to create some balance, be it commercial, or cultural, or ideological, so that we can easily foresee clashes of imperialistic trends for the near future, uncertainty carefully shrouding their outcomes. On the other hand, if Western expansion challenges Chinese tradition, such challenge consists in the impact of the patterns of life of Western cities on China's cultural heritage, which has enjoyed centuries, if not millennia, of uninterrupted continuity.

Such a challenge is perhaps the most serious, under certain aspects, the only deadly one among the many challenges China has faced in its long history. In the past nobody was able to enter and modify the hinterland of China, the masses of farmers brought up in Confucian tradition, folk religion and Buddhism. Now media make such a challenge ubiquitous and even more dangerous, since those who live in the countryside are defenseless in front of the glittering perspectives of consumerism, and eradicated from their past by sixty years of Communist rule.⁴

It is possible to imagine a future in which a solid power apparatus will rule by force and perspectives of economic improvement a people expropriated of the chances of living as persons, a human mass ready for use in view of whatever project, be it determined from inside or from outside.⁵ Although it is possible that the global economic crisis

markets means that local producers are forced to close, thus creating impoverishment in the countries where Chinese economy expands. Paradoxically, the social gains fruit of almost two centuries of social struggle, are being destroyed by the combining factors of greed and social irresponsibility on the part of Western investors on the one side, and the oppression of the workers in a Marxist country on the other side, Marxism being forced to work against itself.

2. One of the reasons of the strength of Chinese expansion is the fact that politics and economics are closely linked together. An upper class of a new kind is emerging, people who belong to the party, and out of their social role create for themselves and for their families considerable amounts of wealth, which in turn allows them to enter the international economic arena from a position of strength. From state to party capitalism, from socialism to aristocracy.

3. <<http://tapeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2009/06/15/2003446204>>.

4. Since globalization is also a media matter, the encounter of expansions will be played around the control of communication. While abroad Chinese production has only a niche market, it remains to be seen how much of the Western messages are allowed to touch the minds of the Chinese. The ongoing battles for the control/freedom of internet show the determination of Chinese government not to allow any intrusion in what they consider their duty to rule in an absolute way, namely Chinese territory, even the mental one.

5. The (state sponsored) revival of Confucianism, folk religion and Chinese Buddhism seems to signal a

jeopardizes the whole system, because of the additional burdens falling on an already oppressed society, other factors such as the amount of foreign currency reserves and the choice to open the internal market seem able to contain it to a point that the Chinese economy possibly will be among the first economies to recover its momentum, thus overcoming the risk of political turmoil.

PAX SINICA AND THE CASE OF TAIWAN

Despite the never-repealed threatening declarations against Taiwan's independence it is allowed to think that the Chinese government too knows that the *pax sinica* is unconquerable, and therefore that it is more victorious than any war. Indeed, under the presidency of Ma Yingjiu, Taiwan and China seem to be "on honeymoon," and their renewed effort for a pacific resolution of their conflicts is bringing fruits at every level, economic and cultural. More than 200 weekly direct flights, a daily quota of 7,000 Mainland tourists, who are allowed to stay for ten days in Taiwan (21,000 a month, more than 200,000 a year), plans for allowing Chinese students to enter Taiwan universities, an increase in economic cooperation at every level,⁶ are just showing how big are the fruits the Chinese way to globalization is bearing, at least at a regional level.

In any case, what remains to be seen is the way the different subjects of worldwide globalization will interact in the future, and which of the many factors at work in the process will get the upper hand: either consumerism or whatever other cultural ideology,⁷ be it any (American, Indian, Chinese) nationalism, or social ethics as is the case of Confucianism, or religious law as is the case of Islam and its *sharia*.

As for China, it is trying many ways to play a major role in this trend. The Olympics 2008 mark a decisive step in the direction of international recognition. China's policy show two trends: strong at home and influential abroad; at home control and discipline; abroad selling goods and ideas. The proliferation of Confucian Study Centers in universities worldwide, the invitation of world leaders to China, the offer of scholarships for stu-

new awareness of the need to offer some spiritual ideals to the people, and of the positive role tradition and religions can play in view of this. Under the unchallenged control of the state: all the religions that have—or are suspected of having—plans for undoing the state absolute authority over its territory (Islam, Lama Buddhism, Christianity) will face or will go on facing persecution.

6. Effective from July 1, 2009, Taiwan is open, under certain regulations, to Chinese capital investments (*The China Post*, July 1, 2009). <<http://chinapost.com.tw/china-taiwan-relations/2009/07/01/214363/Chinese%2Dinvestments.htm>>.

7. It is a fact that consumerism, an ideology proposing the satisfaction of bodily needs, is opposed and destructive of every cultural ideology. If an idea is shared by many, it becomes stronger; on the contrary, if more and more people consume a certain amount of goods, they will enjoy less and less satisfaction. Consumerism divides and isolates individual bodies, while cultural ideologies create and unite collective minds. One of the strong points of the winning strain of globalization is the proposal of consumerism, even at a cultural level. In such a context, it is difficult to imagine how a different cultural ideology will be able to get more numerous followers than media induced consumerism, unless it is forced upon people by state absolute power.

dents from third world countries, the increase of academic studies in the area of sinology, all these are Chinese responses to its awareness of the trend of globalization.

However, for the time being China's international power still is an essentially economic fact; therefore the struggle for world leadership will be probably fought mainly at an economic and financial levels, in a silent way, and only gradually involve ideological factors, a field in which Chinese proposals still appear as too marginal and uninteresting, unable to lure other traditions. Unless the rulers of the other nations, in view of their personal advantage and for the sake of social order (not of social justice or freedom), will agree to accept the condition of fiefdoms, loyal to the Central Kingdom.

BAO DAO (TREASURE ISLAND). TAIWAN AND GLOBALIZATION

The short history of Taiwan shows different features; however, it is still possible to recognize in them the permanence of a model which remains stable in time. Chinese Taiwan is born as a colony and continues in being as a colony. After immigrants from Fujian and coastland Chinese provinces colonize part of the island, and after Zeng Chenggong's attempt to create an independent political entity against foreign invaders, for about two centuries Taiwan is under the control of the Qing Dynasty. From 1895 to 1945, for 50 years it is part of the Japanese Empire, and in many sectors becomes the field in which Japan tests its efforts toward modernization.⁸ After Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai Shek) takes possession of the island, Taiwan is again an informal colony of the United States, which uses it as an outpost to check Chinese expansion.

As a colony, it becomes the object of globalization projects, although they are partial and related to the powers that control it. In such a context, present-day Taiwan shows aspects of advanced globalization. Since it has not many natural resources, except for agriculture (its production is however insufficient for the numerous population), its main effort has been directed toward industrial sectors, and more recently on the cutting-edge sectors of research and technology. Some wise choices, as the investments in the fields of electronics, have allowed Taiwan—in a way similar to Japan—to reach prosperity, although, since it depends for the main part on international trade, such prosperity entails factors of instability. Taiwan's economic prosperity is visible also because the policy of the government is attentive to the internal market, with projects that create job opportunities, and by encouraging some spending in consumption goods and tourism inside the country.

This trend favors the spreading of a set of cultural patterns (coming from Japan and from the West) which are typical of a globalized society; furthermore, these patterns easily gain more and more people, in a special way among the youth, since tradition is

8. A foreign visitor may be struck by some Neoclassic and Liberty-style public buildings dotting Taiwan big cities, especially Taipei. They belong to the Japanese heritage: since in Japan their futuristic shape was not welcomed, they were built in Taiwan.

not strong enough to contrast them. There is no political interference on this process of cultural change; which may also mean that the assumption of new patterns is favored by government agencies: they see in it a help to control society, since people become more and more dependent on the proposals of the media.

At the same time Taiwan shows an opposite phenomenon: the permanence and vitality of a stratum of population living outside of the models of globalization, making use of the technical gains of it, but substantially untouched by the change in cultural patterns it brings about. Besides the countryside, the presence of such groups in the city is immediately visible because of the architectural forms that signal their existence: dwarfed by the numerous modern buildings, it is normal to see shabby, half-crumbling houses surrounding folk religion temples, or thirty-plus year-old blocks, their first floor regularly used for family-size commercial purposes. Their inhabitants keep following a traditional pattern of life, very thrifty and localized, the sort of life that in the past cooperated in making Taiwan's economic miracle possible.

Their jobs are simple ones, and under some aspects, very humble. However, these people are directly in touch with the conditions that allow human survival: agriculture, the products of which are sold in the traditional market; small shops that offer what is really necessary, without any show of refinement, but in a very practical and money-saving way.

This social group does not show any sign of giving up in front of the floodtide of social change: the new generations inherit the activities and the mindset they learn in their families, the mediatic daily hammering not provoking in them any second thought.

Possible factors explaining such continuity may be the resilience of tradition, even of religious tradition, which reinforces an already strong island mentality; a low level of schooling; the social need for some services which, although not enjoying great prestige, are economically remunerative and allow a kind of life more autonomous than that of the white collars; the attachment to the territory; a higher birth-rate, which allows to some of the sons to continue the traditional trade of the family. Paradoxically, it is these people who control the inhabitants of the high-rise buildings, whose time is spent in media-induced activities and are only able to press the keys of the most modern electronic devices.

At first sight, the co-presence of such different life patterns (the aborigines too belonging to the non-globalized group) makes Taiwanese society non-homogeneous. On the one hand it may slow down, or create contrasts in the process of globalization. However, together with the interaction of other combined factors and policies, it may contribute to check the effects of the world economic crisis, from which Taiwan too seems to be able to reemerge without suffering irretrievable damages.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

DASSÙ, Marta e Annunziata, Lucia, eds.

2003 *Il Tempo della Cina. Aspenia*, 23/9.

CAMMELLI, Stefano

2004 *Storia di Pechino e di come divenne capitale della Cina*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

2006 *Ombre cinesi: indagine su una civiltà che volle farsi nazione*. Torino: Einaudi.

CHOW, Peter C. Y., ed.

2002 *Taiwan in The Global Economy: From an Agrarian Economy to an Exporter of High-Tech Products*. West Port: Praeger Publishers.

2002 *Taiwan's Modernization in Global Perspective*. West Port: Praeger Publishers.

EBERHARD, Wolfram

2005 *A History of China*. New York: Cosimo Inc.

EBREY, Patricia Buckley

1999 *The Cambridge Illustrated History of China*. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

GERNET, Jacques

1982 *A History of Chinese Civilization*. Tr. J. E. Foster. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

HUNG, Chien-Chiao

2000 *A History of Taiwan*. Rimini: Il Cerchio.

KUIJS, Louis

2009 "China's Prospects In The Current Global Climate." *International Economic Bulletin*, June 2009.

LEWIS, Mark Edward

2007 *The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han*. Cambridge: Harvard University.

MORTON, William Scott and Charlton M., Lewis

2005 *China: Its History and Culture*. New York City: McGraw-Hill.

SUTTER, Robert G.

2008 *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War*. Laham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield.

TSAI, Kellee S.

2007 *Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

WINTERS, Alan L., Yusuf, Sahid, ed.

2007 *Dancing with Giants: China, India, and the Global Economy*. Singapore: The World Bank, The Institute of Policy Studies.

Globalization and Religions

BANGLADESH

SERGIO TARGA

Globalization has also been seen as “a first truly world revolution.”¹ The creation of a global market where trans-national capital can move around unfettered, is the understated goal² of the revolution that globalization is turning out to be. The convulsions that any revolution implies are here determined by the necessity of globalization to influence and modify local patterns of consumption and in so doing, threaten their underlying cultural, political and social models of reference. As such globalization cannot but

1. J. Kurth, *The Templeton Lecture on Religion and World Affairs*. Quoted in P. Radhakrishnan, “Religion under Globalization,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, 2004, 39/13: 1404.

2. The understatement refers to globalization’s “characteristic” of hiding and obfuscating reality, particularly the economic one. The prophets of globalization would have us believe that one of globalization’s goals is its capacity to reduce poverty and inequality around the world on an unprecedented scale. This would come about as the necessary outcome of the construction of an absolutely free and global market economy, the ideological smokescreen of 21st century imperialism. See J. Petras and H. Veltmeyer, *Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century* (London: Zed Books, 2001).

directly impinge on the security of peoples worldwide, their perceived localised cultural identity *vis-à-vis* the homogenising irresistibility of globalized international capital. Long standing traditions and customs risk evaporating under the pressure of global consumerism; while work ethics and shared values leave space to maximisation of profit in a dangerous, globally disintegrating world. The present paper attempts an evaluation of the effects of globalization on that particular cultural domain taken up by religions in Bangladesh. If indeed religions, in a Durkheimian fashion, celebrate the norms on which societies are built, globalization is undoubtedly at least a challenge to all of them.

Religious traditions the calibre of Islam and Christianity have been aware of globalization right from their inceptions. Islam and Christianity were born with globalization inscribed in their *modus operandi*, so that they went global when the term global itself had not yet been coined. Nevertheless, the historical globalization of religions being referred to here has nothing to do with the globalization of religions of the present-day world. While in the past, globalization was directed by religion which maintained all through the processes of geographical expansion and acculturation the role of subject, in today's world, religions are no longer in the leading seats of globalization but they themselves are objects of its processes. Apparently, the end result is a marginalization of religious traditions in social praxis, their commoditisation to suit market discipline and their assumption of a defensive outlook, a prelude to religious fundamentalism and/or religious based terrorism. Yet, this is not the whole picture. Globalization, perhaps unintentionally, has also opened up venues of opportunities for a renewed religious vitality.

Globalization as such is often accused of spreading anomie. This sociological term of Durkheimian origins refers to "a state of relative normlessness or a state in which norms have been eroded. A norm is an expectation of how people will behave, and it takes the form of a rule that is socially rather than formally enforced. Thus... the effect of normlessness is to introduce alienation, isolation, and desocialization as norms become less binding for individuals. Individuals thus lose the sense of what is right and wrong."³ Taken in this sense, globalization cannot but enter a collision course with religion, the anti-anomie agency *par excellence*. A state of normlessness is not however the result of a direct attack of globalization on religion but is the outcome of globalization's *modus operandi*. No trans-national company or agency will ever be so daring as to directly attack or challenge a religion in any developing country like Bangladesh. Only in the so-called developed world, where anomie is already a widespread cultural reality, may this be possible. A directly anti-religion agenda, particularly where and when religions may not be so conducive to profit making modern practices and habits, is only foreseeable in the developed countries of the West. However, even here a direct ideological clash seems anachronistic: indifference towards religion has proved to be far more harmful to religion

3. See "anomie" in *Wikipedia*, at <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anomie>>. For the history of the term and its meaning see M. Orru, "The Ethics of Anomie: Jean Marie Guyau and Émile Durkheim," *The British Journal of Sociology*, 1983, 34/4: 499–518.

than an open fight against it. Be that as it may, in countries like Bangladesh, globalization may avoid obstacles or win them over by raising the stakes, i.e. buying out people, institutions, cultures etc.

Poverty and poverty alleviation as a matter of fact have turned out to be the best baits for globalization to spread its reach.⁴ The point is that globalization does not create anomie by destroying the holy books of religions, but, as it were, by burning the paper they are written on. The ethos animating globalization processes can be summarily detected in its rough and harsh quality in the unrefined definition of “business company” given by Albert J. Dunlap: “The company belongs to people who invest in it—not to its employees, suppliers, nor to the locality in which it is situated.”⁵ In other words, globalization in its attempt at maximising profit tries to detach economic activities from their human and societal setup. In Dunlap’s definition a company belongs to the anonymous capital providers above and beyond the texture of human relationships needed to make a company work. These relationships are what I would consider the paper on which religions’ holy books are written. This point is of such crucial importance that it needs further elaboration.

The abstraction of economic activity from its human setting involves “the disconnection of power from obligation,”⁶ that is, the disconnection of duties and responsibilities towards the reproduction of individuals and communities’ life in a conducive natural environment, the true scope of any economic activity. This constitutes the beginning of anomie and necessarily involves the belittlement of local work ethics as well as the cultural values and traditions linked to a locality. It is the missing element of globalization policies. The disconnection of “power from obligation” is obtained in fact by disjoining “local” from “global.” This is the true revolution brought about by globalization, the space revolution: geography and distances are no longer to be experienced as tenacious obstacles to human expansion. Because of this separation, made possible by both information and transportation technologies, capital and its extra-local handlers have effectively disenfranchised themselves from any sort of responsibility and thus blame, positioning themselves as a neutral, a-moral reality in a non-place.

By doing away with the parochialism of the local, globalization has become self-referential, further increasing the state of normlessness and thus restricting more and more

4. “One may see the import of such concern for ‘poverty alleviation’ in the strategy of development that ‘globalization’ implies: the flow of international capital to exploit cheap labour in ‘developing’ countries, promising on the one hand greater employment to their people to alleviate their ‘poverty’ with low wages, and on the other hand, high returns to capital thus flowing to a cheap labour country. This is the essence of the rationalization of ‘globalization’ for world development, where client nation states are being purchased with so called ‘development assistance’ which develops an infrastructure to facilitate private entrepreneurship, with the condition that they open up their capital and labour markets to international capital so that their cheap labour can be exploited.” A. Rahman. “Globalization: The Emerging Ideology in the Popular Protests and Grassroots Action Research,” *Action Research*, 2004, 2/1: 11–2.

5. A. J. Dunlap, *How I Saved Bad Companies and Made Good Companies Great*. Quoted in Z. Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 6.

6. Z. Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences*, *op. cit.*, 9.

the space of transcendence, of which religions are reminders. In this respect it must be noticed that religion's global outlook, particularly noticeable in Islam and Christianity's *modus operandi*, has got indeed very little to do with today's globalization, as already remarked above. In religion's global perspective the dialectic of particular and universal is quite different from that of local and global of today's globalization. Religious universalism, whatever the nuances it may embody in the different religious traditions, is built in continuity with the particulars of history and thus of time and space. Religions in a way are the continuous mediation between the particular and the universal resulting in an unstable balance necessarily determined by a situation which is never and cannot ever be self-referential.

Globalization was born indeed as a body free from the shackles of the local, in its opposition and superiority to it. It promised freedom to everybody but, as a matter of course, it actually frees in as much as it enslaves. The definition of Dunlap above is quite adamant on this too. The investors, and thus the true owners of the company we may eventually call globalization, are indeed invested with unprecedented freedom which comes to them by a mobility disenfranchised from the annoying nuisances of the local. This is however startling paralleled by the group of suppliers, employees and simple local onlookers of the company that globalization is. Situated in the local they are at the service of global investors, and thus disposable. Their only freedom is just to make good the chance they momentarily get. Immobility is their characteristic particularly *vis-à-vis* the freedom of global capital owners. Resentment may just be another possible outcome.

The space revolution talked about above for some becomes thus liberation from the physical limits of bodily experience, limitless expansion above and beyond the local domain together with a capacity to act from a distance; for most others a crude reminder of their bounded condition to a locality which they cannot on the one hand domesticate and on the other hand cut themselves loose from. "Rather than homogenizing the human condition, the technological annulment of temporal/spatial distances tends to polarise it."⁷ Because of technological innovations, this polarisation is farther radicalised in the reflexive awareness caused by the continuous flow of information to which both segments of humanity are continually exposed. The separation between the "global" people and the "local" ones is perceived as "more merciless, and having more profound psychological effects than ever before."⁸ And all this further deepens alienation, isolation, and desocialization—the outcomes of the spread of anomie.

Obviously, globalization has come of age and the unrefined definition of Dunlap quoted above, has been partially modified as to integrate a more subtle understanding of things.⁹ Now globalization is more and more being mentioned all along with its twin

7. Ibid., 18.

8. Ibidem.

9. The definition of Albert J. Dunlap came out in a book published in 1996. Its unrefinedness refers only to the early euphoric stages of globalization which are generally made to start with the demise of the Soviet Union in the beginning of the '90s.

term of glocalization, a neologism used to signify the fusion, as it were, of globalization and localization. The term was born out of Japanese business practices and it basically meant “the tailoring of a company’s offering to suit the interests of local markets across the world.”¹⁰ In this meaning, glocalization becomes a more sophisticated way to increase the gap between global and local, owners and employees of globalization, a further step towards a normlessness situation. But recently, glocalization has come out of its economist underpinnings and has come to mean something completely different.

Glocalization is a new paradigm for international relations and an innovative practice of development cooperation. The glocalization strategy empowers local communities, linking them to global resources and knowledge while facilitating initiatives for peace and development. It provides opportunities for the local communities to direct positive social change in the areas that most directly affect them, and to shape an innovative and more equitable international system.¹¹

Obviously in this comprehension glocalization may turn out to be a remedy to globalization’s normlessness, the roots for a possible revitalization of religion.

What has been said so far on the polarization of the human condition and of the spread of anomie as both being the product of globalization processes, can be considered as the space of the pre-religious, the “paper” on which holy books are written. Given this general context it remains to be seen how Bangladeshi religious traditions, Islam in particular, reacted or are reacting to these challenges.

First of all, it must be considered that globalization in Bangladesh as well as in other developing countries is often and, perhaps, acritically identified with a relatively new and sophisticated way in which the West perpetrates its political and cultural hegemony. This comprehension, of course, houses a great deal of validity.¹² In this narrative “the central argument... is that globalization in the past created the present-day Third World... and contemporary globalization perpetuates this marginalization of the developing world... The difference lies in the fact that global disparities and inequities are far more transparent in our virtually uncensored information age.”¹³ This understanding must then be integrated with the notion that since the West is mainly Christian, its hegemonic project cannot but involve the spread of Christianity above and against local religious traditions.¹⁴ It is against the backdrop of this comprehension that the question of Islam and of other local religious traditions *vis-à-vis* globalization must be asked.

10. This definition is found at <<http://www.blurtit.com/q890929.html>>.

11. *The Glocal Forum* website at <http://www.glocalforum.org/?id=197&id_p=193&lng=en>.

12. The truth of globalization, however, goes beyond this neo-colonial and neo-imperialist interpretations. Globalization is not just a one way process (from the central North to the peripheral South). As a matter of fact, capital has not got any specific nationality!

13. M. Murshed, “Globalization and South Asia: A Perspective,” *South Asia Economic Journal*, 2004, 5/2: 312.

14. The question of the relationships between imperialism, Christianity and globalization is not new. See for instance P. Radhakrishnan, “Religion under Globalization,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, 2004, 39/13: 1403.

Generally speaking, and on the basis of what has been said just above, Islam, at least in its organized, visible face, has reacted to globalization rather negatively. At this level, Islam has taken refuge in ideology producing that which has been called “political Islam.”¹⁵ The latter’s roots are traceable to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when people and countries under colonial rule attempted to oppose western political and cultural domination. Political Islam was indeed a revival of religious resources which, however, tended to forget faith and spirituality in favour of a strongly ideologised posture. In this it was not much different from the ideologies of the colonial powers it was trying to counteract.

Similarly today, political Islam tries to oppose the onslaught of globalization by radicalising religio-cultural elements of supposedly local Bangladeshi tradition. The battle against anomie is fought out by revamping identity politics using a politicised version of Islam. An increase in communal attitudes and in intolerance towards ethnic and religious minorities is the unavoidable outcome. Interestingly, the fight against globalization is carried on using globalization and, contradictorily, thanks to globalization.

The revival of Islam observed in the last few decades in Bangladesh is more the outcome of globalization itself than of anything else. The unprecedented interconnection of Muslims around the world through mass media brought about by globalization has given concrete reality to otherwise theoretical religious ideas. The idea of *Umma* holds pride of place among the latter. This has helped Bangladeshi Muslims to feel part of a larger congregation,¹⁶ with specific values and traditions no less important than the values and traditions of the powers that be. In a way we may say that globalization has helped Islam renew its global outlook and missionary spirit. But there is more to it. Often when either *imams* or government spokespeople make any pronouncement in favour of Islam against the dangerous drift of the present globalized world they use the words of globalized Islam passing them off, as those of the local autochthonous Bangladeshi tradition. With the pretext of fighting globalization’s anomie a globalized and thus ideological version of Islam is filtered through to the Bangladeshi Muslim masses.

To this purpose two religious satellite television channels broadcast their programmes in Bangladesh. The oldest television channel is the Peace TV of Dr. Zakir Naik, which has been broadcasting from Mumbai since January 2006. It now reaches 125 countries in the world and its network is continuously expanding. “One of its aims is to serve as an ecumenical body for Muslims, Christians, Jews, Hindus and Buddhists worldwide,”¹⁷ even though the kind of message it proposes is somewhat intolerant of other religious traditions. Peace TV is a clear example of the kind of help globalization is giving Islam in its renewed missionary appeal. Besides, the fact that this channel is located in India once again shows the limits of a comprehension of globalization founded on notions of

15. See S. A. Arjomand, “Islam, Political Change and Globalization,” *Thesis Eleven*, 2004, 76: 9–28.

16. This “belonging” has also a financial aspect! See Staff Correspondent, “34 Islamic NGOs Get Over Tk 200cr from Donors a Year,” *The Daily Star*, 31 August 2005.

17. A. G. Mahbub, “Does ‘Peace TV’ Encourage Interfaith Amity?” At <http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=360555&rel_no=1>.

western and Christian domination only. The Islamic TV channel instead is a Bangladeshi religious channel which started operations in April 2007. Similarly to Indian Peace TV, Islamic Television maintains in its scopes and objectives the establishment of peace through interfaith respect and tolerance together with the spread of Islam.¹⁸ I suspect that to overcome possible government restrictions and objections, the inter-religious dialogue motif present in the stated aims of both TV channels broadcasting to Bangladesh is a formal adjunct and a *conditio sine qua non* to get the TV license. As a matter of fact also Islamic TV does not appear to be inter-religious dialogue oriented. The fact also that its owner, Said Iskandar, is the younger brother of the past Prime Minister, Khaleda Zia, raises some doubts on the actual genuine religious spirit of the channel.

Against the threats of cultural homogenisation and religious marginalization of globalization, Islam has reacted by ideologising itself and thus entering the field of identity politics. For the rural masses of Bangladesh this, in practice, has meant a falling back on “the easily accessible pretentious religious banalities.”¹⁹ The latter includes all the religious paraphernalia from dress code to eating rules etc. Needless to say the spirit of religion is lost in the formal observance of rules and codes which alone seem to guarantee eternal bliss or salvation. As a result, the traditional, cultural, Bangladeshi pattern of tolerance undergoes deterioration.

This falling back on to religious banalities, often seen as a stronghold against globalization, turns out instead to be globalization’s strongest victory. In so doing Islam, but also Hinduism for that matter, gives in to the law of the market and commoditises itself to suit religious demands. The moral and social insecurity caused by the erosion of traditionally shared social norms (i.e. anomie) is pushing more and more people towards “holy men and women” who in exchange for money or gifts guarantee success, health, healing, love, money etc. These “religious operators” take advantage of people’s faith or superstition and make a living out of it. Religion in globalized times may just become a money spinner. In India this is more evident for Hinduism,²⁰ while in Bangladesh Hinduism because of its minority status and Muslim pressure does not appear to suffer from the maladies of *swamis*, *sadhus* and the like.²¹

The ambiguity of the relationship between Islam and globalization is well captured by the expression “defensive counter-universalism.”²² This reactive attitude is paralleled, on the western-Christian side by the defensive counter-universalism of people like Samuel Huntington.²³ If, on the one hand, Islam, at least in its institutional forms, expresses

18. See the Islamic TV official website at <http://www.islamictv.com.bd/index.php?page=about_islamictv>.

19. P. Radhakrishnan, “Religion under Globalization,” *op. cit.*, 1403.

20. In Islam these “marketing and miraculous” aspects can be found flourishing around holy people’s graves (*pirer mazar*). In rural areas instead, wandering ascetics (*fakirs*) offer their expertise to gullible villagers.

21. For the “plague” of *swamis* (i.e. deified people, holy people) in India, see P. Radhakrishnan, “Religion under Globalization,” *op. cit.*

22. See S. A. Arjomand, “Islam, Political Change and Globalization,” *op. cit.*, 23ff.

23. See S. P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Making of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

anti-globalization feelings, on the other hand, it cannot but make use of it albeit in its own guise. Typically, at a political level this is manifested through two devices: “cloning” of international institutions and flexibility in signing international treaties and conventions. “There can be no doubt that global integration has made many Muslims seek to appropriate universalist institutions by what might be called Islamic cloning. We thus hear more and more about ‘Islamic science,’ ‘Islamic human rights,’ an ‘Islamic international system’ and a variety of organizations modeled (*sic*) after the United Nations and its offshoots...”²⁴

Similarly, the flexibility in subscribing to international conventions by allowing reservations and conditionalities permits many Muslim countries to maintain their membership in the international community while at the same time confirming locally their strict Islamic adherence and loyalty. Bangladesh was, for instance, able to subscribe to the CEDAW²⁵ while at the same time maintaining reservations on articles 2, 13 and 16.²⁶

However, this defensive counter-universalism cannot be identified *tout court* with religious extremism. In the same way in which the defensive counter-universalism of Huntington does not necessarily end up in militancy, neither does Islamic defensive counter-universalism. The latter being a reactive and defensive development is highly assimilative in nature, so that “it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, despite its intent, defensive counter-universalism is inevitably a step toward the modernization of the Islamic tradition.”²⁷

Once again Islam’s dialectic relationship with globalization may eventually end up with both an “Islamised globalization” and a “globalized Islam.” Besides, we may already say that “the direct impact of globalization on the Muslim world is contrary to its indirect effects through fundamentalism...”²⁸ and among the latter indirect effects we may recall the violation of human rights, women’s situation etc. Globalization in as much as it has increased international inequalities has perhaps fostered religious extremism, but it certainly did not invent it. Furthermore, religious extremism and terrorism appear to be inversely proportionate to the kind of democratic space in which societal demands, aspects or pressures can find articulation.

The question, then, is to see whether globalization is helping creating the civil space necessary to democratic life or not.²⁹ From developments occurred in recent years it does seem that globalization has been able to offer this space so that “organized labour, farmers, human rights activists, environmentalists, students, youth, the aged and mothers

24. S. A. Arjomand, “Islam, Political Change and Globalization,” *op. cit.*, 23.

25. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

26. In 1997 reservations to articles 13 and 16 were dropped. To date only reservations to article 2 continue. The reservation says: “The Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh does not consider as binding upon itself the provisions of article 2... as they conflict with *sharia* law based on Holy Quran and Sunna.” At <<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm#N19>>.

27. S. A. Arjomand, “Islam, Political Change and Globalization,” *op. cit.*, 24.

28. *Ibidem.*

29. See P. Radhakrishnan, “Religion under Globalization,” *op. cit.*, 1409.

have joined hands in solidarity against corporate power,”³⁰ and this despite their diverse religion, nationality, geography etc.

And it is here that glocalization comes in. In the way it was defined above in this paper, glocalization is a strategy for peace and development which tries to empower local communities and their needs by articulating them with global knowledge, information and resources in general.

In this context religions may gain a new lease of life by offering the world a framework of shared values. “The world will be immeasurably poorer, more dangerous, more fragile and above all, more aimless—I mean without the necessary sense of purpose to help guide its journey—if it is without a strong spiritual dimension.”³¹ But “will systematic world religions prove capable of generating the kind of ‘global civil religion’ (albeit diversified) that is much needed where functional differentiation and cultural fragmentation have destroyed shared norms?”³²

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARJOMAND, Said Amir

2004 “Islam, Political Change and Globalization.” *Thesis Eleven*, 76: 9–28.

BAUMAN, Zygmunt

1998 *Globalization: The Human Consequences*. New York: Columbia University Press.

BLAIR, Tony

2008 *Faith and Globalization*. Lecture delivered at Westminster Cathedral on 2 April 2008. At <[http://www.rcdow.org.uk/lectures/2008/transcripts/Faith And Life—2008—Tony Blair.pdf](http://www.rcdow.org.uk/lectures/2008/transcripts/Faith%20And%20Life-2008-Tony%20Blair.pdf)>.

GAZI, Aataai Mahbub

2007 “Does ‘Peace TV’ Encourage Interfaith Amity?” <http://english.ohmynews.com/article/view/article_view.asp?no=360555&rel_no=1>.

HUNTINGTON, P. Samuel

1996 *The Clash of Civilizations and the Making of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

ISLAMIC TV WEBSITE

2009 <http://www.islamicTV.com.bd/index.php?page=about_islamicTV>.

MURSHED, S. Mansoob

2004 “Globalization and South Asia: A Perspective.” *South Asia Economic Journal*, 5/2: 311–26.

30. A. Rahman. “Globalization: The Emerging Ideology in the Popular Protests and Grassroots Action Research,” *op. cit.*, 13.

31. T. Blair. *Faith and Globalization*, Lecture delivered at Westminster Cathedral on 2 April 2008. At <[http://www.rcdow.org.uk/lectures/2008/transcripts/Faith And Life - 2008 - Tony Blair.pdf](http://www.rcdow.org.uk/lectures/2008/transcripts/Faith%20And%20Life-2008-Tony%20Blair.pdf)>.

32. P. Radhakrishnan, “Religion under Globalization,” *op. cit.*, 1405.

ORRU, Marco

1983 "The Ethics of Anomie: Jean Marie Guyau and Émile Durkheim." *The British Journal of Sociology*, 34/4: 499–518.

PETRAS, James and Veltmeyer, Henry

2001 *Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in The 21st Century*. London: Zed Books.

RADHAKRISHNAN, P.

2004 "Religion under Globalization." *Economic and Political Weekly*, 39/13: 1403–11.

RAHMAN, Anisur

2004 "Globalization: The Emerging Ideology in the Popular Protests and Grassroots Action Research." *Action Research*, 2/1: 9–23.

STAFF CORRESPONDENT

2005 "34 Islamic NGOs Get Over Tk 200cr from Donors a Year." *The Daily Star*, 31 August 2005.

THE GLOCAL FORUM WEBSITE

2009 <http://www.glocalforum.org/?id=197&id_p=193&lng=en>.

WIKIPEDIA WEBSITE

2008 *Anomie*. At <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anomie>>.

INDONESIA

MATTEO REBECCHI

Despite being the farthest Muslim area from Mecca and Medina, down through the centuries the Indonesian Archipelago has surprisingly become the country with the highest number of Muslims in the world. Islam has managed to take over prosperous and developed Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms, and spread all over the Archipelago, taking roots in ancestral traditional backgrounds and, all in all, overtaking the spreading of Christianity spearheaded by the Portuguese and Dutch missionaries. The result of this extraordinary development is that, today, Indonesia can count almost two hundred millions of Muslims, an amount close to 90% of its population. For this simple reason, trying to understand implications within globalization and religions, we are obliged to focus almost exclusively on Islam, neglecting other religions, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, whose presence in the country has been reduced to a small percentage.

In today's "globalized" times, especially in Western countries, it is commonly thought that Islam has always and everywhere

converted people by the sword, and Islam is therefore considered as justifying violence and as a threat to peace. In actual fact, however, the history of Islamic infiltration and development speaks of a peaceful, gradual and astonishing effective spreading of the Quranic faith across the Indonesian Archipelago. Moreover, the stereotypical image of Islam as intolerant and exclusive is disowned by the evidence that Islam has been able to lay deeper roots in different and ancestral cultural backgrounds, acculturating itself and giving its spiritual richness in such a way that it could be received, not as a burden imposed from the outside, but as gift, which can live alongside and respect local traditions and cultures.¹

We are aware that we must avoid the mistake of painting an excessively idealistic picture of Islam in Indonesia, saying that history reports only harmonious relationships among Islam and the Archipelago's cultures and other religions, but we should in any case be open to appreciate all the positive and original aspects that Islam in Indonesia has shown down through the centuries, especially with regard to its openness towards other cultures and religions. In the contest of globalization, the Islam practiced in the biggest Muslim country of the world and the history of its development, has a lot of things to say and teach, in terms of tolerance and openness, both to Muslim and non-Muslim world.

THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAM IN THE ARCHIPELAGO

We could say that, since its beginnings, the history of Islamic development began in a "globalized" way, that is, through a dense web of relationships with the world beyond the islands that make up the Archipelago. Long before the Prophet Muhammad's times, traders from Arabia and Persia managed to reach South East Asian coasts looking for spices and other exotic products and we can justifiably believe that, since the first century of the Muslim era, some contacts were already established between the Archipelago and Arabia. An Islamic community was reported to have settled down in the flourishing and cosmopolitan Buddhist kingdom of Sriwijaya, which dominated Sumatra, Malayasia and part of Java from the seventh century.²

Traces of Islam in the Archipelago are reported by Marco Polo, who visited Northern Sumatra (Aceh) in 1292 on his way back to Italy after his journey to China. The Italian

1. "Indonesian Islamic culture, although a part of the worldwide community of Islam, differs in many ways from other Islamic cultures in the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and Africa in its unique historical development, and because of the influences upon it of the traditions and folkways of the pre-Islamic societies in which it took root", in S. Soebardi and C.P. Woodcroft-Lee, "Islam in Indonesia," in Israeli Rafael ed., *The Crescent in the East, Islam in Asia Major* (London and Dublin: Humanities Press, 1982), 180.

2. A. Azyumardi, *Islam in the Indonesian World: An Account of Institutional Formation* (Bandung: Mizan, 2006), 149–59. According to Azyumardi, after disorder in Canton in 760, part of the local Muslim community, mainly composed of Arabs and Persians, moved to Palembang, in the Sriwijaya kingdom, cf. p. 153. For further information on the early development and spreading of Islam in the Archipelago see: S. Soebardi and C.P. Woodcroft-Lee, "Islam in Indonesia," *op. cit.*, 180–83; R. Soekmono, *Pengantar Sejarah Kebudayaan Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, vol. 3, 1973), 42–73; H.A. Abubakar, *Sekitar Masuknja Islam ke Indonesia* (Semarang: Ramadhani, 1971).

traveler writes about Muslim people living in the town of Perlak, whilst people living in the surrounding towns still held traditional beliefs. The tombstone of Sultan Malik al-Salih, the first sultan of Samudra Pase, who died in 1297, was found in the same part of Sumatra, and, speaking about his visit to the Samudra kingdom (Sumatra) in 1345, the Moroccan traveler Ibn Battuta writes that Islam had already taken roots in the same kingdom for almost a century.

Islam was brought to Java a little later by the so called *Wali Sanga* (The Nine Saints). The tomb of the first of them, Malik Ibrahim, was discovered in Gresik, close to the coasts of North Java. The Chinese traveler, Ma Huan, wrote in 1451 about the presence of different Islamic communities in several towns in Java, mainly composed of western Indians (from Gujarat, India) and Chinese. The complete establishment of Islam in Java coincides with the victory of a coalition of Muslim states led by the Demak ruler against the Hindu-Buddhist kingdom of Majapahit in 1478. Conversions to Islam generally started from harbor cities in the North coasts of the Archipelago, whilst infiltration into the interior areas took place gradually down through the centuries. Thus, the first Javanese kingdom which officially embraced Islam was the Mataram kingdom under Sultan Agung (1613–1645).

Since the fifteenth century, Malacca became a fundamental trading crossover in the Malay-Indonesian area and also an important Islamic centre. After its fall into Portuguese hands in 1511, the Aceh Sultanate (North Sumatra) became the most important Islamic kingdom and centre of Islamic civilization in the area. Moreover, the fall of Malacca became the starting point of more intense *da'wa* (preaching) activities in the Dutch Indies, since many Malacca Muslim citizens decided to leave the city, taking their faith to the harbor cities across the Archipelago. Gradually, the other islands were touched by the spread of Islam. Moluccas, important for spice trading, were reached by the Islamic faith in the fifteenth century, whilst Makassar, in the South Sulawesi, became Muslim at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Scholars have discussed the origins of Islam in Indonesia. The first theory, based on archeological evidence such as some typical tombstones from Gujarat (India) found in Sumatra, says that Islam came from India. This classical theory has been sustained by the Dutch and, in general, western scholars who, unfortunately, could not easily access the Arabic sources which could provide a more complete picture of the matter. Therefore, the historian Azyumardi Azra thinks that this theory does not have a strong foundation. Both he and other scholars believe that Islam came both from India and Arabia, but especially from Arabia, since the so called "Indian" or "Western" Muslims most probably were in fact Persians or even Arabs.³

But wherever the real starting point of Islam in the Archipelago was, we can fairly believe that the doctrines of the Holy Prophet were spread quite soon from all the previ-

3. A. Azyumardi, *Islam in the Indonesian World: An Account of Institutional Formation*, *op. cit.*, 10–25. Of the same opinion is Abubakar Atjeh, cf. Abubakar Atjeh, H.A. Abubakar, *Sekitar Masuknja Islam ke Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, 33–45. We should also be aware that one of the difficulties scholars face in studying the spreading of Islam in the Indonesian Archipelago is the huge multiplicity of languages and dialects they should know to correctly access historical sources, cf. S. Soebardi and C.P. Woodcroft-Lee, "Islam in Indonesia," *op. cit.*, 180.

ously mentioned places, namely Arabia, Persia and India because, from the thirteenth century onwards, the trade nexus across the Indian ocean, from Arabia up to China, created a sort of an “Arabic-speaking Mediterranean” along whose well defined trade routes, goods, people and ideas flowed freely back and forth.”⁴

It is generally believed that the first to bring Islam to Indonesia were the traders from Arabia, Persia and Gujarat (India), who came to the Archipelago, not with the main aim of spreading their religion, but rather of setting up their businesses in this region and the far East region. Some of them intermarried with local people and generated new Muslim families, who settled down especially in harbor cities in the North coasts. Generally speaking, Islam attracted the feudal rulers first and only afterwards did it gradually become the religion of the common people. Yet, considering the consistency of Islam’s development throughout the Archipelago, some scholars believe that this generalized spreading could not have been possible if it had been carried out only by common traders and through the conversion of kings. Thus it is believed that the spreading of the new religion throughout the Archipelago should be attributed to the arrival of more professional teachers and wandering Sufi preachers from the twelfth century onwards. According to Azyumardi Azra, “Islam did not put down its roots among the people of the archipelago states or win their rulers until it was preached by the *sufis*, and these did not become a dominant influence in Islam until the thirteenth century.”⁵

In fact Islam in Indonesia and, more in general, in the whole south East Asia, was imported in the shape of Sufism. This spiritual path convinced Indonesian people most probably because the new doctrine, which was strongly oriented to mysticism, fitted with the religious and spiritual pre-Islamic Indonesian world. Traditional stories tell that *Wali Sanga* (the Nine Saints), which brought Islam to Java, were able to teach Islamic doctrine and *Al Qur’an* along with mystical elements of the Sufi tradition. The preachers were also believed to possess supernatural powers, the ability to perform miracles and the gift of invulnerability (*kebal*). Those elements exercised a strong appeal on the Javanese spirit and, more in general, on people from all over the Archipelago. For these reasons, the transformation from a Hindu-Buddhist tradition to the Islamic tradition occurred through a gradual and peaceful process of acculturation of the new religion, assuring continuity with the pre-Islamic culture. It is believed, for instance, that Sunan Kalijaga, one of the *Wali Sanga* in Java, adapted the traditional Hindu-Buddhist tradition of *wayang kulit* (shadow theater), which was originally connected to ancestor worship, to the new doctrine, telling stories about Islamic heroes and teaching the Islamic faith and ethics to local people.⁶ It is also interesting to note that old mosques in Java assumed architectural pre-Islamic elements, such as the *serambi*, namely a kind of porch where

4. S. Soebardi and C.P. Woodcroft-Lee, “Islam in Indonesia,” *op. cit.*, 182.

5. A. Azyumardi, *Islam in the Indonesian World: An Account of Institutional Formation*, *op. cit.*, 19; 22. S. Soebardi and C.P. Woodcroft-Lee, “Islam in Indonesia,” *op. cit.*, 182; M. Thomas, *Islam in Asia* (Estella: Editorial Verbo Divino, 1991), 9–11.

6. S. Soebardi and C.P. Woodcroft-Lee, “Islam in Indonesia,” *op. cit.*, 183.

some ancient religious practices, like ritual meals (*Selamatan*) and alms-giving were provided. There were no domed roofs, or minarets: instead gongs were used for calling the worshippers to prayer.⁷ This tendency to respect and assimilate old traditional rituals and beliefs, created a sort of syncretistic religion in Java, which later took the shape of the so called *kejawen*, namely a mixture of Islam and Hindu-Buddhist elements, which became the spiritual path followed in special way in the aristocratic environments.⁸

Sufism “was an Islam which did not place great emphasis on doctrinal formulation, beyond the cardinal principle of the oneness of God, but emphasized, rather, the immanent presence of God and the illusory nature of the universe in relation to God’s unique reality.”⁹ In Sufism the stress is on the inner personal experience of relationship between man and God. This fact made Islam closer to traditional spiritual attitudes of the locals and made possible contaminations between Islam and many aspects of traditional culture and beliefs. According to Michel Thomas, with the exception of some universal prohibitions, like alcohol or pork, along with some ritual requirements, such as daily prayer, and *Ramadhan* fast, “Islam was not seriously disruptive of the way of life which had been traditionally followed.”¹⁰

Theologically, the Islamic principle of the oneness of God was interpreted by Sufis as a universal presence of the divine in the world that, in some extreme forms, created pantheistic doctrines. This fact led to controversies and even persecutions. In Java, the *Wali Sanga* themselves tried to correct the Sufi doctrine of Shaykh Siti Jenar, who some considered to be the biggest Islamic missionary in Java. He was condemned to death for “adhering to a heterodox mystical doctrine which centered on recognition of the identity of man with God as the Absolute Reality. In other words, Siti Jenar claimed that he was god for he had united with God.”¹¹ Some other controversial theories came into being during the centuries. Some educated Sufis developed a more philosophical oriented mysticism that was influenced by neo-Platonic theories, in which the universe is seen as emanations of the Divine, the so called *Wujūdiyyah*.

Islam was also able to build a web across the Indian Ocean, binding the Archipelago to the traditional sources of Islam. This net, which brought into being a kind of “spiritual globalization” of the Muslim world, was created both by scholars who came from Arabia to visit South East Asian countries, and by students and *hajis* who traveled from Indonesia to Mecca and Medina on pilgrimage.

Many pilgrims settled down in the Holy Land for several years with the aim of learning the purity of their religion. After their return to the Far East, their teachers in Arabia continued to send directives and advise their former pupils in the Archipelago on practical and doctrinal matters. It is also surprising to note that, despite difficulties in transpor-

7. M. Thomas, *Islam in Asia*, op. cit., 19–20; S. Soebardi, C.P. Woodcroft-Lee, “Islam in Indonesia,” op. cit., 186.

8. N. Mulder, *Mysticism in Java, Ideology in Indonesia*. (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2005), 16–29.

9. M. Thomas, *Islam in Asia*, op. cit., 17.

10. Ibidem, 17.

11. A. Azymardi, *Islam in the Indonesian World: An Account of Institutional Formation*, op. cit., 129.

tation (traveling from Arabia to the Indonesian Archipelago could take at least 8 months), this exchange of ideas and doctrines, but most probably also of filial affections between students and teachers, was already set up in the seventeenth century.¹² Later, the rise of colonies in the Malay-Indonesian areas had the effect of strengthening the political and military bonds between Malay-Indonesian and other Muslim areas, such as Arabia and Turkey, due to the common spirit of rivalry with colonial powers.

On the whole, the early process of conversion to Islam occurred in a peaceful way. Since it was brought by traders and not by the army, Islam was able to penetrate easily the harbor cities of the North coast also because traders could run their businesses in peace and tranquility.¹³ Besides, since it was Sufi oriented, the Islam that penetrated the Archipelago was welcomed as something familiar because it did not disrupt pre-Islamic traditions and spiritual attitudes, including the ones belonging to Hinduism and Buddhism. As such, Islam could develop and spread in most of the Archipelago in a gradual but amazingly consistent way.

THE GROWTH OF RADICAL ISLAM

Since the earliest times, Mystical Islam, which became the main religion across the Archipelago, encountered the opposition of orthodox environments. As we said above, the *Wali Sanga* themselves tried to eliminate some theological errors from the Sufism they brought to Java. Shaykh Siti Jenar was condemned to death because of his doctrine of unity of all beings with God. During his final trial he declared: "I am God. Who am I if not God, since nothing exists but Me?"¹⁴

Attempts to introduce a more *shari'ah* oriented Sufism were made in the seventeenth century through the work of al-Rānirī, al-Sinkili and al-Makassarī, three scholars who are considered to be the precursors of the Sufism reformation in the Malay-Indonesian compound. **al-Rānirī, who was born in India, though he was of Arab descent, tried to reform Islam in Aceh after his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1631.**

This attempt resulted in a persecution of Sufi's neo-platonic doctrines, which acknowledge the universe as a series of emanations of God, the so called *Wujūdiyyah*. Nevertheless, these efforts to strengthen the role of *shari'ah* in Islamic teachings were not caused by opposition to Sufism.

According to Azyumardi Azra, "opposition to Sufism in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago up to the eighteenth century was directed by and large to a more philosophical brand of Sufism. Conversely, there was no opposition to Sufism that was practiced in

12. Ibidem, 179–244. The author speaks of a real "International Network of Ulama."

13. In some way this fact shows that trade has the noble and positive vocation of binding people, cultures, and, in this case, also religions. The French economist Frederic Bastiat once said that "If it is not goods which get across borders, then weapons will cross it." *Zenith*, 22 May, 2008.

14. A report on this trial can be found in M. Nurcholish, *Islam Agama Kemanusiaan, Membangun Tradisi dan Visi Baru Islam Indonesia* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2003), 29–31.

accordance to the *shari'ah*.¹⁵ Furthermore, it must be said that this opposition was not widespread and it had not succeeded in eradicating mysticism or the Hindu-Buddhist elements which had influenced Islam in the Archipelago.

The controversy between the mystical way and a more *shari'ah* oriented Islam took on a new form during the nineteenth century due to an increase in the number of pilgrimages to Haramayn, the Holy Land. Under the sway of colonial powers, the connections between the Far East and Europe improved remarkably and new technology made traveling across the Indian Ocean safer. These facts produced the singular effect of facilitating pilgrimages to Mecca and, as a result, deeper relations between the world of Islam of the Archipelago and Arabia were established. At the same time, however, another important fact was about to affect Sufism inside and outside the Archipelago: the *Wahhabis* reformation in Arabia.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the advanced and prosperous Ottoman, Safavid and Moghul empires had succumbed to the power of unbelieving European powers. Nostalgia for past glory found an answer in the pursuit of a more pure and original Islam, which was believed capable of rebuilding a great Islamic state based on the Qur'an faith and law. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, *Wahhabis*, allied to Ibn Saud's family, conquered the Holy land and started their program of building a new Muslim society.

In a special way, this reforming plan turned out to be against Sufism, which was considered too spiritual and uninterested in political matters, and because of its excessively individual orientation. Conversely, according to *Wahhabis*, Islam should be able to transform and generate a new society, the Islamic State, in which *shari'ah* would become both the religious and the civil law. The ideal model for this new society was found in the early *Umma*, the religious community in Medina at the time of the Holy Prophet, who incarnated religious, political and military functions in one person.¹⁶

Since the *Wahhabis* conquest of the Holy Land, all the *haji* pilgrims were spiritually fed with reformist ideas and brought back to their homelands; thus, as was the case in other areas, this enthusiasm for renewal became a concrete threat for Sufism in Indonesia too. One of the first attempts of the reformers in the Indonesian Archipelago was to transform education structures. Traditional Islamic boarding schools, the so called *pesantren*, which used to be places where children learn the Qur'an and the mystical Sufi path, were

15. A. Azyumardi, *Islam in the Indonesian World: An Account of Institutional Formation*, *op. cit.*, 146-47.

16. According to Thomas Michel, the tension between traditional and reformist Islam can be summarized in the following points: a) Traditional Islam has been an interior religion. To the reformists, Islam is a social program for the holistic reformation of society in all its political, economic, and social aspects; b) Traditional Islam is quietist. Reformists are politically active and struggle for Islamization of society; c) Islam has adapted to indigenous and traditional practices, whilst reformists are purist; d) *Shari'ah* is fix and immutable; e) Reformists refuse the rational approach of traditional theology (*kalam*). Besides they stress social and political implications; 6) Reformists understood the importance of education and preparation of teachers. M. Thomas, *Islam in Asia*, *op. cit.*, 26-7.

transformed into a more puritan and fundamentalist-oriented educational structure. The arrival of teachers from Arabia gave an impetus to this trend.¹⁷

It was the *hajjis* returning from Mecca and Medina to the Minangkabau region (West Sumatra) who generated the *Padri* rebellion, which exploded in 1921 and was eventually suppressed by the Dutch army in 1936. However, the *Padri* movement was able to get rid of the aristocratic rulers who combined Islam with pre-Islamic practices in the Minangkabau region. This region is still a stronghold of radical Islam in Indonesia today.

The pursuit of Islamic renewal gave birth to several movements which came into being at the beginning of the twentieth century under the colonial power. The main three were Muhammadiyah, Sarikat Islam and Nadhatul Ulama. In 1912, after his pilgrimage to Mecca, Ahmad Dhalan founded the Muhammadiyah group. Initially, his attempts to purify and renew religion were rejected in his hometown of Yogyakarta. Nevertheless, the new movement soon developed especially in Java and the Minangkabau region in West Sumatra. Striving for Islamic renewal, Muhammadiyah understood the importance of education in order to create a well prepared Muslim élite and a new model of schools, namely, the so called *madrrasah*, where pupils were educated using a modern and efficient methodology. Pupils from the lower classes, and girls too, could have access to education with competent teachers, not only in religious matters, as was the case in the traditional *pesantren*, but also in secular subjects. Soon, Muhammadiyah expanded its influence also to publishing and producing a number of journals in local languages. Despite being founded in Java, Muhammadiyah grew faster in the Minangkabau region and generated two fundamental streams: the Javanese stream, which was more concerned with religious renewal, and the Minangkabau stream, which was more interested in social matters and political opposition against the colonial powers. Muhammadiyah tried to assume the Middle East doctrine, ritual and jurisprudence. On the other hand, it tried to make modern thinking and local cultures conform to a more pure Islam.

Another movement which came into being during the same period is Sarikat Islam (Islamic Union). Born as an association of traders but with the aim of increasing brotherhood among Muslims, this movement became a political party in 1913, assuming Islamic and communist ideology. Nevertheless, *Sarikat Islam* was unable to unite Muslim organizations against colonial power and it became politically bankrupt in 1933. Since then, the main role in the struggle for independence moved from this Islamic movement into the hands of the secularists.

The third movement, which was born in 1926, was the Nadhatul Ulama (NU), the “Renaissance of Scholars”. The origin of the Movement must be found in the Ahmadiyah controversy. This Lahore-based organization, which is generally considered to be hereti-

17. S. Soebardi and C.P. Woodcroft-Lee, “Islam in Indonesia,” *op. cit.*, 187–88. See also M. Thomas, “Islamic Revival and Its Implications for Christian-Muslim Dialogue.” At <http://groups.creighton.edu/sjdialogue/documents/articles/michel_islamic_revival.htm>.

cal, came to the Archipelago at the beginning of the twentieth century. Ahmadiyah, which claims that its founder, Mirza Gulham Ahmad, is prophet as the same order of the Prophet Muhammad, formally encountered the opposition of Muhammadiyah, but in actual fact the relationships between the two movements were still maintained. Sarikat Islam also gave support to the heresy, disappointing the traditionalists that decided to split and build their own organization, the Nadhatul Ulama, which focused its concern especially on religious matters, religious education, pilgrimages and unity among Muslims. NU turned out to be the Islamic movement which received the legacy of pesantren and traditional Javanese influenced Islam.¹⁸

These three movements incarnate three different interpretations of the change in times and the need for renewal, but none of them was able to unite the Muslim population into one force which could oppose the colonial power. In fact, the main role in the independence process was taken over by the secularists. In spite of the fact that it is the country with the largest Muslim population, in 1945 Indonesia was surprisingly built as a secular non-Islamic State. Actually, there had been attempts to introduce *shari'ah* in the Pancasila statement. In its draft formulation dated July 22, 1945 the first point of Pancasila included *shari'ah*, but this point was soon accused of discrimination by Christians in North Sulawesi, who had taken part in the struggle for independence alongside the Muslims. For this reason, on August 18, a day after the proclamation of Independence, the first point of the official formulation of Pancasila only declared the unity of God and made no reference to Islamic law. Thus, pluralism and freedom of worship were guaranteed and defended by the Constitution of the Nation.¹⁹ This fact disappointed the radical movements. In 1949 some rebellions aimed at building an Islamic State in West Java and South Sulawesi and, later, Aceh (1950). In 1958, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (RGRI) in Bukittinggi (West Sumatra) gave birth to a short-lived Islamic-guided state, which was suppressed by the Army.

TODAY'S CHALLENGES

Some factors triggered the growth of radicalism and fundamentalism in the Muslim world, affecting Indonesia too. The end of World War II coincided with the end of colonies in many parts of the globe. This fact brought to the surface a new awareness among Muslim people. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood struggled for the foundation of an Islamic State and for the growth of a pan-Islamic conscience around the world. The creation of the modern Islamic democracy in Pakistan, and secular governments in other former colonies, eventually failed to guarantee development, welfare and peace. The

18. For an historical overview of Muhammadiyah, Sarikat Islam and Nadhatul Ulama, see S. Soebardi and C.P. Woodcroft-Lee, "Islam in Indonesia," *op. cit.*, 190–204.

19. On this point see M. Nurcholish, *Islam Agama Kemanusiaan, Membangun Tradisi dan Visi Baru Islam Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, 3–20.

Palestinian struggle against Israel, the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Gulf War in 1991, and the war against terror, which was launched by President Bush after 9/11, brought to the surface anti-Western and anti-Israel sentiments across the whole Muslim world, including Indonesia. In the collective imagination of Muslim people, the United States and, more in general, Western cultures became concrete threats which attempted to isolate Islam. Islamic rulers allied with the USA were accused by the radicals of betraying Islam and collaborating against it.

In Indonesia these events facilitated the rise of fundamentalism, which took shape in several organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Laskar Jihad. Besides, there were also the Middle-East groups, such as Mujahiddin who strive to enter and be active in the Archipelago. Terrorist attacks against the Australian Embassy in 2004, the Bali bombing in 2002, and other events convincingly show how real those anti-western feelings are. Intolerance and violence were shown also against other religions. During the last decade, mass killings in Timor Lorosae after the Independence in 1998, bombing attacks on Christian churches, and violence in Sulawesi in 2000, show the hatred and intolerance against Christians.

But conflicts are also occurring within Islamic groups themselves. Recently, in central Jakarta, a rally demonstrating in favor of Ahmadiyah rights to freedom of worship was attacked by members of the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defence Front). Those events show that intolerance is growing, but we must also say that, generally speaking, the majority of Indonesian people do not support violence and seek peace and tolerance among ethnic and religious identities. It must also be said that the so called interreligious conflicts, like the one in Sulawesi in 2000, which caused some 5000 victims, are not always originated by religious differences. The quest for power is always their main cause and religions are only used as means to achieving political and economic goals.

In today's globalized world, radical Islam is addressing its criticism towards modernity and liberalism. For radical Islam, liberal values are too individualistic. Liberal views exalt personal rights and freedom, and limitations to freedom begin where the rights of the others start. In the anthropocentric liberal vision, man, and not God, is the center of the universe. God is not denied, but should be worshipped in a pure, not disturbing and private way. Criticisms are also addressed to moral relativism which is seen as a product of liberal culture and the cause of dehumanization. For all these reasons, radical Islam dreams of a simpler, non-materialistic and God-fearing lifestyle, and believes that *shari'ah* could represent the solution to the problems of our time.

After the fall of Suharto, Indonesia began a new process of decentralization, in which local administration had the possibility to adopt some special local regulations. This provided an opportunity to implement *shari'ah* in some areas. Nevertheless, there is quite a general disagreement about the suitability of *shari'ah* in Indonesia. Islamic law is seen as a possible source of discrimination for both cultural and religious minorities. Islamic law is also looked upon as a threat to the unity of the Nation, since some Indonesian regions are still mainly Christian or Hindu. But discriminations can also occur within

Islam itself, since every Muslim group and movement, including Muhammadiyah and Nadhatul Ulama, claims its own interpretation of *shari'ah* and its concrete implementation.²⁰ It is also feared that Islamic law can discriminate against women. The implementation of a poorly defined anti-pornography law in October 2008 resulted in the protest of many Muslim people and politicians. This law is meant to regulate public actions which can arouse the sexual instinct, but the description and limitations of those actions are not clear enough and are open to misinterpretation. Traditional dress and dances can be considered pornographic, and in some places an unaccompanied woman walking outside her house at night time can be accused of immoral behavior.

After this overview of the radical trends in parts of Islam in today's Indonesia, we must also say that fundamentalism is growing and it shows its influence, though it is not yet dominant in society. Looking at the political history of the country, since independence onwards, the Islamic political parties that support the implementation of *shari'ah* have always been a minority. This demonstrates that society mostly looks upon Islamic law as being unsuitable for finding a satisfactory solution to the country's moral and social problems. On the contrary, the ideology of Pancasila is considered to be the real element that represents the foundation of the country, and the cornerstone that could guarantee the coexistence of cultures and religions in the Archipelago.²¹

Moreover, the effort to purify traditional Islam of syncretism and the contaminations of pre-Islamic traditions has only partially succeeded. It is commonly said that *adat* (cultural customs and rituals) is still stronger than religion obligations. *Kejawen*, namely Javanese traditions, as a result of intermingling between Islam and Hindu-Buddhist elements, are very much alive in Java.

The same open attitude towards foreign cultural elements is visible today in the wide acceptance of Western cultural elements. It is possible to hear people declaring their disagreement with American Imperialism, but it is also true that most Indonesian people, including Muslim, play and listen to rock music, like Western movies, wear jeans, eat at Mc Donalds and will not refuse a scholarship to the USA. That means that we are still far away from a society built on a purely Quranic law and Islamic tradition. Some scholars insist on the need to distinguish between those elements of Islam that represent the substance of Islamic doctrine, and those that are merely cultural aspects of Arabic culture at the time of the Prophet, which got into the Islamic traditions only because Islam came into being in Arabia.

This discernment is necessary for the contextualization of Islam in today's Indonesian society and culture. The same discernment is needed to overcome the idea that Islam can be lived to the full only in an Arabian cultural context.²²

20. E. Sumtaki, *Syariat Islam, Urgensi dan Konsekuensinya* (Jakarta: Komunitas Nisita, 2003), 37–43.

21. A black list of Islamic countries which apply *Shar'ah* with problems of Human Rights can be found in E. Sumtaki, *Syariat Islam, Urgensi dan Konsekuensinya*, *op. cit.*, 26–9.

22. A. Moeslim, ed., *Islam Pribumi, Mendialogkan Agama Membaca Realitas* (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2003), xxi–ii.

Finally, if fundamentalism pushes towards a monolithic society trying to eradicate religious differences, we must also say that Indonesia is still a place where the coexistence of different religious creeds is possible. The story of Indonesia is a story of a multi-religious people. The struggle for independence was carried out by people of different religious backgrounds. We can say that, on the whole, interreligious tolerance is a common experience across the entire Archipelago, even though conflicts or difficulties in interreligious relationships have arisen here and there. This achievement is definitely the product of the Pancasila's ideology and its dream of *Kebhinnekaan* (unity in diversity), but it is also the effect of two other factors: the Asian attitude that seeks tolerance rather than confrontation and the openness and tolerance of Indonesian Islam towards other beliefs. What is needed now is a move from tolerance, respect and acceptance of others towards a deeper mutual understanding and acknowledgement, dialogue and collaboration.

CONCLUSION

The history of Islam in the Indonesian Archipelago shows that the teaching of the Holy Prophet arrived and was spread in a globalized way. Islam came from abroad and developed because of the preaching initially provided by foreign traders and later by more professional preachers. Nor can we forget the role of *haji* pilgrims in bringing what they learned in Arabia to the Archipelago. A deep net of relationships was also set up between scholars in the Archipelago and their teachers and friends overseas, in times when travel across the Indian Ocean was difficult and dangerous. These facts many tell us that spiritual bonds and the desire for the Quran's treasures were able to overcome geographical and cultural distances, bringing into being an *ante litteram* "spiritual globalization" in the Muslim World across the Indian Ocean.

On the whole, we must also emphasize the fact that Islam could spread gradually, but very consistently, across the main part of the future Indonesian Country. This fact demonstrates that Islam, and especially Sufism, which became dominant in the area for centuries, had the ability of fitting in with the local mentality, spiritual needs and culture. The result of this process is visible today, since Indonesia has become the Country with the highest number of Muslim people in the world. The mystical-oriented Islam, which developed in Indonesia, was also able to coexist and assume cultural and religious elements from the pre-Islamic society. This fact led to syncretism and doctrinal problems, which provoked the reaction of purists, but it somehow shows that the Islam which took roots in Indonesia mostly tolerates, respects and does not fear what comes to it from the outside. This open attitude deepens and finds its sources both in spiritual openness of Islam itself, and also in the pursuit of harmony, which represent a legacy of Hindu-Buddhist traditions that have forged the character of the Indonesian people down through the centuries.

Moreover, Islam could spread and be accepted in a peaceful way. This fact must be strongly emphasized, because it contradicts prejudices against Islam, which is often seen

as the religion which spread its influence in the world by means of the sword. Conversions in the Archipelago did not happen because of conquest and war, but because Islam was able to attract and convince people.

The reaction of modernist, *shari'ah* oriented reformers and fundamentalists seems to be mainly something imported, rather than an internal reaction towards doctrinal or moral errors. The source of reformation, which began at the beginning of the twentieth century, was clearly the *Wahabbi* renewal in Arabia which tried to recreate the society of the early times of Islam in Mecca and Medina. We should also reflect on those terms like "modernism" and "reformation", which rather mean "nostalgia" or "dreaming backwards", an excessively idealized golden age of early Islam. Besides the fact that the society created in Medina at the Prophet's times was most probably not as "ideal" as it is commonly said, we can also discuss whether or not that model can be presented as the best one for modern times. The impression is that, despite their names, modernists and reformists concretely make an "archeological" attempt to reawaken a time that belongs to the past and that cannot fit in anymore with today's culture and society. Will Indonesia be able to overcome the temptation to bow down to fundamentalism?

Despite the dream of Islamic brotherhood and a pan-Islamic world, the Muslims in Indonesia are divided into groups and factions. We can find the most fundamentalist doctrine that supports terrorism, but also extremely pluralistic esoteric groups which accept any spiritual path towards God. Politically, it is interesting to observe that division among the Islamic groups made them unable to build an Islamic state based on *shari'ah* when the colonial power fell, in a country with 90% of Muslims. Division among the two main Islamic movements, namely Nadhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, still seems irreconcilable. This disunity, and the absence of a commonly accepted doctrinal and moral authority, makes it difficult to deal with fanaticism and violence, since any group can claim that its ideas are in harmony with God's truth and will.

Globalization has affected Islam since it first began to spread and develop across the Indonesian islands. But, so far, it truly seems that the Islam which has taken roots in Indonesia, despite being the biggest Islamic group in the world, has received more from abroad than what it has given back. The time is now ripe for leaving behind any inferiority complex (especially in relation to the Arabian culture), and becoming aware of Indonesian Islam treasures, which must be shared with the rest of the Muslim World. The legacy of historical development, and the attitudes of the main part of modern Indonesian Islam, speak not only of fundamentalism and closeness, but also of tolerance, peace, contextualization and ability to embrace goodness wherever it comes from. It is not by chance that the last interreligious conference organized by the Community of Sant'Egidio and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was held in Rome on March 4, 2009, focused on the topic of "Unity in Diversity, the Culture of Coexistence in Indonesia" and presented Indonesia as a moderate Islam Nation which, despite its weaknesses, can become a model of coexistence of culture and religions for the rest of the world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABUBAKAR, Atjeh H.

1971 *Sekitar Masuknja Islam ke Indonesia*. Semarang: Ramadhani.

AZYUMARDI, Azra

2006 *Islam in the Indonesian World: An Account of Institutional Formation*. Bandung: Mizan.

HEFNER, Robert W., ed.

2007 *Politik Multikulturalisme, Menggugat Realitas Kebangsaan*. Yogyakarta: Impulse-Kanisius.

MICHEL, Thomas

2009 "Islamic Revival and Its Implications for Christian-Muslim Dialogue." At <http://groups.creighton.edu/sjdialogue/documents/articles/michel_islamic_revival.htm>.

1991 *Islam in Asia*. Estella: Editorial Verbo Divino.

MOESLIM, Abdurrahman (ed.)

2003 *Islam Pribumi, Mendialogkan Agama Membaca Realitas*. Jakarta: Erlanngga.

MULDER, Niels

2005 *Mysticism in Java, Ideology in Indonesia*. Yogyakarta: Kanisius.

NURCHOLISH, Madjid

2003 *Islam Agama Kemanusiaan, Membangun Tradisi dan Visi Baru Islam Indonesia*. Jakarta: Paramadina.

SOEBARDI, S. and Woodcroft-Lee, C.P.

1982 "Islam in Indonesia", in R. Israeli, ed., *The Crescent in the East, Islam in Asia Major*. London and Dublin: Humanities Press.

SOEKMONO, R.,

1973 *Pengantar Sejarah Kebudayaan Indonesia*. Voll. 1–2–3, Yogyakarta: Kanisius.

SUMTAKI, Edy, ed.

2003 *Syariat Islam, Urgensi dan Konsekuensinya*. Jakarta: Komunitas Nisita.

JAPAN

TIZIANO TOSOLINI

In fact the whole of Japan is a pure invention,” Oscar Wilde wrote in 1889. “There is no such country, there are no such people...The Japanese people are simply a mode of style, an exquisite fancy of art.”¹ Echoing Wilde, the eccentric postmodern sociologist Jean Baudrillard compared contemporary Japan to a mere “satellite of the planet Earth:”² artificial, de-territorialized, weightless, beyond the real; a body in orbit with a minimal influence on the real centers of power where the destiny of the world is decided, but also a satellite that continues to make itself present and visible through its manufacturing, its refined products and goods, its uncontested economic prestige. Baudrillard’s judgment, much like Wilde’s, even though excessive and disproportionate, hides an irrefutable truth: glo-

1. O. Wilde, *The Artist as Critic: Critical Writings of Oscar Wilde* (Ed. by R. Ellmann. New York: Random House, 1969), 315.

2. J. Baudrillard, *America* (Trans. C. Turner. London: Verso, 1988), 79.

balization respects no boundaries, it advances without moving, rewrites geographies and maps with the blood-colored ink of profit, scoffing at all prohibitions that would limit and control alien influxes and ways of thinking, foreign customs, styles and beliefs. The world has undoubtedly become a “global village”, as the well-known media guru Marshall McLuhan prophesized as early as 1964,³ but the simultaneity and unfolding of meaning within a shared horizon and a single space (the world’s global feature) do not strictly imply that its inhabitants now live as if they lived in the same village, knew each other, and formed a historical and relational community (its local feature). On the contrary, as Marc Augé remarked,⁴ today more than ever we live in spaces that are “non-places,” anonymous surroundings that obliterate individual identities and contaminate all sense of belonging, indistinctly transforming each person into a generic consumer who is only asked to wait in line, follow instructions, enjoy the product and queue to pay the bill.

The distinction between the particular and the general, the local and the global, however, should not be taken too literally or too rigidly: the term “glocalism”⁵, first coined in Japanese marketing jargon in the 1980s, indicates that the local heritage and the specific group to which one belongs are not swallowed up and annihilated by a larger system of relations but, rather, constitute an irreplaceable element of this very system. It is the micro-group—so the theory goes—which by growing and developing, interacts with increasingly articulated groups until it reaches today’s complex globalizing realities.

Moreover, glocalization acknowledges the fact that the appearance of new styles of communication, stemming from the development of new technologies and media, are having a decisive effect on current social change: massive amounts of information can now be transmitted instantly, accurately, in multiple formats to multiple destinations; one can access, store and share an uncontrolled amount of information without having to ask for anyone’s permission or opinion (and thus bringing about a kind of “actualized democracy”); we are able to speak in real-time with everybody located everywhere in the world, allowing the body to cover the distance separating it from the event; along with the expansion of a global economy, we are witnessing the revival of local cultures and the valorization, both in cultural and in economic terms, of particular traditions, customs, stories and memories.

The sphere of religion, too, is not immune to the changes brought about by this technocratic information age. The conventional forms of religion, linked intimately to the histories and cultures of respective nations and ethnic groups, are increasingly being replaced by organizations and religious movements whose strategies and proselytiz-

3. M. McLuhan, *The Global Village: Transformations in World Life and Media in the 21st Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

4. M. Augé, *Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity* (London & New York: Verso Books, 1995).

5. The concept was later imported into the English speaking world by R. Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992); “Globalisation or Glocalisation?” *Journal of International Communication*, 1994, 1/1: 33–52.

ing activities overflow and transcend all geographical borders and social boundaries; the developing of new means of information exchange allow an increasing number of people to possess more advanced and abundant religious knowledge than professional experts in the field, such as priests, ministers, monks, or *kannushi*. And if in the past the so-called “world religions” (Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam) attempted to develop a hybrid form of “glocalism” by translating and incarnating their message and rites in the particular culture-settings in which they operated, today the phenomenon of “globalization of religion” has taken this mechanism to its extreme consequences: the phenomenon of “inverse influences”⁶ indicates precisely that globalization is not a one-way process, with influences coming from the dominant (i.e., Western) culture, but in various cultural situations is something that exhibits a multitude of influences and cross-fertilization, of “neo-syncretisms”⁷ that intentionally amalgamate the most diverse doctrines and rituals merely on the basis of available information, and without the necessity of any actual contact between the religious groups involved.

All these metamorphoses taking place in the religious field come sharply to the fore in the phenomenon of the new religions.⁸ In fact, globalization seems to offer more vitality and space to these new spiritual expressions than to such traditional established religions as Shinto and Buddhism, which outside Japan—with the exception of a limited number of Zen organizations—tend to focus their efforts solely on Japanese expatriates or ethnic Japanese.

The organizational structure of these new religions can be compared to that of groups regulated by the most sophisticated method of proselytism, with a semi-independent operation of the organizations in each country in accordance with the unique cultural and social situations of the respective country, but also characterized by the presence of mutual organic relations between the various national branches, and oriented toward continual enlargement of the organization as a whole. It is because of this quasi manage-

6. The term “inverse influences” is taken from P. B. Clarke, ed., *Japanese New Religions in Global Perspective* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000).

7. In the past, Japan certainly experienced forms of syncretism (especially of Shinto and Buddhist elements), but here the term “neo-syncretism” is meant to indicate a phenomenon that is typical of the new Japanese religions: the indiscriminate blending of elements obtained by merely accessing information about doctrines, teachings, and activities of other religious movements that do not belong to Japan’s longstanding spiritual tradition.

8. The term “new religions” (*shinkō shūkyō* 新興宗教) refers to the religious movements or groups that have recently emerged in Japan which display an array of elements variously derived from popular religiosity, esoterism, and sometimes also from Christianity, as well as Buddhism and Shinto. The new religions have some common traits, such as the veneration of the founder as a *kami* (or divine spirit); the relationship with the world of spirits has its roots in Japanese popular religiosity and Shamanism; the new religions promise an immediate relief from physical and spiritual problems and a certain prosperity in this life; they are based on new sacred scriptures and revelations (presented as supernatural in origin), frequently delivering prophecies about the end of the world; the new religions do not stand aloof from the world, nor from people who belong to a different faith, but are active within the culture, open to dialogue with other religions and inclined to favor the possibility of belonging to two different faiths.

rial and entrepreneurial structure that the new religions are also called “multinational religions”⁹—a term not accidentally borrowed from the economic sphere. The prototype par excellence of this new religious structure is without doubt the lay association Sōka Gakkai (創価学会), organized globally under the name the Sōka Gakkai International (SGI), which coordinates 198 branches present in as many countries for a total of 12 million followers. Other new religions with the latent potential to become multinational are the Church of World Messianity (*Sekai kyūsei kyō* 世界救世教), with 41 active branches and one million followers, the World Divine Light Organization (*Sūkyō Mahikari* 崇教真光), based in Takayama, with 20 branches and 490,000 followers, the Perfect Liberty Kyōdan (パーフェクト リバティー教団), based in Osaka, present in 10 countries, with 500 temples scattered throughout the world and a total of 1,250,000 members.

It must be observed that Japan is not immune to this logic of “inverse influences” and to the quasi economic structure that characterizes the new spiritual movements. Multinational religious groups of foreign origin are also present in Japan, as in the case of the Unification Church of Korea, counting 400,000 associates, of the Jehovah Witnesses and the Mormons, or Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, with 100,000 and 114,000 adepts respectively, and of some Taoist sects primarily from Taiwan.

However, globalization, together with the phenomenon of glocalism, gave birth to other kinds of religious organizations which, instead of adopting economic strategies typical of multinational corporations, are rather present in the field of networking and multimedia information. The “network” religions operate or act, not so much by advancing with overseas propagation and the establishment of branch organizations, but rather by seeking out global sympathizers who would embrace their cause and participate in their activities—activities that are primarily devoted to the promotion of peace, environmental protection and various social reforms. In this case, the priority given to the expansion of the group organization itself is secondary with respect to active participation in the movement. Among these religions, we can certainly count the Society of White Light (*Byakkō shinkōkai* 白光真宏会), which from 1951 gathers followers and sympathizers by proposing a simple practice to them: to repeat the prayer for peace (“May peace prevail on earth”) and, in an irenic and ecumenical spirit, it also asks its nearly 1,000 followers to erect the so called “peace prayer poles” (there are about 100,000 of them worldwide and this activity intensified after 9/11).

As for the second group, the advent and development of new forms of electronic and digital communication based on computers fostered the creation of “shapeless organizations,” of “stateless religions” without a clear country of origin or headquarters. For instance, the apocalyptic sect *Aum Shinrikyō*, in order to spread its message, made abundant use not only of traditional media (pamphlets, journals, books, CDs, radio programs,

9. Cf. H. Nakahami, “The Indigenization and Multinationalization of Japanese Religion—Perfect Liberty Kyōdan in Brazil,” M. Mullins, R. Young, *Japanese New Religions Abroad*. Special Issue of the *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*, 1991, 18/2–3: 213–42.

tv interviews), but also of such new means as e-mails, web pages and internet sites.¹⁰ Finally, we should note that besides the transformation of religions at the organizational level, globalization and the age of informatics can also directly influence both the message and the relationship between the messenger and the receiver of the religious discourse. So, for instance, the fundamental doctrinal tenet of *Ōmotokyō* (大本教)—that all religions have the same origin (*bankyō dōkon* 万教同根)—is shared and promoted by many recent new religions, thus contributing to the weakening of the idea that to adopt and make use of elements derived from a variety of religious traditions is erroneous or contrary to a certain spiritual purism.

The same can be said of the changes that took place in a cultural milieu where an increasing number of people (or consumers) are no longer mere passive beneficiaries of information, but transmitters of information in their own right, thus preventing a limited intellectual elite of specialists from monopolizing access to religious information. We can therefore expect that an ever greater number of individuals will emerge as spiritual leaders preaching a message not only simple enough to be accepted by other ordinary people, but delivered in such a way that those adherents can easily turn around and transmit the message to others—or even become themselves founders of new religions.¹¹

What globalization is promoting in this field is, in fact, the rejection of conventional religious systems—in which the core of the social functioning and historical continuity of a religion is guaranteed by an established institution (the Church for Christianity, the *Sangha* in Buddhism, the shrine in Shinto) whose doctrines are protected and transmitted by a tradition and whose religious leaders are recognized as authoritative interpreters of the faith—in order to adopt a kind of user-oriented system of religious marketing in which each individual analyzes, selects, and experiments, among the various religions, the elements one finds more attractive and suitable to his or her spiritual sensibility. New ways of proselytizing are also emerging which require an ever decreasing number of individuals exclusively committed to missionary activity: new religions frequently gain new foreign members by the informal efforts of Japanese lay members who are sent to work at companies or factories in other Asian countries.

We should not forget, however, that in this idyllic and almost surreal scenario, constantly reshaped by novel means of informatics, the new religious systems inevitably bring along hidden dangers and traps. The loss of authority of institutionalized religions

10. M. Watanabe, “*Aum Shinrikyō* and Its Use of the Media. Five Phases of Development,” *Bulletin of the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture*, 2005, 29: 42–53.

11. Many founders of religious movements were once disciples of at least one new religion. This is the case of Mokichi Okada (1882–1955), founder of the *Sekai kyūsei kyō* and once follower of the *Ōmotokyō*. Kōtama Okada (1901–1974), who established the *Sūkyō Mahikari*, also belonged to the *Sekai kyūsei kyō* for a few years, while Masaharu Taniguchi (1894–1985), founder of The Home of Infinite Life (*Seichō no ie* 生長の家)—a movement influenced by the New Thought, which had a relevant number of followers particularly in Brazil—was once a member of the *Ōmotokyō*. A former disciple of Taniguchi, Masahisa Goi (1916–1980), founded the *Byakkō shinkōkai*.

goes hand in hand with a weakening of the social integrating role of religion. Particularly for social groups like national and traditional communities, the introduction of new religious forms may foment more tension than harmony or integration. In a similar way, the increasing erosion of the lines of demarcation between the religious and the secular sphere can only weaken the link between the people and their traditional religions: this is evident in the new generation of young Japanese who choose to enjoy themselves during the Christmas season, thus failing to visit the temple on the occasion of the New Year, or who treat the Buddhist seasonal rites with increasing indifference only to celebrate Valentine's day or Halloween, two foreign feasts that have become rituals of mere consumerism.

Another danger caused by the development of new media and communication technologies seems to be the relationship that can be easily established between religion and crime. Japan itself witnessed how the *Aum Shinrikyō*, whose members were educated young people from wealthy families and with a marked interest in natural science, collected information and data on how to produce poisonous gas using modern electronic communication. The gas was released on March 20, 1995 in the Tokyo subways, killing ten people and injuring over five thousand.¹²

In the inevitable historical process of globalization and glocalism, many traditional religions find it increasingly difficult to claim or legitimize the uniqueness of their own religious inspiration and, not without apprehension, they feel almost unable to offer a remedy to the rampant problem of spiritual relativism. One of the most evident consequences of globalization is the transformation of the very concept of religion itself, of its missionary activity, of beliefs that can be reshaped and transmitted anonymously, of human relationships which could now be exempted from all actual involvement and physical proximity. In this scenario, to foresee or guess what is in store for religion seems an almost impossible task. But in the chaotic maze of messages, slogans, and ideals sponsored by a prevailing globalization, a feeble certainty seems to linger and endure, thus unveiling its almost indelible and undying character—that each individual seems unable to find (or experience) a deep and meaningful sense of peace and harmony until some kind of relationship has been established with a Life force, a Transcendent God, an unknown Alterity, a Spiritual energy, an absolute Being or Nothingness... in other words, with something or Someone to which the individual inevitably turns in times of danger, economic uncertainty, lack of hope and unbearable solitude, which this digital age, regardless of its globalizing quality, seems only to intensify without ever finding a suitable cure.

12. On the reactions of Japanese society to this incident, see R. Kisala, & M. Mullins, *Religion and Social Crisis in Japan. Understanding Japanese Society through the Aum Affair* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); I. Reader, *Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyō* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BAUDRILLARD, Jean

1988 *America*. Trans. C. Turner. London: Verso.

BAUMAN, Zygmunt

2005 *Globalizzazione e glocalizzazione*. Trad. E. Coccia. Roma: Armando Editore.

CLARKE, Peter Bernard

2006 *New Religions in Global Perspective: A Study of Religious Change in the Modern World*. London: Routledge.1999 *A Bibliography of Japanese New Religious Movements: With Annotations and an Introduction to Japanese New Religions at Home and Abroad - Plus an Appendix on Aum Shinrikyō*. Surrey: Japan Library.

INTROVIGNE, Massimo

1989 *Le nuove religioni*. Milano: Sugarco.

MULLINS, Mark and Young, Richard

1991 *Japanese New Religions Abroad*. Special Issue of the *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*, 18/2-3.

TULLIO-ALTAN, Carlo

2002 *Le grandi religioni a confronto. L'età della globalizzazione*. Milano: Feltrinelli.

WATANABE Manabu

2005 "Aum Shinrikyō and Its Use of the Media. Five Phases of Development," *Bulletin of the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture* 29: 42-53.

There is a great affinity between religion and globalization; we could even say that what nowadays is called globalization is the expansion of a religion: the religion of the Western-style market economy and of its methods. However, religions add to the phenomenon of globalization in several ways: the variety of the places/cultures which saw their beginnings and their first inculturation; differences in the ways they expand; the claim to absoluteness¹. This claim alone jeopardizes the whole process of globalization, because it re-creates, everywhere, those immeasurable differences that in the past were kept apart by the great distances among far away places. As for different ways of expansion, we can observe contrasting phenomena: on the one hand religions, at least partially, conform

1. Claim to absoluteness means that the one who belongs to a religion comprehends and interprets everything as a function of his belief. This is necessary and unavoidable. Different forms of syncretism do not contradict this assertion because even when a religion accepts foreign elements or deities, it does this insofar as it does not undermine its basic structure.

themselves to the organization and advertising methods typical of market globalization; on the other they oppose to those methods the much more considerable—although less visible—strength that comes together with the experience of belonging to a tradition and to all the cultural forms that tradition produced through the centuries. In other words, the resistance offered by religions to globalizing trends, their ability to offer alternative opportunities, even to take advantage of the phenomenon to expand themselves, question market globalization to its roots and reveal it as not necessary: it is only the result of the efforts and skills of some minority power groups.

ASIAN GLOBALIZING ATTEMPTS

The contemporary presence on the planet of different kinds of globalization attempts, some of which start from Asia, is a factor in worldwide instability. Among these, is the Islamic expansion. It has been at work for more than a millennium, on the basis of missionary efforts, of commercial relations and as a result of military conquest which led to the creation of empires which lasted till the beginning of the twentieth century. By these means Islam expanded from Spain to Indonesia and Malaysia, from Gansu in China and the Balkans in Europe to the Sub-Saharan regions in Africa, with the intention of submitting these regions to the rule of the *sharia*. Islamic globalization is essentially religious.

At present, it continues through population growth, which leads to emigration toward other territories (Europe, US)², and through armed conflicts, which aim at territorial expansion (Sudan, Darfur) and at self-defense from external intrusions (Afghanistan, Mindanao, Somalia, Chechenia). There are not, apparently, cultural proposals other than religious beliefs and traditions, able to lure the attention of the media audience. Rather, it is the Muslim world which is dazzled by the lights of Western civilization, in the same way as the Persian Empire and then Rome were fascinated by Greek civilization. This prompts reactions of closure and opposition, which however do not offer stronger alternatives.

THE CASE OF CHINA

As for Chinese expansion, it presents a peculiar profile. On the one hand it is based on the conquest of markets worldwide; on the other hand the Chinese way to globalization is different, according to the millenarian tradition of the Central Kingdom: not as much an expansion but rather an attraction, according to a relationship of dependence, towards a center that does not yield to any external influence.

Chinese expansion is partly physical: the presence of Chinese colonies everywhere in the world, which are not only territorial (the omnipresent Chinatowns, often clearly

2. In these countries, where political worldviews and legal systems favor respect and propagation of religious plurality, they can easily apply for citizenship and its correspondent rights and obligations. Since their birth rate is usually higher than that of other groups, they constitute an increasingly important cultural or religious entity that has the potentials to reshape the political and cultural physiognomy of their host countries.

marked off from the surrounding neighborhoods), but also commercial, projecting all over the world the ambiguous convenience³ of the made in China.

It is also ideological, at two levels. The immediately visible one is the proposal of Confucian tradition (the traditional Chinese ethic attitudes conducive to social harmony⁴), not only in China but also abroad: with the support of the government, about 200 Confucian Study Centers have been opened in Universities worldwide so far, their number increasing.⁵ At a deeper level there is the proposal of a way of managing democracy (the US ideological platform exported all over the world) that, although not openly challenging it, nevertheless works on the growing gap between those who rule and their subjects, a gap slowly leading to new forms of feudalism.⁶

In such a framework, a tight ideological control over the territory of the motherland becomes crucial. This explains the commitment of authorities at every level in order not to allow the formation of autonomous groups, which may propose ideologies and policies different from the ones of the ruling class.⁷

This confirms what has been said above about the reciprocal intolerance of religions. An established religious government, or a political power, or nationalistic tendencies, do not easily accept alternatives to their absolute control of the territory, because such a monolithic stance is necessary in order to expand, and/or to ward off others' invasions.

Therefore, as a matter of fact, structured and autonomous religious projects, such as Tibetan Lamaism, Islam, Christianity, have no citizenship on Chinese territory; as a consequence, they are neutralized through tight control and rescission of any link with the outer world and by emptying from inside the substance of their traditions: as far as possible the external forms are left intact, but the spirit leading their followers, especially those in power is, as far as possible, normalized.

Besides that of structured religions, the years of Communist rule had virtually decreed the death of popular religion too: together with the sects variously originated as Buddhist offspring, local temples were considered as potential origin of anti-government move-

3. Profiting from an internal lower labor cost (obtained through oppressive conditions, paradoxically protected by a curious interpretation of Marxist doctrines according to which under a Communist rule there is no need of unions), Chinese poor quality goods are sold at lower prices. This compels local factories to shrink their production or to close, by this impoverishing buyers and in general the economic life of the countries where Chinese goods are exported.

4. The Chinese for "harmony" is 和 (he2), the character displayed in the opening ceremony of 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. It is formed by 禾 (he2), pictograph of grain on the stalk, and 口 (kou3), "mouth."

5. Confucian Centers pave the way for a globalization with Chinese characteristics: they promote, justify and support the Chinese view of business, trade, cultural, social and political life.

6. See: "PRC Erodes Rights Abroad: Forum," <<http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/05/24/200344413>>.

7. The decision has recently been taken to the effect that starting from July 01, 2009, all new computers to be sold in China must have a software (the so-called "Green Dam Youth Escort") that automatically closes Microsoft browser Internet Explorer if the user tries to access a blacklisted site, in order to protect children from pornography. The launch of such policy has however been delayed one day before its going into effect. <<http://www.taipetimes.com/News/biz/archives/2009/06/13/2003446077>>; <<http://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/07/01/2003447587>>.

ments. Now, especially in the countryside, Guan Gong, Tu Di Gong, Ma Zu are experiencing a glorious revival, together with the whole Pantheon of popular religion, its calendar, rites, taboos and devotions.⁸ Two or three generations are not enough to neutralize the strength of beliefs and customs practiced for millennia. If it is possible for a political power to forcibly control its territory, it is also possible that ancient traditions do not tolerate intrusions, independently from how much they are politically and economically motivated, and from the means by which they are enforced.

The case of Buddhism in China is special: being a foreign religion, it has tried to adapt itself to the Chinese environment, in order to be accepted. The ambivalence of the present outcomes clearly illustrates both the government strategy of control, and the lines of reaction.

At the beginning of the last century, the famous monk Taixu (1890–1947) started a movement of revival of Buddhism, envisaging a spirituality more oriented towards the creation of a “Pure Land” on this earth. The seeds he sowed are bearing fruit both in China and Taiwan. In China, Buddhism has reappeared on the stage and is experiencing a veritable revival. Nowadays there are in China about 13,000 temples and 200,000 monks and nuns; institutions for Buddhist studies have been reopened or created; the celebration in 1998 of the bi-millennium of the introduction of Buddhism in China turned into a great opportunity to restate, from both sides, the need Buddhism and Chinese government have of each other, in order to build their future together.⁹ For Buddhism, it is only traditional to cooperate with the state; and the present rulers of China acknowledge the role Buddhism has had in Chinese culture, to the point of becoming an inseparable part of it.

All this, under the control of the State. When Buddhism supports Tibetan autonomy, or Islam supports the independence of Xinjiang; and when Falungong grows outside the supervision of government religious agencies,¹⁰ they are mercilessly crushed.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century Continental China is still a territory off-limits for religious freedom, such as it is understood in Western countries: the gain brought about through Christianity, that political power has neither the right nor the need to an absolute control of religions, is far from being accepted, not to say understood.

In such a situation, religions respond with different strategies, according also to their structures. Where religion and national identity are closely interwoven (Lamaism in Tibet, Islam in Xinjiang), movements of organized resistance grow, and problems

8. J. F. Pas, ed., *The Turning of the Tide: Religion in China Today* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

9. Data in Christian Cochini, “Chinese Buddhism Revival and Inter-religious Dialogue,” *Religion and Culture: Past Approaches, Present Globalisation, Future Challenges* (Macau Ricci Institute, Macau, 2004), 265–77, here 266.

10. Falungong can be interpreted as an outgrowth of a movement, the so-called “Qigong fever,” which held sway in China in the 1950s and 1980s, and was initially sponsored by the government. The Qigong techniques were hailed as introducing a scientific revolution, a new Somatic Science able to integrate religion, folklore and ethics into the realm of science. On this, see D. Palmer, “The Body at the Junction of Religion and Scientism. Modernization of Meditative Traditions in Contemporary China,” *Religion and Culture: Past Approaches, Present Globalisation, Future Challenges* (Macau Ricci Institute, Macau, 2004), 313–34.

increase; in the case of Christianity, there are attempts to find articulated answers: a mix of high-level meetings and of small-size activities, which may elude the omnipresent control of security agencies; in the case of Buddhism, State control may even be felt as positive, a sign of cooperation. If finally religious groups find their humus in the widespread thirst for meaning and in the revival of traditional folk-religions practices, new organizations are born, which on the one hand may grow rapidly, and on the other hand meet with repression and intimidation.

GLOBALIZATION AND RELIGIONS IN TAIWAN

A foreigner living in Taiwan does not need too much time to realize that, at least at a first sight, the island is a sort of paradise for religions, which find in it citizenship and vital space.¹¹ With reference to the phenomenon of globalization, what immediately appears is the presence of foreign religions (Christianity in its many branches, but also Indian and other modern groups), brought in to Taiwan by international communities of followers. As for major religions, the developments of Buddhism and of traditional folk Chinese beliefs are a source of great interest.

The case of *Buddhism* deserves special attention: some religious proposal (the new wave of humanistic Buddhism) which came to Taiwan from Mainland China about the end of the Second World War, met with increasing success; having developed new patterns on the island, they are expanding among the Chinese diaspora all over the world in very visible forms.

Some masters coming to Taiwan from China received disciples and realized some large scale projects, which are diversified and somehow complementary; they brought about a Buddhist renaissance, a Buddhism with Taiwan characteristics.

In the wake of Taixu's teachings, these masters adapted Buddhism to the peculiar culture of the island and to the new social conditions. They concentrated their efforts towards the creation of centers that make the doctrine visible and multiply its irradiation. Such centers are called "mountains" according to the traditional way; they extend over entire hillsides, with temples, meditation halls, universities, libraries, monasteries. Great numbers of followers move within the orbit of these centers. They visit them, go there in pilgrimage and there receive their formation; they support the centers financially and through voluntary service. Besides, monasteries have chapters abroad. It is from Taiwan that Buddhism has reached common people in North and South America, Europe and Africa. Even in Europe, Buddhism was known only as a philosophy and a topic for scholarly research, not as a religion open to all. Taiwan Buddhism has made it become a real global religion.

With reference to Buddhist tradition, Taiwan's masters opened new ways. They did not propose the meditation of all Buddhist Scriptures, but chose some, which they deemed

11. For Taiwan religions statistics see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_Taiwan>.

more important. In this way they simplified their learning and made it more appealing. Similarly, in order to lessen the difficulties of traditional asceticism, they proposed different and easier ways to gain merits, such as reciting sacred texts, helping monks and people in need, giving financial contributions to their institutions.

With reference to social position and image, these masters promoted the status of monks and nuns, which was very low. Now they dress well, live in quarters that, if not luxurious, are at least very dignified, attend university studies and get academic degrees, offer a very qualified contribution towards the molding of Taiwan culture, e.g. in the ecological field, in inter-religious dialogue, in social aid and in the field of Chinese tradition. Moreover, they attributed women a much greater importance than the one they had in Buddhist tradition, so that through their contribution Buddhism makes an even greater impact on Taiwan society.

There are contacts with the political world, because of the masters' lobbying skills and thanks to the contribution of professional people, who feel honored to put their competence at the service of their faith. Buddhism as a whole has been able to conquer the higher strata of society, by presenting an image of itself highly refined and attractive, able to respond to the specific needs of the upper classes in a satisfactory way.

To sum up, Taiwan Buddhism, at least in some of its organizations, has gone through an evolution that has prepared it not only to face the challenges of present day globalization, but also to play a leading role in it: a high-class Buddhism, made easier, socially committed, revered and admired, with a solid organization, able to export its patterns.

Indeed, in the places where the Chinese diaspora lives, these groups are present, even with imposing structures. Taiwan Buddhism has taken advantage of the Buddhist intercultural tradition in general, and of its specific experience, to make itself present wherever globalization expands, to the point of becoming one of the trademarks of Chinese culture abroad. A case in point is the Fo Jiao Ciji Gong De Hui (佛教慈濟功德會, **Buddhist Compassion Relief Foundation**). It was founded by a woman, a self-ordained Master, with poor means; now it has more than 300,000 volunteers, hospitals and schools, offering aid to places hit by natural calamities with the greatest timeliness and professionalism, expanding Buddhist *Dharma* through social works, especially in the Developing World.¹²

A noteworthy event, signaling the ability of Taiwanese Buddhism to play a prominent role in the political arena has been the Second World Buddhist Forum (WBF), which took place on March 28–30 2009 in Wuxi, Jiangsu (China), and on March 30–April 2 in Fo Guang Shan (Taiwan).

The first WBF had taken place in Zhejiang (China) in 2006 and had been organized by the Chinese government. Taiwan Masters seized the opportunity offered by the Forum to

12. C. J. Huang, "Globally Engaged Buddhism: The Buddhist Compassion Relief Foundation from Taiwan," *Taiwan Journal of Religious Studies*. 2005, 5/1: 1–38.

introduce themselves as authoritative partners in the revived process of dialogue across the Taiwan Straits. The Dalai Lama and his supporters were not invited.¹³

*Other religions*¹⁴ present in Taiwan also show features that are in line with Buddhist development patterns: charismatic leadership, recognizable distinctive elements, solid economic organization, middle-high social class members (to have some money and some free time at disposal seem to be important factors facilitating religious involvement), influence on culture. Seen from outside, they present characteristics that are similar to those of business companies. This is also easily understandable: in a time in which market is everything, even religions pattern themselves according to market needs and requirements. Religions coming from abroad too conform to similar patterns. They find followers among those who are disoriented in the maze of numberless models of life offered by the city and seek answers that can quench their thirst for meaning.

As for *traditional Chinese religion*, its history in Taiwan shows aspects of similarity with that of Buddhism, with the difference that its span covers a longer period of time and presents typical and original Chinese features. Chinese migrants from Fujian and Guangdong brought with them the statues of their gods and ashes taken from the incense burners of the temples of their places of origin, so that the building of new shrines in Taiwan recreated the same environments from where they left, or, better, extended those environments into the new territories, keeping in them the same traditions of the motherland. The arrival of Daoism and Confucianism in Taiwan followed the same pattern (the presence of Yiguandao on the island being a more recent development, in the wake of the Communist takeover).¹⁵ After rooting themselves in the Chinese communities, these religions followed the transformations that took place in Taiwan, until the encounter with the Western world, in the **nineteenth and twentieth centuries**.

While adapting to the historical changes, they re-discovered in their tradition the most effective resource functional to keeping them alive in the midst of new contexts, with the potentiality of offering meaningful answers to their believers. The followers of folk religion and of Daoism generally belong to the lower classes (which does not necessarily mean that they are short of money) and show their attachment to the traditional Chinese way of life to which they belong in an immediate and spontaneous, natural way. In many ways they revitalize their traditions. The restoration of temples offers an example: although such works require considerable sums of money, widespread collective participation makes them possible and successful. Religious festivals and their pic-

13. See: "Taiwan Buddhist Master: 'No Taiwanese,'" <<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/03/31/2003439813>>; "Dalai Lama's Exclusion Criticized," <<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/03/30/2003439777>>.

14. E.g., Tian Di Jiao, Yi Guan Dao, TianDe Jiao, Li Jiao, Xuan Yuan Jiao, Tian Li Jiao. See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_Taiwan>.

15. About Yiguandao, see D. K. Jordan and D. L. Overmyer, *The Flying Phoenix: Aspects of Chinese Sectarianism in Taiwan* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Y. Lu, *The Transformation of Yiguan Dao in Taiwan: Adapting to a Changing Religious Economy* (Laham: Lexington Books, 2008). <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I-Kuan_Tao>.

turesque celebrations become mass events, highly valued as manifestations of traditional culture, echoed by the media. Television channels broadcast the plays that were—and still are—performed on the stages before the temples. Books and pamphlets help people to know places and traditions. Temples host foundations that manage schools and cultural centers. They extend their influence also overseas, wherever there are Chinese migrants, who keep in touch with their origins and received traditions.

Anyway, overseas Chinese also continue the ancient tradition of taking their gods with themselves and founding new temples in the places where they live. Chinese folk religion temples can now be found everywhere in the world, where significant communities of Chinese exist. With their festivals and ritual practices they contribute to the spreading of Chinese culture. **All these phenomena signal the ability of Chinese folk religion in Taiwan** to actively and dynamically participate in the globalization trend, by wisely using modern technologies in view of maintaining and increasing its influence on Chinese communities, especially at the local level. Mainland China is poised to learn from the Taiwan experience, especially now that RPC tourists are visiting the island in great numbers.¹⁶

It is also true, however, that the strong localization of folk religion on the territory makes it not easily controllable. This is important at a political level. Folk religion could become a strong opponent to all centralizing measures taken both from inside and from outside. If it regains momentum on the Mainland, it could create problems for the political stability so dear to the ruling class.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ALLÈS, Elisabeth

- 2004 “Islam’s Adaptation in China: Present Realities.” *Religion and Culture: Past Approaches, Present Globalisation, Future Challenges*. Macau: Macau Ricci Institute, 259–63

CENG, Qingyao

- 2007 “The Paradigm Shift: From Chinese Theology to Sino-Christian Theology.” *China Study Journal*, Autumn/Winter: 5–20.

CHEN, Chung-cheng

- 2004 “Popular Religion in China: Symbolic Change and the Modernization Process in a Global Perspective.” *East Asian Studies*, 35: 190–231.

COCHINI, Christian

- 2004 “Chinese Buddhism Revival and Inter-religious Dialogue.” *Religion and Culture: Past Approaches, Present Globalisation, Future Challenges*. Macau: Macau Ricci Institute, 265–77.

16. See: “Cross-strait Flights Should Increase to 540: President Ma,” <<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/05/02/2003442562>>; “An Overflow of PRC Tourists, Money,” <<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2009/05/08/2003443045>>; “Public Favors Limits on Chinese Tourism, Cabinet Poll Says,” <<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/05/22/2003444244>>; “Top Hotel Chains Eye Move into Taiwan’s Market,” <<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2009/05/28/20034444766>>.

DE BRUYN, Pierre-Henry

- 2004 Maoist Tradition in Modern China: Observations and Reflections.” *Religion and Culture: Past Approaches, Present Globalisation, Future Challenges*. Macau: Macau Ricci Institute, 335–47.

HUANG, C. Julia

- 2005 “Globally Engaged Buddhism: The Buddhist Compassion Relief Foundation from Taiwan.” *Taiwan Journal of Religious Studies*, 5/1: 1–38.

JORDAN, David K. and Overmyer, Daniel L.

- 1986 *The Flying Phoenix: Aspects of Chinese Sectarianism in Taiwan*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

LU, Yunfeng

- 2008 *The Transformation of Yiguan Dao in Taiwan: Adapting to a Changing Religious Economy*. Laham: Lexington Books.

MADSEN, Richard

- 2008 *Democracy’s Dharma: Religious Renaissance and Political Development in Taiwan*. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press.

PALMER, David

- 2004 “The Body at the Junction of Religion and Scientism. Modernisation of Meditative Traditions in Contemporary China.” *Religion and Culture: Past Approaches, Present Globalisation, Future Challenges*. Macau: Macau Ricci Institute, 313–34.

PAS, Julian F., ed.

- 1990 *The Turning of the Tide: Religion in China Today*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

SHEN, Fuwei

- 1996 *Cultural Flow Between China and Outside World Throughout History*. Beijing: Foreign Language Press.

Globalization and Christianity

BANGLADESH

SERGIO TARGA

It is apparent to me that as far as religious traditions are concerned, the most troublesome aspects of globalization have not got to do either with cultural homogenisation or with socio-economic inequality among people. These two ills are nothing new in the history of humanity. Indeed any newness here refers less to the phenomena themselves and more to their dimension and geographical extension in a globalized context. Cultural homogenisation becomes troublesome only when it is linked with the spread of anomie, the lack of cohesive and ethical world-views and, last but not least, the relativization of religion itself. Only then do religious traditions feel threatened and react. Catholic Christianity is no exception. The measure of the reaction of Catholic Christianity to the perceived threat that globalization represents depends on the socio-political context in which she is implanted. It is obvious that where the Catholic Church is more socially, economically, culturally and politically entrenched her reaction to globalization will be “ferce.”

In these contexts in fact the Church has got much to lose. Where instead the Catholic Church has got little to lose, for instance in countries like Bangladesh, she may put into operation more transparent strategies of mission able to show the way also to older and powerful churches. The latter's reaction to globalization may be spuriously determined by their lost power and influence more than by their divine mandate. The present paper attempts thus to look at the Catholic Church in Bangladesh and at the strategies it devised to cope with globalization. The category of mission will be central to both a positive understanding of globalization and of church as well as to their interaction. Specifically, globalization will be here seen as the new context in which the Church's mission must incarnate itself, because "Globalization, *a priori*, is neither good nor bad. It will be what people make of it."¹

To say that the Church is missionary by its very nature is to say that wherever the Church finds itself, there she will evangelize. Mission is not a creation of the Church it is instead its inner nature, that without which the Church stops being Church. In this perspective **globalization becomes the modern challenge to mission, a new historical reality** in need of evangelization. In the Church's millenarian history globalization becomes thus the last of a long series of historical realities in the midst of which the Church has been required to give birth, once again, to Christ.

Framing globalization within the context and concept of mission has at least two positive kinds of consequences. The first, globalization itself is freed from a certain nebulous and mysterious conceptualization and brought back to being a historical event, the modern context of the Church's mission. The second, globalization is no longer and exclusively a negative reality threatening the Church's existence; it becomes instead the space of the church's mission, a place, like any other true mission place, fraught with possibilities and opportunities.

Faced with cultural homogenisation, the relativism of religions and the pauperisation of fairly large sections of humanity that globalization is seemingly bringing about, the Church globally has reacted in three different ways. It has either chosen to refuse globalization as such (conservative approach) or to accept it tout court (liberal approach) or to assume a prophetic stance towards it (dialectic approach). These three approaches are not to be seen as conflicting with each other; they are instead to be seen as opportunistic in a way and as indication of the struggle the **Church has to go through in order to always be true to its Master and to His mandate**, in another. Cultural homogenisation and religious relativism are refused *in toto* by the fundamentalist among Christians.

This refusal has more to do with the loss of power and influence of the **Church than** with globalization itself. Eventually, it ends up with unholy alliances between churches

1. John Paul II, "Address of the Holy Father." In The Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, *Globalization: Ethical and Institutional Concerns*. The Proceedings of the Seventh Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences 25–28 April 2001. Vatican City 2001, 28.

and right-wing politics in the attempt to secure privileges and opportunities the Church has earned during the centuries.

The a-critical acceptance of globalization may be, on the other hand, the result of ambiguous thinking of churches which find themselves in a minority or ghetto situation. And this may be perhaps the reality of the Catholic Church in Bangladesh. Globalization is often and simplistically identified as the latest Western attempt to exploit the so called developing countries. It is thus seen as an enemy, particularly by the impoverished Muslim masses.² In these contexts the unspoken truth of things is that “your enemy’s enemy is your friend.”³ Globalization becomes thus a way for religious and ethnic minorities to fictitiously affirm their own diversity over and above a majority population culturally and religiously suffocating them. This identification with globalization is however highly dangerous, **even insane. In so doing, Christian minority communities run the risk of being identified as the enemy and as foreign bodies to the polity.**

Again, the acceptance of globalization by minority churches may also be determined by the attempt to avoid any sort of conflict either within or without their communities. The ghetto mentality and the survival instinct may explain such an attitude. The ghetto in fact is the creation of a world within a world in which survival is the most important rule. Here the outside world is just ignored. The same desire to avoid conflicts, particularly with the majority community and with political power, is what determines, again opportunistically, the **Church’s stands on issues pertaining to globalization.**

As long as the issues at hand do not put at risk the Church’s prerogatives, privileges and freedom, the Church will go hand in hand with the powers that be, accepting or refusing according to political expediency. But in so doing “We are in danger of becoming small religious ghettos increasingly marginalized from any significant influence in the life of the country.”⁴

Obviously, the possible responses to globalization seen so far do not enter the definition of mission as hinted at above. Only in the non-opportunistic and prophetic approach to globalization can the Church engage itself in a true evangelising mission. In this respect, globalization not only is the problem to be faced and resolved but also the opportunity for the Bangladeshi Church and all the Asian churches to become truly local and truly Asian. Globalization may turn out to be a great opportunity for the churches of Asia in order for them to discard their remaining European shade and taste, their foreign label. The homogenising force of globalization may thus push Christian churches to rediscover their own identity through a renewed inculturation effort. “The urgent task of the Asian

2. To what extent this feeling of enmity is then superimposed on the Muslim masses by misguided and disgruntled elites and to what extent this is instead original to those same masses, is a matter open to discussion.

3. P. Vadakumpadan, “Cultural Globalization and Assertion of Identity in the Context of Northeast India,” In *Mission Today*, 2008, x/2:166.

4. J. Mansford, “Inculturation of Worship and Spirituality. A View from Indonesia.” At <<http://www.sedos.org/english/mansford.htm>>.

churches is to become churches not only *in* Asia but also *of* Asia, and *for* Asia, to become truly local churches.”⁵

To do so the Asian churches should rediscover the triple kind of mission they have set for themselves since the '70s of the last century. The FABC in its “Evangelization in Modern Day Asia” (1974) has promoted the triple dialogue with the Asian poor, Asian cultures and Asian religions as the *conditio sine qua non* of the mission of the Church in Asia. This concept was then fully acknowledged and re-proposed in the Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation of John Paul II, *Ecclesia in Asia* (1999).⁶ It is by living out this triple dialogue that the churches in Asia may perhaps hope to manage the evangelization of globalization and their own inculturation at the same time.

The dialogue with the poor must be the starting point. The indications are that the impoverishment of countries and, particularly, of large sections of populations in them, are one of the side effects of globalization.⁷ “Globalization without marginalization”⁸ is what the churches should aim at. In this sense inculturation for the churches of Asia is “to seek alternative models of economic development, not based on the greed and individualism of global capitalism that sets the rich against the poor but upon the words and witness of Jesus the Nazarene.”⁹ Over and against modern global consumerism, the Church should rediscover a culture of sufficiency and contentment, proposing compassion and solidarity over competition, social justice over inequality. In fact, things look rather more complex. In countries like Bangladesh, the Catholic Church is caught up in a dilemma. The utter poverty of many in the country may favour the Church’s silent complicity with globalization.

It is certainly true that if globalization produces a positive outcome for the Bangladeshi poor this is in the form of a trickle down effect; a few drops of water escape from the rich man’s bottle and falling casually on the dry land of the thirsty poor, momentarily, make grass grow. Yet, these trickle down effects are still something! The critics of globalization may highlight the semi-enslavement of workers in the modern garments factories in Bangladesh, their low wages, the lack of any sort of social security, the environmental degradation, the commoditisation of work etc. that globalization is causing. Nevertheless, for people who are accustomed to living at subsistence level, a monthly salary is already a conquest. The Catholic Church in Bangladesh perhaps may just feel the same way. On

5. I. Kodithuwakku. “Christian Mission in an Era of Globalisation,” *Vidyajyoti Journal of Theological Reflection* 2008, 72/12: 929. Emphasis as in the original.

6. John Paul II, *Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Ecclesia in Asia*, 1999, nn. 1, 15, 18, 20, 21, 24. The document can be found at <www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost.../hf_jp-ii_exh_06111999_ecclesia-in-asia_en.html>.

7. As a start, the question may be tackled by reading Wade, Robert Hunter. “Is Globalisation Reducing Poverty and Inequality?” In *World Development*, 2004, 32/4: 567–89.

8. John Paul II, *Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Ecclesia in Asia*, *op. cit.*, n. 39.

9. J. Mansford, “Faith and Culture in Dialogue: A Reflective Theological Synthesis,” paper presented at the Asian Mission Congress 18–22 October 2006, Chiang Mai, Thailand. At <http://www.fabc.org/asian_mission_congress/docs/PriorReflectiveTheologicalSynthesis.pdf>.

top of that, it may also be the case that the foreign missionary component of the Catholic Church in Bangladesh is less favourable to a proposal of cultural sufficiency than its local counterpart. The cultural background of the missionaries together with a misconceived idea of charity and love for the poor are behind such a lukewarm attitude.

Indeed, when it is considered that half the Catholic population of Bangladesh comes from a tribal background, it would be expected that these Catholics might become the bearers of a more egalitarian socio-economic and cultural model able to counteract the strong inequalities brought about by a disordered globalization. Unfortunately, at the moment these Catholics are under-represented in the hierarchical set up of the Catholic Church.¹⁰ It is however also true that the lure of modern consumerist culture is felt by everybody, even by tribal people who all too easily abandon their age old traditions and customs in favour of modern day ideas and gadgets.

The second kind of dialogue the Asian churches are called to live out is that with the cultures of Asia. In a time where globalization and its culturally homogenising force are threatening the cultural individuality of people and countries, the Catholic Church is called to inculturate itself even further. In this sense globalization is an opportunity for the Church to sink its roots deeper and deeper in the cultures of Asia. In the process, a misunderstanding is possible.

Inculturation is neither simple adaptation to nor just absorption of the local culture. Inculturation is, first and foremost, evangelization: "Inculturation begins when the Gospel discovers itself in a culture, accepting the face of God already present, and *rejecting faces* that do not reflect the God of our faith."¹¹ Against the forceful and violent restatement of one's own cultural identity *vis-à-vis* the cultural homogenisation of globalization,¹² the Church should remind its faithful of the need of conversion that every culture retains.¹³ In this sense true cultural dialogue is possible. But globalization awakens the Church to another positive reality too. "In a globalizing world we cannot remain monolingual or monocultural. We can better enter into the mystery of faith through a number of ways. To inculturate is to become inter-cultural."¹⁴ Against the temptation of building ghettos, the Catholic Church is called upon to open up its cultural frontiers ready for cross-cultural encounters. Indeed globalization may help Asian churches to dismiss their monolithic

10. Bishop Ponen Paul Kubi is the lone Mandi bishop of the diocese of Mymensingh. He was first ordained auxiliary bishop of the same city on 13 February 2004. He became titular bishop of Mymensingh on 1 September 2006. Most of the Catholics of the Mymensingh diocese are ethnic Mandi.

11. Archbishop T. Menampampil, "Inculturation of the Sacred Liturgy in Asia: Possibilities and Problems," *Vidyajyoti Journal of Theological Reflection*, 2009, 73/2: 91. My emphasis.

12. "In this era of globalization every culture that stands under threat searches for ways of re-assertion, every community under homogenization pressure is eager to reaffirm itself... The reassertion of societies took different forms in different periods of history... In recent years, exaggerated religious orthodoxy has become a powerful way of re-affirming loyalty to threatened cultural values." Archbishop T. Menampampil, *op. cit.*, 86.

13. See P. Vadakumpadan, "Cultural Globalization and Assertion of Identity in the Context of Northeast India," *op. cit.*, 172.

14. J. Mansford, "Faith and Culture in Dialogue: A Reflective Theological Synthesis," *op. cit.*, 3.

attitude and dogmatic intransigence in favour of a more flexible, more dialogical and culturally open attitude.

As a Church we need to absorb and give equal weight to each and every genuine, cultural narrative, refrain from cultural hegemony whether national (national culture over against local indigenous cultures), or international (a Western tradition over against myriad local traditions). Only a multi-cultural, poly-centric World Church is able to dialogue.¹⁵

It is obvious that such a stand on cultural dialogue would require a prophetic Church. Certainly the minority status of the Catholic Church in Bangladesh makes it more difficult for her to break free from its self-imposed boundaries. However, this Church's multi-cultural and multi-ethnic composition would make an ideal social laboratory. In fact the questions of inculturation, cultural encounters and integration should first be addressed within its own boundaries. The Church of Bangladesh often works as globalization does in the wider world: it becomes a sort of homogenising force which misrecognises the cultural specificities of its components, i.e. Tribal peoples, Dalits, Bengalis etc.

On the external front, the risk run by the Church is to a-critically bless a culture in the vain attempt to shed its foreign label and gain thus the support of the majority community. In so doing, however, the Church fails in its countercultural mission. "To be countercultural is to live simply in order to be effective in the services of others, especially those who are left out by the processes of market globalization."¹⁶ And this pushes us back to the dialogue with the poor. At this point a question might be asked: considering that some of the best educational institutions both in Bangladesh and in Asia are Catholic, it is not clear why these institutions do not promote the transforming countercultural dynamics of Christianity and keep instead teaching the neo-liberal economy which inevitably leads to materialism, consumerism and to the marginalization of large parts of humanity.¹⁷ Perhaps the sad answer is that to continue to be considered the "best educational institutions" they cannot but follow the majority cultural stream abdicating both religious inspiration and academic pursuit which often require going against the stream.

The third kind of dialogue the Catholic Church in Asia is called upon to carry out is that with other religious traditions. In the beginning of this paper we mentioned the relativization of religious traditions as one of the ills caused by or accompanied to globalization. Inter-religious dialogue, starting from the poor and being part of the wider dialogue with Asian cultures, is the last aspect of the mission in Asia in a context of globalization. Against the exasperation of identity politics which uses religion as a rallying point and against the dissolution of ethical norms and their transcendental referent, the Church in

15. J. Mansford, "Dialogue and Culture: Reflections by a Temporary Sojourner." Talk given at an International Consultation on Inter-Faith Dialogue in Bangkok, Thailand, 2001. At <<http://eapi.admu.edu.ph/eaproo2/prior.htm>>.

16. J. M. Fung, "The Multifaceted Aspects of Mission." At <<http://eapi.admu.edu.ph/eaproo1/jfung.htm>>.

17. J. Mansford, "Dialogue and Culture: Reflections by a Temporary Sojourner," *op. cit.*

Asia should actively engage in inter-religious dialogue. Liberating itself from the security of its theological ghetto, the Church should enter a situation of diaspora. "From Ghetto to Diaspora" might be the new motto for Asian churches.

Pilgrims of dialogue discover that there is little demand for exhaustive descriptions, but much to be gained from listening to imaginative suggestions, to artistic images, to poetic statements. In a word, we return to the truth as announced by the Nazarene in awakening miracle, probing parable, questioning word. Multi-faith pilgrims embrace diversity in the wonderful adventure of discovery. The gift of dialogue is not an easy path to follow. Like sailing the ocean there are no fixed points, no certain current, and yet there is a direction and there are stars indicating, beckoning on.¹⁸

And diaspora here refers more to dissemination than to dispersion, to a mental attitude than to a theological principle. In fact by using globalization's innovative communication technology, people and churches may now come together and build religio-cultural networks in support of human dignity, the latter being the common base from where to start out as "pilgrims of dialogue." One thing should be cleared up: dialogue is not necessarily and only an intellectual enterprise. True inter-religious dialogue cannot but lead to social change: in fact "the use one makes of religion depends on the option one has made on the type of society."¹⁹

And the Church in Asia has already made a preferential option for the poor. It is them who now preordain the future path of cultural and inter-religious dialogues. This in practice and essentially means two things. The first, to choose the poor as the starting point of our dialogue is to choose their religion and not the high religion of elites. In fact the high religion of elites often hides and justifies unequal social power relations and value systems detrimental to the poor.

The second, inter-religious dialogue, if started from the poor, does not go about intellectually looking from the Self in the Other. Dialogue does not mean to seek out theological commonalities with other religious traditions, but, instead, to treasure the aspirations to liberation of the poor present in the different religions and bring them together. In this sense inter-religious dialogue captures the struggle of people and communities recognising their common horizon.

It must be recognised that the Catholic Church in Bangladesh in recent years has grown increasingly attentive to the question and necessity of inter-religious dialogue. A clear example of such attentiveness is the reaction to the letter of the 138 Muslim Scholars²⁰ of 11 October 2007 addressed to all Christian religious leaders. The letter has become a

18. *Ibidem*.

19. W. Fernandes, "Inter-religious Dialogue from the Perspective of the Poor." In *Vidyajyoti Journal of Theological Reflection*, 1995, 59/2: 103.

20. The English version of this letter can be downloaded at <<http://www.acommonword.com/index.php?lang=en&page=downloads>>.

matter of meetings and discussions not yet concluded.²¹ In a way the Catholic Church in Bangladesh while being absolutely orthodox in matters of faith, risking sometimes being more Roman than Rome, is demonstrating quite a clout in the field of dialogue.

Obviously, the high profile people involved in the ongoing dialogue and the consequent fall out that this dialogue has in terms of social prestige might explain some of the enthusiasm surrounding these inter-religious meetings.²² Be that as it may, the real question remains the possible exclusion of the poor and of their religious worldview from the purview of this dialogue, so that eventually it is always the elites of the different religious denominations that come together. On the other hand, the “pilgrim” attitude of which something has already been said above does not seem to be yet an acquisition of the Church. The Church sometimes appears to use dialogue as an expedient only, forgetting perhaps that dialogue is not pre-evangelization, but evangelization itself.

Whatever the case, the Catholic Church in Bangladesh, particularly, but not only, through its Episcopal Commission for ecumenical and inter-religious dialogue, must be recognised for the merit of having kept alive and stimulated inter-religious dialogue in the country.²³ Now inter-cultural and religious dialogue are no longer the sole concern of the Church but they are becoming part of politicians’ agenda also²⁴ and of other religions as well. Against globalization’s cultural homogenisation, religious relativism and economic marginalization the Church in Bangladesh is striving forward acknowledging both the challenges and the opportunities that globalization is bringing along. The Church wants and tries to be “not only in Asia but also *of* and *for* Asia.”

With our Asian sisters and brothers, we will strive to foster communion among Asian peoples, who are threatened by glaring economic, social and political imbalances. With them we will explore ways of utilizing the gifts of our diverse religions, cultures and languages to achieve a richer and deeper Asian unity.

21. The importance of the meetings has to do with the involvement of the Department of World Religion of the Dhaka University. The first meeting was held in the University itself on April 18, 2008. Islamic and Christian scholars, in equal numbers, participated. The second meeting was held in the premises of the CBCB centre (the official seat of the Catholic Bishop Conference of Bangladesh) on November 28, 2008. It was joined by 100 university students both male and female, Muslim and Christian. Other meetings are being prepared. The meetings are being patronised by both the Department of World Religions and the Episcopal Commission for Ecumenism and Inter-religious dialogue of the Catholic Church.

22. If we then consider that the Church in Bangladesh is a tiny minority in a sea of Islam, dialogue cannot but be its only survival strategy. The fact that this same Church does not show to be equally interested in a dialogue with Hinduism, leaves some doubts on the genuine inspiration and truth of the whole dialogical process.

23. Besides the events already mentioned, the Commission has recently (2 March 2009) organised also a meeting between Sikhs and Christians. See “Bangladesh: Christians, Sikhs stress unity in first religious dialogue.” At <<http://www.sikhnet.com/news/bangladesh-christians-sikhs-stress-unity-first-religious-dialogue>>.

24. See for instance the Statement of Dr. Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury, Adviser for Foreign Affairs (Foreign Minister), Government of Bangladesh at the High Level Dialogue on Inter-religious and Intercultural Understanding and Cooperation for Peace on the theme “Inter-Religious and Intercultural Cooperation for the Promotion of Tolerance, Understanding and Universal Respect on Matters of Freedom of Religion or Belief and Cultural Diversity,” 4 October 2007, New York. At <http://www.un.int/bangladesh/statements/62/plenary_inter_religious_cultural.htm>.

We will build bridges of solidarity and reconciliation with peoples of other faiths and will join hands with everyone in Asia in forming a true community of creation.²⁵

BIBLIOGRAPHY

138 MUSLIM SCHOLARS

- 2007 *A Common Word between Us and You*. A letter addressed to the World Christian leaders. At <<http://www.acommonword.com/index.php?lang=en&page=downloads>>.

CHOWDHURY, Iftekhar Ahmed

- 2007 “Inter-Religious and Intercultural Cooperation for the Promotion of Tolerance, Understanding and Universal Respect on Matters of Freedom of Religion or Belief and Cultural Diversity,” 4 October 2007, New York. At <http://www.int/bangladesh/statements/62/plenary_inter_religious_cultural.htm>.

FABC

- 1995 *Christian Discipleship in Asia Today: Service to Life*. Final statement of the sixth FABC plenary assembly. FABC Paper No. 74. <At <http://www.ucanews.com/html/fabc-papers/fabc-74.htm>>.

FERNANDES, Walter

- 1995 “Inter-religious Dialogue from the Perspective of the Poor.” *Vidyajyoti Journal of Theological Reflection*. 59/2: 91–105.

FUNG, Jojo M.

- “The Multifaceted Aspects of Mission.” At <<http://eapi.admu.edu.ph/eapro01/jfung.htm>>.

JOHN PAUL II

- 2001 “Address of the Holy Father.” The Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, *Globalization: Ethical and Institutional Concerns*. The Proceedings of the Seventh Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences 25–28 April 2001. Vatican City.
- 1999 *Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Ecclesia in Asia*. At <www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost.../hf_jp-ii_exh_06111999_ecclesia-in-asia_en.html>.

KODITHUWAKKU, Indunil

- 2008 “Christian Mission in an Era of Globalization.” *Vidyajyoti Journal of Theological Reflection*. 72/12: 913–30.

MANSFORD, John

- 2006 “Faith and Culture in Dialogue: A Reflective Theological Synthesis.” Paper presented at the Asian Mission Congress 18–22 October, Chiang Mai. At <http://www.fabc.org/asian_mission_congress/docs/PriorReflectiveTheologicalSynthesis.pdf>.
- 2001 “Dialogue and Culture: Reflections by a Temporary Sojourner.” Talk given at an International Consultation on Inter-Faith Dialogue in Bangkok, Thailand. At <<http://eapi.admu.edu.ph/eapro02/prior.htm>>.

25. FABC, “Christian Discipleship in Asia Today: Service to Life.” Final statement of the sixth FABC plenary assembly. FABC Paper n. 74, 1995. At <<http://www.ucanews.com/html/fabc-papers/fabc-74.htm>>.

1997 "Inculturation of Worship and Spirituality. A View from Indonesia." At <<http://www.sedos.org/english/mansford.htm>>.

MENAMPARAMPIL, Thomas

2009 "Inculturation of the Sacred Liturgy in Asia: Possibilities and Problems." *Vidyajyoti Journal of Theological Reflection*. 73/2: 85–106.

SIKHNET

2009 "Bangladesh: Christians, Sikhs stress unity in first religious dialogue." At <<http://www.sikhnet.com/news/bangladesh-christians-sikhs-stress-unity-first-religious-dialogue>>.

VADAKUMPADAN, Paul

2008 "Cultural Globalization and Assertion of Identity in the Context of Northeast India." *Mission Today*, x/2: 166–74.

WADE, Robert Hunter

2004 "Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality?" *World Development*, 32/4: 567–89.

INDONESIA

MATTEO REBECCHI

Any discourse on the Catholic Church cannot be separated from the Church's universalist nature. The Church is the family of God which embraces the whole world as a consequence of the love of God for every single person. This inner urgency has animated missionaries who have gone and still go to every corner of the world including the remote Islands of the Indonesian Archipelago to spread the message of the Gospel. Then, after the seeds of faith have been spread, the ties between newborn churches and the older Christian communities unite this family in a universal embrace. Consequently, talking about the Church, we cannot forget those links and connections which bind communities from all over the world, relationships that have their roots in Catholicity itself as a fundamental characteristic of the Church. It is for this reason that the Church in the Archipelago has experienced a sort of "spiritual globalization" since its very beginning. Besides, the Church does not live apart from the world, as a *corpus alienum*, but on the contrary she lives inside it as a sign of salvation, a sign

of love of God for every man and woman on earth. This calling to be deeply rooted in human history makes the Church a living organism which senses the joys and sufferings of all humankind experiencing all its human events and accompanying humanity in its every single step towards the Kingdom of God. Therefore, besides the internal globalization due to its universal character, the Church, being united to the course of human history, has also always experienced a more “earthly” globalization.

Evidence of such influence of external factors on the life of the Indonesian Church are spread along the path of its history. Despite its distance from Europe which represents the starting point of the diffusion of Catholic faith in Indonesia, the history of the expansion of Christ’s message over the Archipelago shows how strong the links have been between the Church in Indonesia and Churches in other countries, particularly in Europe. Moreover, an element which deeply influenced the growth of the Church in the Archipelago has been the colonial experience. Its main actors were Portugal, Holland, Spain, Great Britain and lastly Japan which at the time were the main powers, the rulers of the “globalized” world. Coming to the remote islands of the Indonesian Archipelago looking for spices and other natural riches, these international powers sometimes supported the mission of the Church but more often became the main obstacles against the diffusion of the Gospel. Independence freed Indonesia from dependence and pushed the Church toward the process of its Indonesianization, namely the transition from the missionary period to autonomy and the pursuit of a new identity.

Even with a quick look at its historical development we can easily realize that the path of the Church has been “global” since its beginning in the sense that any approach to Indonesian Church life cannot be understood without a wider view of what was going on in other parts of the world. Moreover, what is happening to the Church today inside the globalized world is not something that comes about by itself but is deeply rooted in the past. For this reason we are going to take an overview of the historical development of the Catholic faith in the Archipelago before approaching the challenges of globalization today.

THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE ARCHIPELAGO

The first evidence of the presence of Christianity in the Archipelago is reported by the Shaykh Abi Salih al-Armini who lived around 1150. In his book *Tadhkur fiha Akhbar min al kanais wal adyar* we find a list of 707 churches and monasteries in Egypt and other countries, including Nubia, Abyssinia, Western Africa, Spain, Arabia, India and even Indonesia. He reports that close to Barus, North Sumatra, there was a Church dedicated to Mary Immaculate, built around 645, which belongs to a Nestorian sect coming from Syria. The origin of this church has been studied and some scholars have concluded that the community in Barus was in fact completely united to the Catholic Church of the Chaldean rite, rather than a Nestorian sect. If so, there is the possibility that the Catholic

Church could have come to the Indonesian Islands at the same time or even before the coming of Islam itself to the Archipelago.¹

The presence of the Church grew during the ninth until the fifteenth century and some Catholic communities of Chaldean rite were present in Sumatra and East Java, with a Bishop in the city of Palembang (Southeast Sumatra). The existence of those communities was known in Europe because of the reports of some ecclesiastic figures on their journeys in Asia. The first of them was given by J. de Monte Corvino OFM who visited the East coast of Sumatra in 1291. Later, Odorico da Pordenone OFM reached some harbor cities in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Java in 1312, and Mgr. J. de Marignolli OFM (representative of Holy See in China) visited the community of Palembang in 1347.

The expansion of Christianity in the Archipelago experienced a notable acceleration in coincidence with the beginning of Portuguese colonies. After the conquest of Goa in 1510 and Malacca in 1511 the ships of the Portuguese began carrying not only traders and soldiers, but also Franciscans, Dominicans and later Jesuits whose first task was to give their spiritual support to the Europeans living in the new colonies.

In 1512 the Portuguese established their power in North Moluccas and in 1522, in the Castle of Ternate, a priest was in charge of the pastoral care of the Portuguese. Due to the dedication of a layman called Gonsalo Veloso the mission among the natives began in North Moluccas, producing a large number of conversions. The first baptisms were celebrated in 1534, which is still considered the official date of birth of the Catholic Church in the Indonesian Archipelago. Nevertheless, the birth and growth of the Church must be “paid with blood”, and the Indonesian Church was no exception. The first martyr who shed his blood on the Indonesian Islands was Fr. Simon Vaz OFM who was murdered in North Moluccas in 1535.

Taking advantage of the presence of the Portuguese in Ambon the great missionary, Francis Xavier, arrived in the Moluccas in 1546. He began his work among the Europeans but soon dedicated himself also to the evangelization of local people in Ternate, Ambon and Halmahera. During his stay he wrote a small catechism in Malay, taught and baptized thousands of people. Francis Xavier knew Muslim people too and some of them became his close friends, like the King of the Moluccas, Hairun, even though the saint was aware that he would not succeed in converting them.² Even if some information seems to be inexact or the fruit of somewhat superficial knowledge, Saint Francis in his letters makes interesting reports on the places he visited, people he met and their habits. He left for Malacca in 1547 with the aim of traveling to Japan, but his companions continued his work in the Moluccas together with other missionaries. At the end of the sixteenth century, there were some 30.000 Christians in the Moluccas out of a population of 150.000.

1. H. Boelaars, *Indonesianisasi, Dari Gereja Katolik di Indonesia Menjadi Gerja Katolik Indonesia* (Kanisius: Yogyakarta 2005), 60. See also B. S. Mardiatmadja, *Gereja Katolik Masuk Indonesia*, notes of the course on Local Religions at Driyarkara University (Jakarta: Pro Manuscripto, Academic Year 2008–2009); Documentation—Information Department Office of Bishops' Conference, *The Catholic Church in Indonesia* (Jakarta, 1989), 23.

2. See Francis Xavier, letter n. 59.

Later the evangelization spread from the Moluccas to Sulawesi too and, following the routes of traders in search of spices and sandal wood in the Archipelago, reached Flores and Timor. The Catholic presence in that area is reported from 1556 even if regular evangelization started between 1561 and 1599³ due to the work of the Dominicans and Jesuits.

After this short description of the birth and first development of the Church in the Archipelago we can conclude that the beginning of evangelization took place under the protection and support of the Portuguese flag. The missionaries came to the Archipelago crossing the sea on colonial and military ships and were sent especially for the spiritual care of European traders and soldiers. But on the other hand, their zeal made many of them aware of the necessity to care for the autochthonous population too, digging the foundations for the future local Indonesian Church. This fact brought about some conflicts. In fact the Portuguese, instead of witnessing to the Gospel, very often scandalized local people by their lifestyle and bad behavior. Quite often the missionaries, included Francis Xavier himself, were forced to blame the foreigners and defend the natives, especially when the interests and bad behavior of the Portuguese became a serious obstacle to evangelization.

THE VOC AND THE SPREAD OF PROTESTANTISM IN THE ARCHIPELAGO

During the sixteenth century some important events in Europe were to strongly affect the development of Christianity in the Archipelago. The first of them was the ascent of the power of Spain. In 1580 King Philip of Spain took over power in Portugal. This fact put an end to the absolute dominion of the Portuguese in the Far East too. Nevertheless, another, and more important fact which happened in the Old Continent was to strongly affect the growth of the new born Church in the Archipelago: the rise of Protestantism in Europe, and in particular in Holland. During the Eighty Years' War which opposed Spain to Holland, some Dutch regions freed themselves from the sway of Catholic Spain in 1579. The Calvinists, so far oppressed by the Catholic kingdom, became free to profess their faith and took over power; the Catholics now became the victims of discrimination and persecution.

Freedom from the Spaniards was also the starting point for the rise of Dutch colonial endeavor which took over the former Portuguese possessions. Ambon was conquered by the Dutch in 1605, Batavia (now Jakarta) in 1619, Solor in 1646 and Ternate in 1683. The arrival of the Dutch came along with the rise of Protestant dominion in the colonies too. According to the principle *cuius regio, eius religio* Catholicism was forbidden in Holland and Catholic missionaries were expelled as Portuguese spies from the East India colonies too. Until 1807 only two Catholic missionaries were allowed to enter the VOC (*Vereenigde*

3. B. S. Mardiatmadja, *Gereja Katolik Masuk Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, 10.

Oostindische Compagnie or Dutch East India Company) territories. As a result many Catholic communities, left without pastoral care, became Protestant.⁴

Colonies were ruled by the VOC which was not interested in spiritual matters and tried to show a neutral attitude towards religion but in fact opposed the Catholic mission. Calvinist missionaries were sent from their homeland with the aim of caring for the European traders and sailors, but during the Synod of Dordrecht (1618–1619) the Protestant Church decided to address evangelization also towards pagans (the so called *Zending*). Nevertheless, VOC did not make serious efforts to support the Protestant Church. From 1622 the preparation of Protestant missionaries was guaranteed by a good school in Leiden supported by VOC which, however, decided its closure in 1633 because of “financial shortage”. In two centuries, only three autochthonous people became Protestant pastors and the shortage of pastoral personnel to sufficiently teach and form Christian communities compelled the Protestant missionaries to concentrate only on sacramental services and mass baptisms. Pastors in Jakarta had to take care of communities spread between Padang (West Sumatra) and Timor. On the other hand, some of the Dutch missionaries were very talented and full of zeal and some of them started the translation of the Bible in Malay. In 1610 only the prayer “Our Father” was available in Malay Language, whilst the first publication of the entire Bible in Malay occurred in 1733.⁵

One of the main problems for the Protestant mission in the Archipelago was the fact that missionaries were VOC’s employees, getting a salary from the State and being controlled by VOC’s Governors. They could not blame or disagree with VOC’s policy. Their reports addressed to Holland had to undergo the VOC’s censorship.⁶ Moreover, another difficulty was the negative example given by the Dutch in matters of religion. Like the Portuguese before them, very often the Europeans living in the colonies were people rejected by society in their motherland and their lifestyle and habits often became an obstacle for evangelization.⁷

However, the whole Archipelago did not fall under the sway of the VOC and a particular situation was experienced by the Eastern part of the Indonesian Islands. Fleeing from the Protestant pressure Catholics found refuge in East Flores and Timor which became the stronghold of Catholicism in the Archipelago up to the beginning of nineteenth century. From this shelter the Dominicans could secretly visit some Catholic communities

4. On the situation of the Protestant Church during the VOC period, see T. V. D. End, *Harta Dalam Bejana, Sejarah Gereja Ringkas* (Jakarta: Gunung Mulia, 2004), 217–19. See also H. Boelaars, *Indonesianisasi, Dari Gereja Katolik di Indonesia Menjadi Gerja Katolik Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, 67–77.

5. The Malay Language used for the first translation of the Bible was a mix of Malay, Latin and Portuguese. The overture of the Letter to the Romans, can be seen as an example of such translation in T. V. D. End, *Harta Dalam Bejana, Sejarah Gereja Ringkas*, *op. cit.*, 221.

6. A revolt in Ambon which was reported by Protestant pastors in Batavia as consequence of injustice perpetrated by the Company, brought about the strong reaction of the VOC. In some other cases the Protestant pastors underwent incarceration or were dismissed because of their criticisms against the VOC exponents; see *Ibid.*, 222–23.

7. *Ibid.*, 223.

still alive in those areas in Flores which were under the sway of Dutch government, such as Ende and Larantuka. Some other missionaries tried to enter the Archipelago during the VOC dominion. In 1638 two Carmelites, namely Fr. Dionysius a Nativitate and Brother Redemptus a Cruce were murdered in Aceh; in 1900 they were beatified and became the first saints coming from Indonesian land. Some other missionaries were able to come to the Archipelago in areas not controlled by the VOC, such as the Theatines invited by The English East India Company in the southwest coast of Sumatra and Kalimantan. Some missionaries visited the coast of Java during their journeys to or from Indo-China, China or Philippines, and sometimes they were allowed to work among Catholic Europeans, especially in Batavia.⁸

All in all, the VOC period represented the darkest time for the Catholic Church in the Archipelago. The discrimination experienced in Holland was strongly felt also by the Catholic communities in the East India Colonies to the point that the newborn Church was threatened with extinction. But also the Protestant Church did not really develop. In fact, the spiritual care of the Protestant Church was addressed almost exclusively to Europeans. It is true that some of the Protestant missionaries dedicated themselves also to the *zending*, the evangelization of pagans and local people. But because of the closure to Catholic missionaries, the number of conversions to Christian religion began to drop. In two centuries the number of Christians in the Archipelago slightly increased from 44,000 to 55,000.⁹

THE END OF THE VOC: CHALLENGES AND NEW EXPANSION OF THE CHURCH

New ideas about freedom brought about by the French Revolution pushed the Dutch government to guarantee freedom of worship in Holland, even if Catholics were still discriminated against. In 1799 the VOC came to an end and power in East India passed under the direct control of the Crown of Holland. Formally freedom of worship was assured in the colonies as well but having lived underground for a long time, it was not easy for the Catholic Church to revitalize the mission in the Archipelago straight away.

Nevertheless two missionaries came to Batavia from South Africa on 4 April, 1808 and the Catholic Church was able to start again in the territories under Holland's control. The first two missionaries received the so called "*radikal*" from the Dutch Government, namely a declaration of loyalty towards the Nation which they had to accept in order to be allowed to exercise their mandate. Through the "*radikal*" the State was trying to maintain control over all missionary activities, Catholic especially, and in fact the Dutch government continued to hamper the Catholic mission in the Archipelago. P. Candalh, a priest of the MEP congregation, did not get permission to go to Nias Island from Malacca

8. Documentation—Information Department Office of Bishops' Conference, *The Catholic Church in Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, 24–5.

9. H. Boelaars, *Indonesianisasi, Dari Gereja Katolik di Indonesia Menjadi Gereja Katolik Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, 69. See also T. V. D. End, *Harta Dalam Bejana, Sejarah Gereja Ringkas*, *op. cit.*, 226.

because only Dutch missionaries were allowed to enter the area, whilst a different and more favorable policy was implemented for the Protestants.¹⁰

When Mgr. Grooff was sent from Suriname as Apostolic Vicar in Batavia he did not receive the “*radikal*” from the government. In 1846 he started reorganizing the clergy and reactivated some old priests who were in retirement. The reaction of the government was very strong. Giving the reason that only the government could give assignments to priests, no priest was allowed any more to do his ministry in the whole of Java Island. The Holy See strongly reacted too. The agreement between the Church and the Government in Holland produced the so called “*Nota der Punten*” which finally declared the right of the Church of autonomously giving assignments to priests. The earlier opposition of the Government, however, had already produced its effects. In 1847 there were hardly any priests in the Oriental part of Dutch East India.

Nevertheless, a new season for the growth of the Catholic Church was about to blossom. When the new Apostolic Vicar, Mgr. P. M. Vrancken, came to Batavia in 1848, there were only 4 parishes, namely Batavia (opened in 1808), Semarang (1808), Surabaya (1810) in Java and Padang (1837) in Sumatra, with a total 5670 Catholics. Those parishes were run by Dutch priests for European Catholics. The island of Bangka saw the growth of a strong Chinese Catholic community animated by a lay man who had been baptized in Penang, Malaysia. The first tentative Catholic evangelization of Batak people in North Sumatra carried out by Fr. De Hessele in 1854 failed because he died soon after his arrival in the area.

Priests began to come again to the Archipelago to restart pastoral care of the old communities, in West Timor (1883), Flores, West Kalimantan (1885), North Sulawesi (1886), South Sumatra (1887), South Moluccas (1888) and the Centre of the Moluccas (1891). In 1894 the Jesuits began their missionary activities among the Javanese in Central Java.¹¹

During the nineteenth century some new congregations tried to open their missionary work in Dutch East India with different results. Mill Hill Missionaries were not allowed because of their British nationality whilst the Missionaries of Sacred Heart and the Cappuchins were able to work in Papua and Kalimantan despite not being given the “*radikal*”. Ursuline Sisters started their work in Jakarta in 1856 and the Brothers of Oudenbosch opened a school in Surabaya in 1862.

After the end of World War I many more congregations and orders strived to settle in the Archipelago. Some of them were still not allowed to enter because of the citizenship of their members and also because the Dutch government feared that the Church would contribute to a rise in the sense of autonomy and independence among the Catholic communities. Nevertheless, despite those difficulties, the expansion of the Church during the early decades of the twentieth century was amazingly fast. From 1900 to 1940 the Church

10. H. Boelaars, *Indonesianisasi, Dari Gereja Katolik di Indonesia Menjadi Gerja Katolik Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, 74.

11. Documentation—Information Department Office of Bishops' Conference, *The Catholic Church in Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, 27–8.

increased from 1 to 15 ecclesiastical territories, from 49 to 224 Parishes, from 50.000 to 566.300 worshippers (half of them autochthonous), from 1 to 14 religious congregations of priests, from 1 to 7 congregation of brothers, from 5 to 37 congregation of nuns, and from 46 to 570 priests.¹² The Church in Indonesia started to prepare local clergy by opening the seminaries to local people and in 1940 there were already 334 seminarians, 90% of them autochthonous.¹³ On 1 August, 1940 Mgr. Soegijapranata SJ, became the first local bishop of the Indonesian Church.¹⁴

In 1940 the Church was still mostly dependent on European missionaries, especially Dutch. Nevertheless, also because of the orientation given by the Apostolic Letter *Maximum Illud* (1919), the Church in the Dutch East India Territories began to assume autonomy and a more local character. In this process toward the foundation of a local Indonesian Church the contribution of the Dutch missionaries must be highlighted. In this regard one of the most outstanding figures was the Jesuit Fr. Van Lith, who was very committed to knowing and studying the Javanese culture and struggled to promote the peaceful coexistence of the European and autochthonous in the same nation where both having the same dignity. He contributed also to the intellectual formation of future leaders by founding a school in Muntilan, Central Jawa. Mgr. Albertus Soegijapranata SJ, the first Indonesian bishop, and Ignasius Kasimo¹⁵, who was to become an important political activist, were both formed in the Van Lith school.¹⁶

The eruption of World War II coincided with another dark period for the Catholic Church in Indonesia. At its beginning 60 German missionaries (along with some 2400 people) were arrested and deported; 18 died in a ship hit by a torpedo close to Nias Island. After the attack on Pearl Harbour the Japanese put an end to the Dutch colony in the Archipelago. Under the Japanese Imperial sway German missionaries were liberated while the Dutch were arrested. On 30 July, 1942 the Bishop of Moluccas and New Guinea, together with 13 brothers and priests, were brutally killed after being falsely accused of possessing weapons. Only the bishops in Jakarta and Ende were not detained. Since Indonesian people were not openly persecuted, Mgr. Soegijapranata, 19 priests, 60 brothers and 206 nuns, could still work and keep the Church alive even if under the strict control of the Japanese. The cost of persecution was very high: 74 priests, 47 brothers, 161

12. H. Boelaars, *Indonesianisasi, Dari Gereja Katolik di Indonesia Menjadi Gerja Katolik Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, 85–96.

13. *Ibid.*, 99. See also E. Subangun, *Dekolonisasi Gereja di Indonesia, Suatu Proses Setengah Hati* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2003), 24.

14. It is very famous the Mgr. Soegijapranata's motto: "I am 100% Catholic and I am 100% Indonesian"; H. Boelaars, *Indonesianisasi, Dari Gereja Katolik di Indonesia Menjadi Gerja Katolik Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, 112.

15. I.J. Kasimo founded the *Pakempalan Poltiek Katholiek Djawi* (PPKD), a politic and cultural movement which represents the first expression of political awareness of Indonesian Catholics, cf. E. Subangun, *Dekolonisasi Gereja di Indonesia, Suatu Proses Setengah Hati*, *op. cit.*, 79–83.

16. H. Boelaars, *Indonesianisasi, Dari Gereja Katolik di Indonesia Menjadi Gerja Katolik Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, 108–16.

nuns lost their lives in concentration camps; many churches and schools were damaged or destroyed.¹⁷

INDEPENDENCE AND THE INDONESIANIZATION OF THE CHURCH

At the end of the World War II Japan, already defeated, lost its dominion in the Archipelago. Soon Holland tried to conquer back its old possessions but encountered the fierce opposition of Indonesians who had already declared their independence on 17 August, 1945. Regarding the independence issue Catholics showed two different positions: those in Holland supported a kind of Federal Republic under the control of the Netherlands; the Church in Indonesia, on the other hand, was in favor of total autonomy. When Semarang was conquered back by the Dutch, Bishop Soegijapranata left the city and moved to Yogyakarta where he got close to the partisan leaders. The Dutch Bishop of Jakarta, Mgr. Willekens, showed the same attitude against the greed of his own homeland. A meeting between Soukarno, Hatta and General Sudirman, namely the president, the vice-president and an important leader of the resistance, took place in the surgery room of Panti Rapih Hospital, in Yogyakarta, a Hospital run by the Dutch nuns of the Carolus Borromeus Congregation.¹⁸ In the end independence was accepted and declared in the Netherlands on 27 December, 1949.

After independence the Church was still very dependent on foreign personnel. 90% of the priests were foreigners, many of them Dutch, which emotively represented an obstacle. Between 1949 and 1951 the missionaries were given the possibility of Indonesian citizenship. From then on the Department of Religion has been in charge of giving the necessary recommendation for all missionaries applying for new visas; but we must also say that it has always been dominated by Islamic groups. The applications for 500 missionaries' visas sent to the Department of Religion in 1952 were rejected. In 1953 the Department director stated that from then on no more missionaries were needed in Indonesia.¹⁹

Nevertheless the doors were not completely closed. Propaganda Fide was pushing towards the internationalization of missions and for this reason some other congregations got the chance to start their work in Indonesia.²⁰ In 1951 the Apostolic Vicariate of Padang was entrusted to the Xaverians from Italy; in 1955 Capuchins from Germany began their work in Sibolga (North Sumatra); in 1960 German Redemptorists opened their mission in Sumba; American OSC arrived in Meruake in 1960. With the help of these new forces the Church started a new expansion in some areas which so far were still untouched by the Christian message. Missions were opened in Southeast Kalimantan,

17. Ibid., 119.

18. Ibid., 119–26.

19. Ibid., 130.

20. Ibid., 130–31. This policy of *Propaganda Fide* met with the opposition of Provincial superiors of congregations in Holland who thought that for the good of Indonesian mission it was better to send Dutch missionaries only.

some parts of Irian Jaya, Mentawai Islands, Nias, North Moluccas and the area of the Toraja people in Sulawesi.²¹

But at the same time, another international case was about to put in danger the Catholic Church in Indonesia: the Papua controversy. During the '50s Holland should have handed over Papua to Indonesia, but this shift did not occur smoothly. Some 500 factories were still running in the area under the direct control of Holland. When president Soukarno reacted by nationalizing all the factories present in the territory Mgr. Soegijapranata expressed his concern to the Catholic Party in Holland, explaining that the Papua controversy could put in danger the Church in Indonesia. The same complaint would be expressed by the Indonesian Catholic Party to its counterpart in the Netherlands. In 1959 the Indonesian government prohibited the missionaries to teach. A short war ended with an agreement between the two parties; Papua was given back to Indonesia on 22 April, 1963.²²

On 3 January, 1961 the Holy See constituted the local Indonesian hierarchy. All the non-Indonesian ordinaries were willing to retire if it was necessary to give space to Indonesian bishops. The shortage in Indonesian personnel did not allow for this substitution; of twenty-five dioceses only three were guided by local bishops. This important gesture, however, was appreciated by the Indonesian Government which saw it as a significant step toward the implementation of the National Ideology of Pancasila.²³

After the repression of a Communist *coup d'état* in 1965,²⁴ Indonesia started a period of stability and development, guided by the new president Souharto. The Church was trying to continue the process of Indonesianization of leaders and inculturation of the Catholic faith. Some Catholic leaders were able to give their contribution to the development of the country by involvement in the political field and even becoming part of the cabinet or reaching the highest offices in the army. The inculturation of the liturgy started with the translation of the rite of the Eucharistic Celebration which was worked out between '64 and '66. Due to shortage of priests, the Indonesian Episcopal Conference (MAWI) twice sent petitions to the Holy See asking permission for ordination of married men in '71 and '80. Those requests were in both cases rejected.²⁵

After Vatican II another important structural change occurred in the dioceses. The so called *Ius Commissionis*, that is the full entrustment of a diocese to a congregation, was transformed in the so called *Mandatium*, in which a diocese is assigned and entrusted to a bishop who assumes the full authority for the pastoral care of its territory. This important

21. Documentation—Information Department Office of Bishops' Conference, *The Catholic Church in Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, 29.

22. During the conflict for Papua the Catholic Vice Commander of Naval Forces Yos Sudarso lost his life. He is numbered among the national heroes. Cf. H. Boelaars, *Indonesianisasi, Dari Gereja Katolik di Indonesia Menjadi Gerja Katolik Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, 130.

23. *Ibid.*, 144.

24. *Ibid.*, 148–49. A list was found of priest and bishops who were to be killed if the *coup d'état* had succeeded.

25. *Ibid.*, 151–62.

step changed the image of Indonesian dioceses which became more “multicolored”. Since then different congregations have started working together in the same territory, also collaborating with diocesan priests.

Despite the full loyalty of the Catholic Church to the ideal of Pancasila, its contribution to the Independence struggle and its commitment to development of the country, the Church continued experiencing discrimination. In 1979 it was announced that the visa for missionaries would not be renewed, since, according to the Department of Religion, Indonesia did not need missionaries anymore. Besides, applications for visa renewals had to be made only in Jakarta and not, as had been the case, in each province. In 1979 the visas of 79 missionaries expired and so they could stay in Indonesia only illegally. In the meantime, the Department of Religion declared that any kind of financial aid for the Church had to be delivered through the same Department, which was notoriously inefficient and corrupt. The protest of the Catholic Church together with the Conference of Protestant Churches obtained permission to handle autonomously international aid and also to ease ruling regarding the recommendation for new visas.

Another attempt to control the Church occurred in 1984 when the Government imposed the Pancasila as the ideological foundation of any social institution (ORMAS). Formally the Bishop’s Conference (MAWI) should have undergone the same rule but, obviously, Pancasila could not be accepted as the main inspirational source for the Church in substitution of the Gospel. The case went on for some time and finally in 1987 the solution was found: MAWI changed its statutes and became KWI (*Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia*). In the new statutes the Conference was not considered anymore as a social organization, but as a religious institution instead. KWI was freeing itself from the ideological submission to Pancasila, but at the same time its statutes assured that it was not in contradiction with the Pancasila ideals. In this way the Church was showing itself to be completely faithful to the Gospel but also loyal to the Nation. The dream of Mgr. Soegijapranata, the first Indonesian bishop, namely being 100% Catholic and 100% Indonesian, became a reality in the new KWI statutes.

Despite the above mentioned difficulties, during the period after independence the expansion of the Church continued very fast. The number of Catholics increased from half a million in 1940 to 4.5 million in 1990. The number of missionary personnel decreased, especially because of difficulties in getting new visas, but the local vocations to priesthood and religious life kept on increasing noticeably. In 1940 there were 570 priests in the Archipelago. They rose to 1905 in 1990, half of them autochthonous. Until the 80s most of the priests were religious, whilst lately the number of diocesan priests has also increased.

The number of seminarians has also significantly increased, most of the Seminaries have the status of Theological Faculties and the responsibility in seminary education has gradually been handed over to Indonesian educators. The number of brothers increased from 520 in 1940 to 936 in 1990, half of them Indonesian. The amount of nuns amazingly increased from 164 in 1940 to 5000 in 1990.

TODAY'S CHALLENGES

As we have seen above, the process of Indonesianization of the Church started after independence and was in fact welcomed also by the government as an effort to implement the nationalistic and anti-colonial spirit of Pancasila. The Church wants to be Indonesian and find its identity as local Church. But how does this process fit with the globalization which today is assuming the shape of a new form of colonialism and domination from abroad? How is the Church responding to challenges coming from the globalized world which affect all the aspects of human life?

According to some authors the tendency of the Indonesian Church is to consider itself as a little flock, which it really is, since the percentage of Catholics reaches only 3% of the Indonesian population. The risk is to take shelter in a ghetto separated from society, a spiritual and safe environment in which Catholics can live their faith freely, but also without really caring about what is going on in the country. This can be seen as a consequence of feeling powerless in front of problems generated by globalization considered too big to be overcome by such little group of people.

According to some scholars this attitude is evidently still present in some groups of the Church which strongly stress devotions and liturgy. One of the groups that responds to these needs, but not the only one, is the Charismatic Renewal, which demonstrates the attitude of responding to the immediate spiritual needs of their adherents but does not do that much to overcome the tendency towards isolation from other ecclesial groups and more in general from society.²⁶

Some polls have also shown that according to the majority of Catholics involvement of the Church in social and political matters should not be considered a priority. Instead, they say, the Church should concentrate its efforts more in spiritual support, health care and education,²⁷ showing that the tendency is still towards a vision of a Church focused on charity and not yet able to perform its function as yeast for the transformation of society from the inside. According to Emmanuel Subangun this attitude is a legacy from the colonial period.²⁸ For some others scholars, the Church during the Souharto regime sought the support of its power and was not able to express its disagreement and opposition until the publication of the Letter of the Bishops' Conference for Lent of 1997 which expressed the open protest of the Bishops against the responsibilities of Souharto's Government for the problems of society. The year after, as a consequence of the students' protests which broke out in different cities, Souharto resigned.²⁹

26. E. Subangun, *Dekolonisasi Gereja di Indonesia, Suatu Proses Setengah Hati*, op. cit., 33-43.

27. Ibid., 54.

28. Ibid., 18; 53-60; 110.

29. Cfr. Bishops' Conference of Indonesia, *Concern and Hope, Lenten Pastoral Letter* (Jakarta, 1997). See also contributions of J. Müller, "Gereja dunia sebagai persekutuan belajar bersama;" J. Mansford, "Conflict Resolution: Konflik dan Kekerasan Gerakan. Yesus dan Dinamika Perujukan Sosial" and J. B. Banawiratma, "Hidup Menggereja yang Terbuka" in J. B. Banawiratma, ed., *Gereja Indonesia, Quo Vadis?, Hidup Menggereja Kontekstual*. J. B. Banawiratma, ed., (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2000), 39-55; 105-64; 181-96.

In the context of today's globalized world Indonesia has already experienced two main financial crises, one occurred in Asia in 1998, and the last one which is still on course. Needless to say, the main victims of such global disasters are the poor. During the last few months alone thousands of workers have lost their jobs and do not know how to survive. As we said above, some critics attest that the Church should do more to face the problem of poverty, but on the whole we cannot say that the Church is uncaring in this regard. If we look at the history of the Church the contribution it has given to the development of the country through Catholic hospitals, schools and other social structures is undeniable. In some places those structures still represent outstanding examples of dedication and professionalism. Solidarity has been concretely expressed by the Church towards the victims of natural disasters which have hit the country in the last few years no matter which religion or ethnic group those victims belonged to.

After the *tsunami* in 2005, the Indonesian *Caritas* has been renewed and some new branches were founded in dioceses where it was not previously active. Therefore its new structure should be able to better handle emergencies and provide material support to those in need. In some dioceses, such as Jakarta, the spiritual care of workers' groups is run by a special pastoral bureau. Moreover, recently, pastoral letters and exhortations have been stressing the responsibility of every Catholic and of the Church as a whole for the development and the future of the country, the care for the poor, justice towards workers and ecology.³⁰ These exhortations try to revitalize solidarity, but also to remind the Church and its members, including its ministers, to be witnesses of the Gospel, even through their lifestyle. The traditional values, deeply rooted in the traditions and cultures of the Archipelago, are threatened by consumerism and secularism also in Indonesia and it is undeniable that the lifestyle of priests and religious is often beyond the real possibilities of the average person they serve.

Globalization means also cultural uniformity to a global dominant model which neglects differences and traditions. There is no doubt that the Western cultural model is embedding itself deeply inside the Indonesian culture and also the Church. The media makes its contribution to the spread of this cultural domination and through satellite television (which provides free channels in Indonesia) has already reached every remote corner of the Archipelago.³¹

Fortunately, the single Indonesian cultures are still very strong so much so that it seems very difficult that they will be extracted from the hearts of people. Quite often those traditions are even stronger than religious obligations. Therefore a Javanese will

30. Cf. Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia, *Keadaban Publik: Menuju Habitus Baru Bangsa, Keadilan Sosial bagi Semua: Pendekatan Sosio-Budaya, Nota Pastoral Sidang Konferensi Waligereja*. 1–11 November 2004. (Sekretariat Jenderal Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia).

31. I myself experienced the arriving of a satellite parabola in the middle of the jungle in the Mentawai Islands. That very night the whole village, with their traditional tattoos and wearing perizomas, gathered for the first time to watch television. We can just imagine what a cultural shock soap operas or Hollywood movies produce on such a traditional culture.

always be a Javanese and a Batak always a Batak. They will go back to their tradition and ceremonies in the main moments of their lives even if they wear jeans and possess the latest model of Nokia mobile phone. In this sense we can say that the Indonesian people have a fairly strong natural protection in the face of cultural globalization. Values like the sacredness of family, respect for the elderly, natural solidarity are still very alive in Indonesian culture. Moreover, we must also say that the Church has always tried to save all the good present in the cultures and still tries to find its way forward in the process of inculturation. Simple examples of this endeavor are the translations of the Bible and of the Missal in several Indonesian local languages.³²

Most probably the main effort of the Indonesian Church in responding to today's challenges, including those coming from globalization, is the revitalization of the smallest cells of the Church. According to the guidelines suggested by the FABC in the last two decades, the Indonesian Church has made the choice of the Small Christian Communities (*Komunitas Basis Gerejawi* or KBG) the core of its pastoral activities since the Synod of the Indonesian Catholic Church (SANGKI) in 2000. This model was taken from the experience of Latin America, Africa and the Philippines, but has deep roots in the traditional structure of "*lingkungan*", that is the local community of Catholics living in the same neighborhood.

The characteristics of these Small Christian Communities are: small groups, mutual knowledge among the members, regular meetings, reading and sharing on the Bible, searching together for the solutions to problems of the community members in the light of Scripture; being united to the universal Church especially through the Eucharist; being Church at grassroots level and openness to dialogue with every component of society.³³ Practically, the KBG represent the smallest cells of the parish, collecting people living in the same territory or neighborhood. The bishops' hope is that the Small Christian Communities may become the main instrument for spiritually feeding the members of the Church and also for influencing and helping Indonesian Society as its evangelical yeast. Through the KBG the Church should be more easily accepted by Indonesian society and culture at grassroots level, overcoming the impression of the Christian faith as a foreign product. Moreover, the Small Christian Communities should be able to dialogue with other religions through the so-called "dialogue of life"³⁴ by means of natural relationships already present in the neighborhood among people of different faiths. The KBG

32. On this point we can also add that missionaries, starting from Francis Xavier with his reports on the culture he found in the Moluccas, have always tried to save the cultural richness they found among people they were sent to. Just to give some examples: the traditions of Nias culture are kept safe in a Museum founded by a German Capuchin; the Xaverians have collected quite a large collection of literature on Mentawaiian culture, including language, tradition and beliefs; the most reliable dictionaries of Batak and Jawa languages were written by missionaries.

33. A. Margana, *Komunitas Basis, Gerakan Menggereja Kontekstual* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2004), 30–2. It must also be said that in some Dioceses the definition of ssc is also extended to Ecclesial Movements and other Association, in some others it is more restricted to small communities sharing the same neighborhood.

34. Cf. A. B. Sinaga, "Hidup Menggereja yang Terbuka," in J. B. Banawiratma, ed., *Gereja Indonesia, Quo Vadis?, Hidup Menggereja Kontekstual*, op. cit., 80.

should also be able to express concretely the care of the Church for the poor living in the neighborhood. So, it is clearly evident that the Indonesian Church is expecting very much from the Small Christian Communities.

Needless to say, it is too early to express any kind of evaluation of this pastoral policy, but we can attempt to make some comments. First, we can say that by rooting itself in the preceding and already alive *lingkungan* and other small communities, the net of the KBG has found good foundations for its growth. Moreover, the disposition of Indonesian people to gather together in spiritual meetings facilitates the development of the KBG as the most basic and simple environment where Catholics can live their faith and a place open to every member of the Church living in the neighborhood no matter which ethnic group they belong to. This fact is very important in the multicultural context of Indonesia because it represents the concrete opportunity in which to express the ability of the Church to unite people from different races and ethnic groups in the same spiritual family.

Nevertheless, besides those positive points and the right intent to make the Church grow from its base, some weaknesses appear here and there. In fact, the Small Christian Communities in Indonesia are not a structure created by its base but are suggested by the hierarchy which draws its inspiration from the Small Christian Communities in Latin America and Philippines. So far it seems that the original spirit of Small Christian Communities, and also their method of reading the Bible applying it to everyday problems, has touched only superficially the lifestyle of the communities in Indonesia. For instance, their activities are very much restricted to devotions, such as reciting the rosary or Novenas, or Mass, so that, all in all, what we call Small Christian Communities are often not so different from the old *lingkungan*.

The reflection on the Bible as the source of solutions to neighborhood problems or the dimension of inter-religious dialogue seem far from being fully implemented. Besides, at least in big cities like Jakarta, there is the real risk of losing young generations who, generally, do not join the meetings of Small Christian Communities, preferring other ecclesial groups instead. So the KBG seem to have quite a long way to go in order to fulfill their tasks and to get closer to their ideals as the smallest and basic structure of the Church and parishes. They represent the novelty of the Church in Indonesia today and we hope that their functions will be accomplished to the full for the good of the Church and society. But we also believe that the choice of KBG should not be exclusive. On the contrary the multiform challenges coming from today's world need a wider spectrum of answers which can be offered by the KBG in collaboration with other groups, associations and charisms present in the Church.

The Indonesian Church, so tested in the past to the point of extinction, is now growing and growing, as a little but very enthusiastic flock. This Church which has been planted and supported by missionaries coming from the other side of the world is now completely autonomous and looking for its mature identity. The number of Christians increases, mostly because of the initiative and the enthusiasm of lay people who feel

a personal commitment to sharing their Christian experience with their neighbors, schoolmates, relatives and colleagues, resulting in some places in a very flourishing catechumenate.³⁵ Moreover, the lack of vocations felt in Europe and other parts of the world seems to be still unknown in Indonesia. Many young people, especially in areas not yet deeply influenced by secularization, are still willing to give themselves to God to become priests or religious. Today, the Indonesian Church, founded by missionaries, has already begun sending Indonesian missionaries to other countries more in need. This Church, born because of dedication and sacrifice of missionaries coming from abroad, is already mature enough to offer in return its own spiritual treasures to the rest of the Church and humanity.

While recognizing such remarkable achievements, we must also be aware that the shift from the missionary phase to the maturation of the local Church, united to the nationalistic sentiments which brought Indonesia to independence, can induce some sort of narrow-mindedness. In particular a self-reliant Church such as the Indonesian Church can, for historical reasons, adopt two forms of narrow-mindedness: the first is towards what may be considered as belonging to the “outside” such as “foreign” charisms, ideas, theology, the Magisterium, new missionaries and so on;³⁶ the second is the disinterest in what is not directly related to internal problems and also, because of an exaggerated concern about shortage of personnel, the Church may consider the sending of Indonesian missionaries to other countries as a loss rather than an enrichment.

So far the Indonesian Church has shown maturity in these matters and at a certain level a strong concern for internal problems must be tolerated and considered normal in this phase of the development of the Church. We do hope that this concern for its internal problems will always be shared with a similar concern for the life of the whole Church and for the future of the whole of humanity.

CONCLUSION

The birth and growth of the Catholic faith in Indonesia cannot be separated from its source that is Europe. The seeds of the Church were brought to the Archipelago by missionaries who benefited from the support of colonial powers at least for transportation facilities and military protection. At the beginning the mission was mainly addressed to Europeans, but soon the missionaries oriented their pastoral care to autochthonous peoples and began digging the foundations of the Indonesian Church far before the real-

35. Just as an example, in the Toasebio Parish in Jakarta, baptisms of adults can reach as many as 200 every year. In Jakarta the catechumenate is very much alive also in universities where the candidates are invited and accompanied by their Catholic colleagues. Many catechumens are also former students of Catholic schools who had been impressed by the evangelical life of their teachers and school environment. In 2004 the number of Catholics in Indonesia was almost 6.5 million people, whilst, as we have seen above, in 1990 it was some 4.5 million; <<http://www.ekaristi.org/statistik/stats.php>>.

36. A possible sign of this mentality is the lack of an official version of the Catechisms of the Catholic Church and also of the office of readings in the Breviary.

ization of any dreams of national independence. The initial support of colonial powers turned out in the long run to be against the interests of the Catholic Church itself during the VOC period, which represented the darkest time for the development of the Catholic faith in the Archipelago. During those hard times the Church was almost destroyed because of the opposition of the VOC leaders as consequence of religious conflicts which arose in Holland after the Lutheran Reformation and independence from Catholic Spain. For these reasons we can conclude that globalization, understood as the influence of global powers on the destiny of the Church in Indonesia, is not something new but was experienced by the Church since its very beginning. Moreover, all in all, the VOC domination was much more threatening to the Catholic faith than the present globalization. We can even say the Catholic Church in the Archipelago was much more “globalized” in the past than it is today.

The fact that in the past the Church has been profoundly challenged by global political, commercial and military interests gives hope that it will not succumb to the challenge of modern globalization. On the contrary, the signs we have seen above, indicate that the Church has enough energy to face the new challenges of the present day. The Church is numerically growing and still appeals to people.

The number of catechumens and also vocations are signs of hope for the future both in Indonesia and in other churches more in need. Further, the pastoral policy of Small Christian Communities will become a good example for the Church in other countries in so far as it brings true and abundant fruits in interreligious dialogue, commitment in social development, care for the poor, witness of faith at the grassroots of the Church and inter-ethnic coexistence. The future will say if the KBCS are able to respond such challenges.

The independence of the country from 350 years of foreign domination has given new life to the Church in Indonesia which has struggled to become autonomous from its dependence on Europe. As we have seen above, one of the factors which has compelled the Church towards autonomy was the policy of the government towards missionary visas. The reaction of the Church was excellent since in a few decades the Church has already reached the level of full autonomy which makes it self-supporting, at least from the point of view of personnel.

We have seen that a beautiful sign of its maturity is also the fact that the Indonesian Church has already started to send Indonesian missionaries to other countries. Finally, we have also pointed out some risks that can possibly occur if an excess of nationalism dominates the Church in the form of a mindset closed to what is not Indonesian, to what does not concern directly the problems of the country and to the Indonesian mission *ad extra*. We hope and we believe that such narrow-mindedness will not overcome the universalistic spirit of the Church.

The Indonesian Church seems to be already mature enough to give its contribution to the realization of that “spiritual globalization” which is the typical character of the Body of Christ in which every member is ready to give and receive from others in a dynamic

of mutual giving. This is the dynamic of the universal Church, the life of the family of Christian people which embraces the world, a family in which everyone has their own talents and can give their contribution for the good of all. This was the dream of Mgr. Soegijapranata, being 100% Indonesian and 100% Catholic, which means “universal” or, in modern terms, “global”.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BANAWIRATMA, J. B., ed.

2000 *Gereja Indonesia, Quo Vadis?, Hidup Menggereja Kontekstual*. Yogyakarta: Kanisius.

BISHOPS' CONFERENCE OF INDONESIA

1997 *Concern and Hope, Lenten Pastoral Letter*. Jakarta.

BOELAARS, Huub

2005 *Indonesianisasi, Dari Gereja Katolik di Indonesia Menjadi Gerja Katolik Indonesia*. Yogyakarta: Kanisius.

DOCUMENTATION—INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF BISHOPS' CONFERENCE

1989 *The Catholic Church in Indonesia*. Jakarta.

END, Th. Van Den

2004 *Harta Dalam Bejana, Sejarah Gereja Ringkas*. Jakarta: Gunung Mulia.

EUCARESTIA DOT ORG

2009 <<http://www.ekaristi.org/statistik/stats.php>>.

KONFERENSI WALIGEREJA INDONESIA

2004 *Keadaban Publik: Menuju Habitus Baru Bangsa, Keadilan Sosial bagi Semua: Pendekatan Sosio-Budaya*. Nota Pastoral Sidang Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia, 1–11 November 2004. Sekretariat Jenderal Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia, Jakarta.

MARDIATMADJA, B. S.

2009 *Gereja Katolik Masuk Indonesia*. Notes of the Course on Local Religions at Driyarkara University. Jakarta: Pro Manuscripto.

MARGANA, A.

2004 *Komunitas Basis, Gerakan Menggereja Kontekstual*. Yogyakarta: Kanisius.

SUBANGUN, Emmanuel

2003 *Dekolonisasi Gereja di Indonesia, Suatu Proses Setengah Hati*. Yogyakarta: Kanisius.

While scholars agree that the phenomenon of globalization is an event that characterizes, underlies, and determines all contemporary worldviews, this unanimity gives way to a multitude of opinions when they try to establish at what point in time globalization began or how it should be defined. Although some scholars believe that this phenomenon began towards the end of the twentieth century, many others, especially historians, who track the expansion of human population and the growth of civilization, look upon globalization as a centuries-long process. Still others trace the wave of global trade, colonization, and enculturation (which linked continents, economies and cultures as never before) back to the discovery of the “New World”, the development of the British Empire and the establishment of European colonies. As for its definitions, suffice it to point out that there are several available, and that what distinguish one from the other is the degree of importance and value attributed to the political,

economic, technological, cultural and ethical factors each formula tries to mix and encapsulate in itself.¹

Whatever the results of these indispensable etiological and terminological analyses, we should also notice that the Church, especially in her discourses and exhortations to the Asian peoples, repeatedly recognized the importance of the process of globalization by stressing not only its economic characteristic (insisting upon the need for a “globalization without marginalization,”²) and its cultural dimension (made possible by the modern communications media, which is quickly drawing Asian societies into a global consumer culture that is both secularist and materialistic, thus eroding the traditional family and social values which until now had sustained peoples and societies), but also in its religious quality. In this regard, it is stated that the Church is certainly aware of how her mission of evangelization in the age of globalization is deeply affected by the means of communication which, having the unlimited ability to reach and shape the ways of thinking and living of people all over the world, can help to spread the Good News. These means, however, do not exempt the Church from constantly striving to root this message in the new cultural milieu in which she is called to work and witness the Gospel.³

Globalization as such, therefore, must be analyzed not only in its possible negative aspects—namely when it becomes indifferent to all singularity, particularity, specificity, and discrimination—but also in its positive aspects, as an opportunity to spread the mes-

1. Space allows us only to quote a few of the most representative definitions proposed by various scholars. The sociologist Anthony Giddens speaks of globalization as an “intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (A. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, 64). He thus stresses how globalization modifies the social representation of “distance”, attenuating the significance of territorial space and redesigning political and cultural frontiers without actually doing away with them. This “inter-connectedness” has gone on to influence many aspects of the economy, culture, mass communications, international politics and military strategy. For Ian Clark, globalization “denotes movements in both the *intensity* and the *extent* of international interactions; in the former sense, globalization overlaps to some degree with related ideas of integration, interdependence, multilateralism, openness and interpenetration; in the latter, it points to the geographical spread of these tendencies and is cognate with globalism, spatial compression, universalization, and homogeneity” (I. Clark, *Globalization and Fragmentation*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, 1). Clark sees globalization as being in constant tension with the parallel phenomenon of “fragmentation” (or “localization”) which tends towards disaggregation, autarchy and isolation. The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu dismisses any call to define globalization, although he does offer the following political assessment: “This word embodies the most accomplished form of the *imperialism of the universal*, which consists in universalizing, for a society, its own particularity by tacitly instituting it as a universal yardstick” (P. Bourdieu, *Firing Back Against the Tyranny of the Market* 2. Trans. by L. Wacquant. London: Verso, 2003, 86). Bourdieu considers globalization a pseudo-concept because it is both descriptive (in that it interprets the unification of the global economy as an objective reality) and prescriptive (in that it designates an economic policy comprising a wide range of legal and political measures designed to unify the world’s economy). Bourdieu views globalization as an ideological construct that uses the tools of rhetoric to legitimize the global neo-liberal project and undermine the European social-democratic model.

2. Pope John Paul II, *Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Ecclesia in Asia*, 1999, n. 39.

3. *Ibid.*, n. 49. The cues and directions of this *Apostolic Exhortation* have been revisited in the seventh plenary assembly of the *Federation of Asian Bishops*, “A Renewed Church in Asia: A Mission of Love and Service,” *FABC Papers*, 2000, 93:6.

sage of the Gospel truly to the ends of the earth. From the point of view of global communication, the Church approaches the virtual world inaugurated by the Internet with realism and confidence and appreciates its magnificent opportunities for evangelization: by providing information and stirring interest it makes possible an initial encounter with the Christian message; it can provide the kind of follow-up which evangelization requires by making available sources of information, documentation and education about the Church, her history and tradition, her doctrine and her engagement in every field in all parts of the world; it can offer help and support to all the believers living in an hostile cultural environment. Certainly, the Church is aware that electronically mediated relationships can never take the place of the direct human contact required for genuine evangelization. For evangelization always depends upon the personal witness of the one sent to evangelize. Moreover, as John Paul II wrote on the occasion of a World Communication Day, “The Internet causes billions of images to appear on millions of computer monitors around the planet. From this galaxy of sight and sound, will the face of Christ emerge and the voice of Christ be heard? For it is only when his face is seen and his voice heard that the world will know the glad tidings of our redemption. This is the purpose of evangelization. And this is what will make the Internet a genuinely human space, for if there is no room for Christ, there is no room for man.”⁴

Now, we can certainly ask how the relation between the phenomenon of globalization and the intrinsic missionary vocation of the Church, which assumes it as her new existential context, is considered and actualized in the particular situation of Japan. More specifically, we can ask how (and if) the Church in Japan intends to actively participate in this new process of evangelization and how (and if) she is reacting in the face of the waves of the new media, which increasingly break down all borders and differences, thus situating the Church within a virtual universality which is even more radical than the one the Church itself had weaved, tirelessly and patiently, throughout her historical peregrination.

The answers to these simple questions can vary, but one cannot fail to notice that the Church, in Japan, is still searching for a definite identity, struggles to develop her own theology and inculturation route and lacks that confidence (which can only come with time) in proclaiming and witnessing Christ’s Gospel. The Japanese Church, much like her Asian sister-Churches, is undoubtedly still in the early stages of her journey and is forced to move within a social and cultural context that makes no secret of its aversion or indifference to any creed and religious confession,⁵ even more so if the religion in ques-

4. John Paul II, *Message of the Holy Father for the 36th World Communication Day: Internet—A New Forum for Proclaiming the Gospel*. (May 12, 2002), n. 6.

5. According to a recent study of the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 72% of the Japanese do not have any specific religious affiliation, although 56% claimed to believe in something supernatural, and 94% of the respondents said they respected their ancestors. Asked about what happens to people’s spirits after they die, 30% said they believed they would be reincarnated, 24% that it will enter another world, and 18% that they will simply vanish. In *The Yomiuri Shimbun, 72% Irreligious; 56% Believe in the Supernatural*. May 31, 2008.

tion (Christianity) bloomed and developed in the far and foreign regions of the West. This is a social and cultural feature which, paradoxically, is shared even by the Japanese Church herself, a feature that mirrors that innate Japanese tendency to mistrust all that is perceived as not autochthonous, native, or the expression of their own history, disposition, and spirituality.

One can realize this as we recall some enlightening remarks by the famous Catholic writer Endo Shusaku on the difficulty that Christianity encountered (and, in his opinion, it will always encounter) whenever someone attempted to introduce it to the Japanese context. He wrote: “The religious mentality of the Japanese is—just as it was at the time when the people accepted Buddhism—responsive to one who ‘suffers with us’ and who ‘allows for our weakness,’ but their mentality has little tolerance for any kind of transcendent being who judges humans harshly, then punishes them. In brief, the Japanese tend to seek in their gods and buddhas a warm-hearted mother rather than a stern father. With this fact always in mind, I tried not so much to depict God in the father-image that tends to characterize Christianity, but rather to depict the kind-hearted maternal aspect of God revealed to us in the personality of Jesus.”⁶ In his famous novel, *Silence*, the author had Ferreira (the Jesuit who abjured the Christian faith during one of the numerous persecutions against the Christians) say: “For twenty years I labored in the mission... The only thing I know is that our religion does not take root in this country... This country is a swamp. In time you will come to see that for yourself. This country is a more terrible swamp than you can imagine. Whenever you plant a sapling in this swamp the roots begin to rot; the leaves grow yellow and wither. And we have planted the sampling of Christianity in this swamp.”⁷

6. S. Endo, *A Life of Jesus*. Trans. R.A. Schuchert (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), 1.

7. S. Endo, *Silence*. Trans. W. Johnston (New York: Tappin Publishing Company, 1980), 224–25. Note, however, that this tendency to see Christianity as something alien, strange, and incomprehensible is by no means shared by all scholars. Many thinkers—especially non Christian ones—do catch a glimpse of the beauty, meaning and originality that the message of the Gospel could offer to the Japanese. I would like to report here an exhortation that the Buddhist philosopher Nishitani Keiji (1900-1990) once addressed to his dearest friend, the Catholic missionary Jan Van Bragt, who recently passed away. Speaking of the intellectual figure of Nishitani, Fr. Van Bragt wrote: “No picture of Nishitani is any good if it does not show the extraordinary ‘broad-mindedness’—in the deepest sense of the word—of the man. We must first remember that Nishitani is nothing if not a convinced Buddhist. But one day he had been asking me, as he often did, many questions about Christianity and especially about the Christian Church in Japan, when all of a sudden, in a tone nearly of accusation, he sprang the question at me: ‘But why, why do you Christians not proselytize more fervently in Japan?!’ I do not think I was able to come up with much of an answer then and there, but the impromptu question had certainly given me a glimpse of a mind and heart capable of fully appreciating the strong points of Christianity, and what Christianity could contribute to Japan, while staying firmly anchored in Buddhism.” In J. Van Bragt, “Translating *Shūkyō to wa nani ka* into *Religion and Nothingness*,” T. Unno, ed., *The Religious Philosophy of Nishitani Keiji* (United States of America: Asian Humanity Press, 1989), 10. A question, then, spontaneously rises and almost imposes itself, without unfortunately being graced by a definitive answer: What did a Buddhist philosopher like Nishitani ever glimpse, understand, and admire of Christianity which a Christian novelist like Endo instead perceived as foreign and unnatural, to the point of never—as far as we know—encouraging the missionaries (nor the local clergy) to proselytize among the Japanese?

These words and this almost psychological interpretation of why a religion like Christianity (but we could also say every other religion that is not autochthonous—like Shinto—or which was not transformed to the point of becoming very different from its original model—like Buddhism⁸) was not accepted or failed to take root in Japanese soil, seem to be shared not only by the majority of those who study the Japanese religious phenomenon, but also by some leaders of the Christian people itself.⁹

Here we seem to find the same attitude that Japan embraced and continues to adopt with respect to every element, idea, or system which it borrowed or imported throughout the centuries, namely that of copying and absorbing the material culture of other people while firmly rejecting these peoples' principles. And while every talk of Orientalism (or in its package-tour Japanese version, *nihonjinron*, "discussion of the Japanese"), which justifies the nearly total indifference and incompatibility between Asian and Western thought, is outdated and historically overcome, it seems to be still deeply rooted in the rhetorical imagination of the interlocutors, thus protecting them from any encounter that might breach or cast doubt upon their interpretive categories, and guard them from any unpleasant confrontation with a way of thinking that might overflow the boundaries of their worldview.¹⁰

In today's highly globalized context, marked by a very high degree of connectivity (reached through the increasingly advanced information technologies, of whose market Japan is a formidable leader), it is almost hard to believe how slowly the Japanese Church

8. We can say that, *vis-à-vis* the phenomenon of globalization, the destiny reserved to these two religions will be quite benevolent. Shinto, which rather than a religion is part of the genetic heritage of every Japanese, will continue imperturbably with its festivals and *matsuri*, suspending time and cyclically ignoring all possibility of historical change. Buddhism, which presents itself as a spiritual balm to soothe the wounds caused by the impassible and uninterrupted flow of the real, seems to be a religion suited to solving the crisis of modern man, who no longer possesses any irrefutable certainty and increasingly struggles to keep up with the frantic rhythm of technological progress. Cfr. S. Žižek, *On Belief* (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), 12–5.

9. Here it may be useful to quote part of an interview given by a Japanese bishop who participated in the *Asian Vocations Today Conference*, which took place in Bangkok in October 2007, an interview that repeated the same concepts (if not the same words) already expressed by Endo Shusaku: "Regarding Oriental or Asian mentality, according to psychologists Asian people have a maternal way of thinking, while European and American people have a paternal mindset. So, most of the missionaries stressed the very, very big image of God and separated it almost infinitely from human beings, pointing out that we humans are very, very small. But God is so big. So if we sin against the will of God, he will strongly condemn us. The missionaries, who did tremendous work in general, brought this kind of thinking to Japan. But today, some Japanese say: 'We cannot follow this kind of image of God. Rather, for Oriental people, God is very, very near to us. And God lives even inside of us. And the character of God is also full of love for each person. He is very kind. If we sincerely express to God the sinfulness of ourselves, God will accept us.' This kind of a kind image of God appeals more to the Japanese, and not only to the Japanese but Oriental people in general." In *Interview: "As Catholics We Have to Appeal More to the Japanese Mind,"* <<http://www.cbcj.catholic.jp/eng/jcn/nov2007.htm#7>>.

10. "In Japan everything has been made level and uniform—even humanity. By one official count, 90 percent of the population regarded themselves as middle-class; in schools, it was not the outcasts who beat up the conformists, but vice versa. Every Japanese individual seemed to have the same goal as every other—to become like every other Japanese individual. The word for 'different,' I was told, was the same as the word for 'wrong'... Some of the same spirit could be found among Japanese in the United States. When Chinese

goes about the necessary task of translating theological works; how more than forty years after the Second Vatican Council she is still using a temporary, incomplete, and unsatisfactory edition of the liturgical Missal; how she lets herself be dazzled by contextual theologies shaped on a supposedly Oriental feeling or sensibility rather than on reasoned christological or ecclesiological references. Thus, for instance, in 1998 the Asian bishops were summoned to Rome for a synod with John Paul II. As the title of the event, the pope chose “Jesus Christ the Savior and his mission of love and service in Asia: that they may have life and have it more abundantly.” In that occasion the Japanese bishops stated quite openly and with a sort of naïve candor that “if we stress too much that Jesus Christ is the one and only Savior, we can have no dialogue, common living or solidarity with other religions.”¹¹

And yet, despite the Japanese Church’s delay in updating and inculturating her liturgical practice, pastoral action, and theological reflection, in spite of the temptation to hide behind declarations of irreconcilability between her own interpretation of Church and one that does not forfeit proclaiming that Jesus Christ is the only mediator of salvation, the phenomenon of globalization seems to manifest and inaugurate new opportunities for approaching Christianity. For example, according to a recent poll, 30% of the Catholic parishes use the Internet to broadcast the Sunday liturgy of the Word, to present the Church activities of the week, and to share information in order to help build up a sense of community. Or again, a high number of parishes created *home pages* and *blogs* in order to get in touch with those who use these means of communication more frequently, especially among the young who increasingly turn to the world of cyberspace as a window on the world. Or think of the simple fact that today it is increasingly easier and faster to access information about Christianity or watch images, programs, and documentaries dealing with some aspects of its history and mission—a fact that kindles in many people the desire to make contact with the Catholic Church and participate in Bible study groups.

Moreover, the phenomenon of globalization, with its ability to reduce distances once thought prohibitive, allows many people to take part in pilgrimages or visit worship places that are either distant or were merely dreamed of, thus helping the Japanese people to personally experience the universality of the Church and feel welcome in every Christian community that they might wish to visit. For, after all, it is here, as we observe the curiosity of many Japanese to know about the Christian world and to grasp its meaning, that we realize once more how the words and person of Christ are truly global and are

or Indian, or Korean or Vietnamese immigrants move to the Promised Land, they generally lose no time at all in assimilating themselves... Many Japanese in America, however, were much less conspicuous, and much less American. One third of the Japanese in New York, according to a poll, never read an America periodical; around half admitted (or boasted?) that they had no American friends at all.” P. Iyer, *Video Night in Kathmandu. And Other Reports from the Not-So-Far East* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 332; 351.

11. For a report on this synod and the description of some new models of Church in Asia, see T.C. Fox, *Pentecost in Asia: A New Way of Being Church* (New York; Orbis Books, 2002).

addressed, without distinction or prejudice, to all peoples. And perhaps this is also why, from a spiritual point of view, globalization has little to do with East and West, or official forms of denomination, and more to do with something more universal and intimate which never changes or disappears: the encounter that each person of every time and place can have with Him who “loved the world so much that he gave his only Son, so that everyone who believes in him may not be lost but may have eternal life” (Jn 3:16).

And if it is true that ours is the first age that, as the great student of comparative religions Huston Smith has noted, does not have a temple (but has, rather, a stadium or a shopping mall) at its center, it is likewise true that the reflections that one sees on the waters covering the rice fields (cultivated even in the city, amidst houses and tall buildings) reflect not only the solitary figures of shops and skyscrapers, but also the sparking streaks of a sky that never stops embracing us with its imperceptible transparency, with its mysterious references to a sweet transcendence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOURDIEU, Pierre

2003 *Firing Back Against the Tyranny of the Market 2*. Trans. by L. Wacquant. London: Verso.

CLARK, Ian

1997 *Globalization and Fragmentation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

FOX, Thomas C.

2002 *Pentecost in Asia: A New Way of Being Church*. New York: Orbis Books.

GIDDENS, Anthony

1990 *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

HIDEO Ohki ed.

2005 *A Theology of Japan: Origins and Task in the Age of Globalization*. Saitama: Seigakuin University Press.

IYER, Pico

1989 *Video Night in Kathmandu. And Other Reports from the Not-So-Far East*. New York: Vintage Books.

JENKINS, Philip

2002 *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity*. Oxford University Press.

RECEPTION, Andrew G.

2007 *God's Global Household. A Theology of Mission in the Context of Globalization*. Naga City: Agnus Press.

SCHIAVONE, Aldo

2007 *Storia e destino*. Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore.

ŽIŽEK, Slavoj

2001 *On Belief*. London & New York: Routledge.

TAIWAN

FABRIZIO TOSOLINI

The relationship between China and the Catholic Church is one of the flashpoints where the conflict of globalizations and its hidden reasons surface in a most visible way. Although many missionaries, even now, hold on to the unconfessed feeling that they are the first ones to go to China, and are sent to a virgin land, Church and China have a long history of unfinished encounters. It is altogether possible that news about Jesus were spread in China since apostolic or sub-apostolic times, through the contacts of Han Empire with the Mediterranean regions. Then, under the Tang, Yuan and the first years of Qing Dynasty the Christian religion was able to thrive rather freely, unhindered by political power. Curiously enough, with the exception of the Tang, the Yuan and the Qing were foreign rulers, aware of being at the head of a multicultural empire. Present times instead, at least as far as Christian religion is concerned, rather resemble the Ming or the Song epochs, although with the strange fact that now China is open to many

foreign cultural elements, provided they do not escape the omnipresent control of the State.

In any case, while Christian presence was swept away with the fall of Tang and Yuan Dynasties, the Catholic and Christian communities living now in China can trace back their origins to the missions started during the last period of the Ming Dynasty and continued under the Qing: Jesuit and other Catholic missions beginning at the end of the sixteenth century, and various Christian missions from the mid-nineteenth century.

However, after some promising beginnings, the relationship between Catholic religion and Chinese governments has been problematic and has given rise to the suspicion, on the Chinese side, that missionaries came to preach the gospel just in order to provide a religious complement to the imperialism of Western Nations. A comparison with the way Buddhism spread in China may be instructive.

Buddhist monks came to China during the Han Dynasty, and dedicated themselves to the translation of sutras into Chinese, thus spreading knowledge of the *dharma*.

Moreover, they adapted their doctrines so as to harmonize with Chinese traditional values, to the point that at the beginning Buddhism was considered a sort of Daoism. The chaotic periods following the fall of the Han and leading to the rise of Tang Dynasty changed the situation: more and more people found in Buddhist doctrines a way to inner peace in the midst of those troubled times, so that Buddhism gained more and more favor, to the point of receiving the support of the state.

Some great Buddhist masters were the spiritual leaders of Chinese nobility, even of some Emperors; Buddhism became one of the spiritual strains of Chinese culture. The loftiness of the doctrines of the monks and of their way of life, the autonomy of the masters in the doctrinal field and the absence of a ruling centre helped such a process of penetration into Chinese culture. Buddhism became increasingly influential, to the point of causing a strong reaction, culminating in the persecution of 845, when thousands of temples were destroyed, and hundreds of thousands of monks were secularized; a setback from which Buddhism never completely recovered, although now it enjoys a splendid renaissance under the supervision of the government.

The Catholic missionaries who came to China at the beginning of the seventeenth century represented an already structured Church, of which they spread not only the doctrines but also the organization, asking for an unreserved acceptance. Furthermore, the traditional conflicts among Religious Orders resulted in the presentation of a distorted image of the Church, polarized along their different spiritual approaches and traditions.

The Rites Controversy first, and then the coming of different Christian denominations, coupled with Western aggressions, showed the Chinese that they were only functional to the implementation of plans coming from abroad, their tradition deprived of the respect it deserved. Given this background, the trial Catholics (and also Christians) underwent under Communist regime had historical reasons and could result in a correction of past errors and in an improvement of the ways the Christian message should be spread among the Chinese.

However, that process did not stop at correcting errors. In the same way as Buddhism, Christianity was simply labeled as foreign religion which, in order to gain citizenship in the country, should be superimposed with Chinese characteristics. For Buddhist masters, to accept the control of political power seems not to be a problem. For Christian believers instead, things are not so simple: the relationship with Christ is also historical and lived in a tradition; moreover, it entails the discovery of a dimension in human life that is above the control of any State. From such a discovery stems the perception of enjoying a freedom that is original in every single human being, and over which duties to society have no absolute authority.

The history of the relationship between Communist rule and the Catholic Church after the Second World War is a history of unceasing attempts at bringing under full state control the comparatively little and dispersed communities together with their leaders, by cutting every link with the Church abroad and by asking them to accept the supervision of ad hoc organizations set up by the government.

The evolution of political thought in China has shown that the Chinese leadership tries to assert Chinese culture and tradition as the interpretive key of any other doctrine (in the form of the so-called Socialism with Chinese characteristics) and allows any component of civil life to exist only in as much as it is functional to its establishment.

In such a context, the original attempt to rein in the Church as a first step leading to its disappearance, an attempt pursued according to an already established Communist pattern, has undergone some shifts. Now, in the era of the open door policy, the talk is of mutual accommodation: Chinese government should accommodate to religions by fully implementing the policy of religious freedom and administering religious affairs according to the laws; it should also direct religions to accommodate to socialism.¹ This means: “*religious freedom* is understood in a very restricted sense, *in accordance with laws*, means close supervision, and *accommodation to socialism* means to support the rule of the government.”²

In greater detail, the accommodation of religious communities to socialism means: “*politically* they have to be directed to love their country, support socialism and the leadership of the Communist Party, and obey the existing religious and non-religious regulations and laws. *Economically*, religious communities have to be directed to support the economic reform and contribute to the development of socialist market economy. *Ideologically*, religious communities have to be directed to respect non-believers and other religions. *Culturally*, religious communities have to be directed to enhance the bright side of their faiths and denounce their dark side. *Socially*, religious communities have to be directed to support normal social production, social life and social order.

1. These are the so-called “Three Sentences” of Jiang Zemin. Lap-yan Kung, “What to Preach? Christian Witness in China, with Reference to the Party’s Policy of Mutual Accommodation,” *Religion and Culture: Past Approaches, Present Globalization, Future Challenges* (Macau: Macau Ricci Institute, 2004), 279–301. Here 284.

2. *Ibid.*, 287–88.

Finally and *morally*, religious communities have to be redirected to enhance their moral teaching to support socialist morality.³

In such a hermeneutics of religions some perspectives surface. First, what matters is the functional value of religions rather than their beliefs; second, Chinese socialism is the criterion defining the limits of true religion, it provides the ultimate *eschaton* of true religion; third, religions are political in nature and therefore they should be closely supervised.⁴

While this last point reflects the traditional Chinese stance on religions, for the Catholic Church in China the economic aspects of accommodation are of importance. Indeed, in the last twenty years, much of the effort of the Church has been directed toward projects of social relief, with considerable amount of money flowing in from abroad. The government policy has been that of encouraging such an effort, because of some advantages: the Christian need of doing good works, even in an organized and structured way (in order to testify faith, to provide positive experiences of encounter with the Christian message, to increase the social relevance of the presence of the Church, to improve the conditions of life of many poor people) could induce Catholic groups to register, thus accepting the supervision of the Party over their activities. In turn, government officials would only need to control the leaders and those with some power inside Catholic communities (bishops and priests) in order to have all following their policies.⁵

The split which took place in the '50 between the registered and unregistered Church had at least the positive result of preserving among some Chinese Catholics the traditional vision of Christian faith, by this contradicting the illusion of some others that accepting the Party's interpretation of (Christian) religion and at the same time calling themselves Christians was possible and right.

Another positive effect has been the assumption of responsibility on the side of the laity: every single believer had to struggle for his/her faith. This has brought with it suffering, martyrdom, but also courage, awareness of the strength of Christian communities, an active spirit eager to promote the life of the Church in concrete, tangible ways.

The late Pope John Paul II tried in every way to avoid the risk of the splitting of the Church; Pope Benedict XVI has tried to go further and in a letter to the Chinese Catholics on May 2007⁶ called for reconciliation among the two communities, while at the same time clearly stating that the relationship with the government entails, on the one hand

3. *Ibid.*, 284–85, referring the position of Duan Qi Ming, Head of the Division of Politics and Law of the Religious Affairs Bureau.

4. *Ibid.*, 285.

5. Another phenomenon that is difficult to interpret is the growth of cults that have a loose reference to Christ and his doctrine, but are independent from any already existing Church organization (See K.-L. Leung, *The Rural Churches of Mainland China Since 1978*, Hong Kong: Alliance Bible Seminary, 1999, 174–183). While they can be considered as spontaneous expression of the need of religious experience, they may also be interpreted as one of the tools used in order to create confusion and splits among Christian/Catholic believers.

6. Text in <http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/letters/2007/documents/hf_ben-xvi_let_20070527_china_en.pdf>. Compendium 2009, <http://vatican.va/chinese/pdf/2Compendium_zh-t_en.pdf>.

Christian loyalty to established political leadership, and on the other hand the necessity for the Church to be free in its internal life.⁷ The letter met with different appreciations; undeniably it also induced some confusion among Catholics in China, especially those belonging to the unregistered churches. A compendium of the Letter, with an authoritative interpretation has been issued in May 2009, its effects not yet easily visible.⁸

In the meantime, another kind of answer to the constraints in which the Churches find themselves has taken shape: experiences of spontaneous groupings, mainly among Christian denominations, but also among Catholics. Some of them are called *house churches* and meet in unconventional venues, such as private houses or hotels; some still use traditional worship places. Their small size and relatively little impact on social life protect them from the interest of local officials. Their activities are more closely related to the core values of religious experience: worship, common prayer, catechesis, Bible reading and sharing. Their growth, especially among non-Catholic Christians,⁹ seems to be exponential and very difficult, if not impossible to monitor or control. It is one of the ways in which Chinese thirst for spiritual values seeks lasting answers.

On the Catholic side, another fact is worth noticing: the saga of diplomatic relationships between the Holy See and the People's Republic of China. Before 2008 statements from Rome about possible developments were rather frequent and created disquietude among the faithful in Taiwan. The 2008 election in Taiwan of the new President Ma Yingjiu, a member of the Guomindang, and the consequent improvement in bilateral relations between Taiwan and PRC China, have frozen all talks with the Holy See. This has shown that interest of China in these talks was not so much to normalize diplomatic relationships, as to use them in order to further isolate Taiwan.

This fact further demonstrates that in the difficult relationships between China and Catholic Church/Christian Churches something of basic importance is at stake. Christian faith is the greatest witness to the existence of a truth—a truth involving history—by far exceeding any human historical power. This is what some in China are trying to deny, in the name of the absoluteness of a culture. The pages of Western history report some past situations similar to this present one. The first and most important is the reaction of the Roman Empire to the existence of the Christians, who at that time were called atheists because they did not worship the state gods; the second is the fight of Pope Gregory VII

7. A note on the Letter in J. Heyndrickx, "La Cinquième Rencontre entre le Christianisme et la Chine: Seule la Persévérance Dans le Dialogue Peut Mener au Succès," *Courrier Verbiest*, 2009, 21/2:2–5.

8. Since the publication of the Letter in 2007, a game of the kind played with Taiwan has been going on, concerning foreign Catholic organization trying to do social ministry in China: in order to work in peace without problems, the best way is to become friends with the leaders of the Patriotic Church. In doing so, however, they tacitly distance themselves from the Pope's mind and wishes, which are for the Patriotic Church to show its loyalty to the centre of the Church; they contribute to isolate the Pope and those in China who follow him.

9. Scholar Yu Jianrong, a professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Rural Development Institute, determined that Protestant house church members numbered between 45 and 65 million, with another 18 to 30 million attending government-approved churches. However, he has acknowledged in an interview that the total number of Protestant Christians might be as high as 100 million. Source: Compass Direct News Service PO Box 27250 Santa Ana CA 92799, "China: Office Becomes New Force for Religious Repression," 1.

with the German emperor Henry IV over the right to appoint bishops in the dioceses of the Holy Roman Empire. In both cases an imperial power, which understands itself as universal, is challenged by a belief that, although without human weapons, still holds to the claim of being even more universal.

TAIWAN

In 2009 the Catholic Church in Taiwan celebrates the 150 Anniversary of the arrival of the first Dominican missionaries from the Philippines via Xiamen (Fu Jian). The Presbyterians arrived on the island about the same time.¹⁰ The Church in Taiwan, which experienced a dramatic increase in numbers¹¹ after the establishment of the Republic of China (the Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai Shek) at the end of 1940's, is still young.

The reasons for such an increase were the numerous missionary Orders (men and women) which resettled their members in Taiwan after being forced out of Mainland China and the cultural and social works they initiated, by this actively contributing to the development of the country. The growth in membership which followed was therefore fast, but not solid, not necessarily determined only by reasons of personal quest for meaning and inner conversion.

The decrease in foreign missionaries, because of age and shortage of new vocations in the West, has brought with itself the decline of many activities for which it has not been possible to find adequate local replacements.

This has gone hand in hand with the changes affecting Church's life at every level consequent to the Vatican II. A new and more positive evaluation of local traditions and religions, efforts to find new ways to allow people to perceive the closeness of the Gospel to their lives, changes in the liturgy and church organization, new kinds of pastoral activities together with the not always harmonious policies of the different Orders, all these factors ingenerated some disorientation and incertitude, at a time in which society too was undergoing great changes and challenges.

Furthermore, vocations to Church service have not been many, and at present are even declining; although a good half of the Christians is not ethnically Chinese but belongs to Aboriginal tribes, they are not sufficiently represented at the hierarchical level; bishops are asking priests from the Churches of Korea and Vietnam.

All these phenomena signal an obvious fact: the Catholic Church in Taiwan is facing the problems connected with the necessity of living and growing on the basis of its own resources. Here some of the shortcomings of a too extensive intervention from abroad into a local Church become evident: almost inevitably, together with human and financial

10. In the seventeenth century Dominicans from the Philippines and Calvinist missionaries from Holland established some communities, but in both cases the experience was short-lived.

11. Data, by diocese, in <<http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/country/tw.html>>.

resources, also a foreign agenda arrives, setting goals and methods that are not necessarily those required by the situation on the ground.

A self-evident example: Taiwan is generally considered a Chinese Church even if half of the believers are Aborigines and new vocations come almost exclusively from among them. A reason for this may be that to take care of a Chinese Church is considered more important and more promising than to concentrate efforts on the simpler cultures of Aborigines, which do not seem to have any future.

Moreover, the massive help from abroad and the leadership of foreign missionaries has left in Taiwan believers a somehow passive attitude with respect to faith and responsibility for the Church: a readiness to accept and obey, not so much an eagerness to witness and try new ways; such an attitude is not easy to reverse. On the other hand, the Taiwan Catholic Church is challenged by the success of other religious groups (especially Buddhists, other Christians, new religions) which have learnt some lessons from market economy and are achieving visible results. However, even an unsophisticated analysis of the reasons for such different outcomes shows that the Catholic Church has some characteristics that make her unfit for competing in such a contest.

A capitalistic enterprise (whatever it may be) needs charismatic leaders, who start with great commitment and sacrifices, but after a while meet with success and are honored, respected and followed by increasing numbers of adepts. Among Protestants it is possible to find such leaders, who may also create their own churches; among Buddhists such a phenomenon is the rule; among Catholics, it is almost impossible at a lower level (priests and sisters do not go beyond creating small groups of friends, and change place and responsibilities very often); perhaps it might happen among the leaders,¹² although the plans that are made are simply too ambitious with respect to the real strength of the Church in the country.

Connected with this, another great difference can be noticed: Buddhists, new religions and even some Protestant groups choose qualifying projects (mainly in the cultural field) to show to the external world their strength and growth. Recent examples include the Museum of World Religions in Yong He (Taipei County)¹³ and the Maitreya Temple near Xin Zhu, which is still under construction and will have a huge Maitreya statue in bronze 72 m tall.¹⁴ Due to their small numbers, and to the already existing services, which are in the less visible field of social assistance, Catholics do not have the necessary resources for enterprises of this kind; and due to the present sensibility towards poverty, the choice of

12. The recent experience of Card. Shan, (former bishop of Gao Xiong) could be interpreted as a point in case: after getting lung cancer, he traveled the island and shared his experience of preparing himself to say goodbye to life. This widely known witness to Christian faith is also functional to the establishment of a Centre (the "Mount Beatitude" near Gao Xiong, see <<http://www.ucanews.com/2006/04/07/cardinals-dream-take-shape-as-hilltop-church-complex-enters-first-phase/>>) that somehow resembles the flourishing Buddhist Mountains dotting Taiwan's landscape. However, Card. Shan cannot count on the scores of committed personal disciples that form the force of Buddhist masters and of some famous pastors.

13. Website of the Museum, <<http://www.mwr.org.tw/>>.

14. Website of the Center, <<http://www.maitreya.org.tw/>>.

the poor, as well as the lack of means, not many would approve and support similar plans, although in the cultural environment of Taiwan (and maybe of other countries in the Far East), they would have a strong appeal for non-Catholics.

Indeed, Mount Beatitude in Gao Xiong, the new General Medical Building in Fu Jen University (which in the future could become a hospital), plans for the new Taiwan Regional Major Seminary and the offices of Taiwan Regional Bishop's Conference, the building or refurbishing of some churches, are signals that show the attention of the local (Chinese) Catholic hierarchy to such perspectives.

Together with this, bishops are inviting all the Catholics to actively cooperate in evangelization and missionary work. Such a commitment can be the right way also to promote an active stance and a sense of responsibility towards the Church they belong to, which in the long run will produce numerous initiatives and positive results.

In other more traditional directions, pointing to an increase in the participation to the universality of the Church, such as sending priests abroad for further studies, relationships with Rome and other local Churches all over the world, participation in international Church events, openness to new theological trends, new experiences and charisms, the Catholic Church in Taiwan is in the forefront: it shows a genuine spirit of openness, conducive to mutual enrichment. Under these aspects, together with the Protestants, it plays an important role in view of a positive globalization of the country; it also sets an example, and paves new ways for the Church and the society in Mainland China.¹⁵

In Taiwan, the process of (Western)¹⁶ globalization is taking place in a peaceful, even natural way, without preclusions. This is what happens to the Catholic Church too.

However, it is always necessary to increase the respect and valorization for the ways faith in Christ takes form in and among Chinese faithful, so that globalization, at least in the Church, may really be the fruit of contributions coming from the Spirit working in all the believers, everywhere.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

CRIVELLER, Gianni

2001 "Christian Studies in Mainland China." *Tripod*, 21/122: 6–28.

HEYNDRICKX, Jeroom

2009 "La Cinquième Rencontre entre le Christianisme et la Chine: Seule la Persévérance Dans le Dialogue Peut Mener au Succès." *Courrier Verbiest*, 21/2:2–5.

15. After direct connections and tourism, Taiwan is considering the opening of its universities to Mainland students. This would possibly offer some opportunities also to priests and seminarians to attend courses in Taiwan and know more about the Church on the island.

16. The kind of globalization rooted in Western civilization indeed shows many limits and shortcomings. However, it presents characteristics of openness to discussion, criticism, changes and improvements that are typical of Western reason, to the point of offering an arena and an environment in which other projects can propose their alternatives and find respect and consideration. This is not necessarily the case for other kinds of globalizing projects.

KUNG Lap-yan

- 2004 "What to Preach? Christian Witness in China, with Reference to the Party's Policy of Mutual Accomodation." *Religion and Culture: Past Approaches, Present Globalization, Future Challenges*. Macau: Macau Ricci Institute, 279–301.

LAZZAROTTO, Angelo

- 2008 *La Cina di Mao processa la Chiesa: I missionari del Pime nel Henan 1938–1954*. Bologna: EMI.

LEUNG Ka-Lun

- 1999 *The Rural Churches of Mainland China Since 1978*. Hong Kong: Alliance Bible Seminary.

VALENTE, Gianni

- 2002 *Il tesoro che fiorisce: storie di cristiani in Cina*. Roma: Associazione Amici di 30 Giorni.

WHYTE, Bob

- 1988 *Unfinished Encounter: China and Christianity*. London: Fount Paperbacks.

XIE Zhibin

- 2006 *Religious Diversity and Public Religion in China*. London: Ashgate.

YANG Huilin, Yeung Daniel H. N.

- 2006 *Sino-Christian Studies in China*. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Press.

Conclusion

M. REBECCHI, F. TOSOLINI, T. TOSOLINI

At the end of our inquiry we would like to offer some tentative reflections on the complex phenomenon that is the relationship between mission and globalization. As Pope Benedict XVI mentioned in his last Encyclical Letter, *Caritas in Veritate* “Despite some of its structural elements, which should neither be denied nor exaggerated, ‘globalization, a priori, is neither good nor bad. It will be what people make of it’. We should not be its victims, but rather its protagonists, acting in the light of reason, guided by charity and truth.”¹ Among the different facets of the fluid reality of globalization we focused our attention on the following aspects. The chapters of this book have repeatedly underlined that globalization is marked and driven by economic forces which, supported by a massive use of media, technology and propaganda, create and then offer to satisfy most (if not all) of the needs expressed by individuals. This offer, it is said, is supposed to meet the most

1. Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter *Caritas in Veritate*, n. 43.

basic of aspirations: that of experiencing happiness and fulfillment at every level of human life. This, unfortunately, turns out to be just an illusion and a deceptive mechanism. Most people, in fact, seem unable to realize that this is indeed a daydream and that other alternatives are available and ready to hand. The forces of globalization elude the grasp not only of the individual but also of the larger community, such as nation and state. For “In the cabaret of globalization, the state goes through a striptease and by the end of the performance it is left with the bare necessities: its power of repression. With its material basis destroyed, its independence annulled, its political class effaced, the nation-state becomes a simple security service for mega-companies. The new masters of the world have no need to govern directly.”²

A second element concerns the relationship between globalization and localization or glocalization: people are lured into some common modes of life which they perceive as desirable because they free them from the burden of those responsibilities they felt obliged to follow when living inside their original places and traditions. The pursuit of this unlimited freedom is in itself a chimera and an illusion: what they really do is fall into a kind of stifling anonymity where the only freedom is to conform to the latest fashions and frenzies. And since it is impossible to return to the familiar and traditional patterns or life-styles, all measures to reverse this trend prove powerless, if not hopeless.

A third aspect: globalization can sustain itself only at the price of a wide-spread destruction of the environment. This in turn is nothing but the reflection of the exploitation of what is typically human in each individual. In the same way forests are devastated and societies are impoverished, so the richness of the human being is robbed of its humanity and left to the mercy of basic instincts and uncontrolled urges. This makes the individual easy prey to the ruthless laws, precepts and logic of the global financial market in which one is either bought or sold. In this way globalization creates a kind of relationship devoid of any trace of reciprocity and gratuitousness, nothing less than a kind of *homo homini lupus* updated to the new globalized context.

What then could be a possible missionary approach and dialogue with the new opportunities and traits fostered by globalization? What are the distinctive missionary proposals that could inspire or challenge this cultural trend?

It could certainly be said that if for globalization any kind of relationship is seen through the lenses of quantity, self-interest and greed, the missionary approach is one that is attentive to the quality of human relations, to the respect for individuals and to the mysterious dimensions of reciprocity. Moreover, if globalization seems to make promises without actually keeping them, mission offers the possibility of experiencing directly and immediately what it preaches, creating the space for an authentic mutual interaction involving the message, the messenger and the receiver.

Besides, as the Pope remarked, the Love whom the missionary is called to promote and share with others is strictly linked with the necessary criterion of truth. In fact, if

2. Z. Bauman, “The World Inhospitable to Lévinas,” *Philosophy Today*, 1999, 43/2-4, 161.

Love is truth does it not fulfill simultaneously the requirements of com-*passion* (because it is love) and that of discernment (because it is truth)? Perhaps this equation of truth and love (more that the equation between truth and freedom) seems to open up new possibilities to find a reconciliation between the need to evaluate and a desirable will of dialogue.

For indeed, if the missionary is sent to the end of the world to bring the good news of Love and Salvation, thereby entering into and perpetuating a different kind of globalization, is it not only through this Love and Truth that s/he could create an almost sacred space in which fraternal relationships are possible and the richness of alterity respected?

Cumulative Index

Abdullahel, Shafi 15, 18
 Aborigines 45, 132
 Abubakar, Atjeh 60–1, 72
 Aceh 20, 22, 25, 60–1, 64, 67, 106
 Afghanistan 81
 Afp 16–7
 Africa 60, 81, 84, 102, 106, 114
 Ahmadiyah 66–8
 Al-makassarī 64
 Al-rānirī 64
 Al-sinkili 64
 Alienation 15, 50, 52
 Allès, Elisabeth 87
 Alterity 34, 78, 139
 America 11, 34, 73, 79, 84, 114–5, 122, 124
 Annunziata, Lucia 46
 Anomie 50–5, 58, 91
 Anthropology 8, 18, 74
 Anti-globalization 56
 Aquaculture 12
 Arabia 60–6, 69–71, 102
 Arjomand, Said Amir 54–7
 Arrighi, Giovanni 9, 14, 18
 Asceticism 85
 Augé, Marc 74
Aum Shinrikyō, 76–9
 Autarchy 41, 120
 Azyumardi, Azra 60–5, 72
Bahasa Indonesia 22–3
 Bali 22, 27, 68
 Banawiratma, J.B. 112, 114, 118
 Bangkok 35, 96, 99, 123
 Bangladeshi 7–8, 13, 15, 18–9, 53–5, 93–4
Bankyō Dōkon 77
Bao Dao 44
 Baptisms 103, 105, 107, 116
 Bastiat, Frederic 64
 Batavia 104–7
 Baten, Abdul 16, 18
 Baudrillard, Jean 73, 79
 Bauman, Zygmunt 14, 17, 27, 29, 51, 57, 79, 138
 Befu, Harumi 36
 Beijing 40, 82, 88
 Benedict xvi, 129, 137
 Bangladesh Export Processing Zones Authority
 (*Bepza*) 10–1
 Bertozzi, Alberto 4
 Bhardwaj, Arjun 9, 11–3, 18
 Blair, Tony 57
Bishayon 7
 Boelaars, Huub 103, 105–8, 110, 118
 Bonnie, Setiawan 26, 29
 Bourdieu, Pierre 120, 125
 Brazil 42, 76–7
 Britain 22, 102
 Buddha 21
Bunmei kaika 32
 Buruma, Ian 36
Byakkō Shinkōkai 76–7
 Calbraith Perry, Matthew 31
 Calvinist 105, 131
 Cammelli, Stefano 46
 Capitalism 9, 42, 46, 94
 Catholicism 104–5
 Chaldean rite 102–3
 Chalmers, Johnston 31
 Charlton, Lewis 46
 Ceng, Qingyao 87

- Chen, Chung-cheng 87
 Chiang, Kai Shek 44, 131
 Chow, Peter 46
 Chowdhury, Fariha Akhter 15, 18,
 Chowdhury, Iftekhar Ahmed 98–9
 Christ 76, 92, 102, 117, 121, 124, 128–9, 133
 Christianity 4, 43, 50, 52–3, 59, 75, 77, 82–4, 89, 91,
 96, 102–4, 122–5, 128, 134
 Civilization 32–3, 35, 42, 46, 61, 81, 119, 133
 Clammer, John 35–6
 Clark, Ian 120, 125
 Clarke, Peter Bernard 75, 79
 Cochini, Christian 83, 87
 Colonialism 9, 112
 Communication 42, 74, 76, 78, 97, 120–1, 124
 Computer 14, 121
 Conflict 56, 93, 110, 112, 126
 Confucianism 42–3, 59, 86
 Confucius 33
 Consumerism 42–3, 50, 78, 94, 96, 113
 Conversions 61, 71, 103, 106
 Cooperation 40, 43, 53, 84, 98–9
 Corporations 9–14, 18, 76
 Corruption 10, 15, 26
 Cosmopolitan 34, 39, 60
 Criveller, Gianni 133
 Cyberspace 124
- D**
 Dalai Lama 86
 Dalits 96
 Daoism 86, 127
 Dassù, Marta 46
 Dawla, Bayezid 16, 18
 Death 63–4, 82
 De Bruyn, Pierre-Henry 88
 Delwar, Hossain 18
 Democracy 9–10, 23–4, 46, 67, 74, 82, 88
 De Monte Corvino 103
 Development 9–15, 17–9, 26–8, 31–4, 37, 41, 51, 53,
 56–7, 59–60, 62, 67, 71, 74, 76–9, 86, 88, 94, 100,
 102, 104, 110–1, 113, 115–7, 119, 128, 130–1
 Dhalan, Ahmad 66
Dharma 85, 88, 127
 Dignity 97, 108
 Diocese 95, 110, 131
 Discrimination 15, 23, 56, 67–8, 104, 106, 111, 120
 Dissemination 35, 97
 Dodrecht, Synod of 105
 Domination 40, 54–5, 112–3, 117
 Dominican 131
 Dongson culture 21
 Dunlap, Albert 51–2
 Durkheim, Émile 50, 58
- Dutch 22, 31, 59, 61, 66, 104–9
- E**
 Eades J.S. 36
 Eberhard, Wolfram 46
 Ebrey, Patricia Buckley 46
 Ecclesiological 124
 Ecology 113
 Economy 8–9, 11, 14, 18–9, 25–7, 31, 34, 42–3, 46, 49,
 74, 80, 86, 88, 96, 120, 128, 132
 Ecumenism 98
 Education 23–4, 65–7, 111–2, 121
 Egypt 67, 102
 Emperor 32, 131
 Endo, Shusaku 122–3
 Ershad 9
 Ethics 15, 43, 50–1, 58, 62, 83
 Ethos 9, 51
 Europe 33, 40, 65, 81, 84, 102–4, 116–7
 European 22, 33, 65, 93, 104–5, 107–8, 119–20, 123
 Evangelization 92, 94–5, 98, 103–7, 120–1, 133
 Evolution 21, 32, 40–1, 85, 128
 Exploitation 15, 138
- F**
 Fabc 94, 99, 114, 120
 Faith 4, 54–5, 57, 60–2, 65, 75, 77, 85, 94–5, 98–9,
 101–2, 104, 110, 112, 114–7, 122, 129–30, 132–3
Falungong 83
 Fernandes, Walter 99
 Ferreira 122
 Ferrucci, Alberto 21, 27, 29
 Festivals 86–7, 123
 Feudal 32, 62
 Feudalism 40, 82
 Flavio, Felice 26, 29
 Floods 15, 35
 Folk-religions 84
 Fo Jiao Ciji Gong De Hui 85
 Fox, Thomas 125
 Fragmentation 57, 120, 125
 Franciscans 103
 Freedom 14–5, 23, 27, 41–2, 44, 52, 67–8, 83, 93, 98–9,
 104, 106, 128, 138–9
 French 41, 64, 106, 120
 Front *Pembela* Islam 68
Fukoku kyōhei 32
 Fukuzawa, Yukichi, 32–3
 Fundamentalism 50, 56, 67–71
 Fung, Jojo 96, 99
- G**
Gaiatsu 36
 Gao Xiong 132–3
 Gazi, Aataai Mahbub 54, 57
 Gernet, Jacques 46
 Giddens, Anthony 120, 125

- Globalization 3–5, 7–21, 25, 27–31, 35–9, 41–5, 47,
 49–60, 63, 70–1, 74–8, 80–2, 84–5, 87, 89, 91–102,
 112–4, 117, 119–21, 123–5, 128, 133–4, 137–9
 Glocalization 27, 53, 57, 74, 138
 God 21, 23, 29, 63–64, 67–68, 71, 78, 95, 101–102, 116,
 122–123, 125
 Gongchandang 40
 Gonsalo, Veloso 103
 Gospel 4, 95, 101–2, 104, 111, 113, 120–2, 127, 131
 Grooff, Mgr. 107
 Gui, Benedetto 27–28
 Gulham, Ahmad 67
Guomindang 40, 130
 Guru 74
 Guyau, Jean 50, 58
H
Haji 65, 70
 Halle, Mark 17, 19
 Han Dynasty 39–40, 126–7
 Hayato, Ikeda 34
 Healey, G. 33
 Hefner, Robert 22–3, 25, 29, 72
 Hegemony 53, 96
 Heisig, James W. 4
 Heritage 42, 44, 74, 123
 Hermeneutics 129
 Heyndrickx, Jeroom 130, 133
 Hideo, Ohki 125
 Hierarchy 110, 115, 133
 Hinduism 23, 55, 59, 64, 98
 Holland 22–3, 102, 104–7, 109–10, 117, 131
 Homogeneity 31, 120
 Huang, Julia 85, 88
 Humanitarianism 23
 Hung, Chien-chiao 46
 Huntington, Samuel 55–57
I
 Ibn, Battuta 61
 Identity 22–3, 28, 31, 34, 41, 50, 54–5, 63, 83, 93, 95–6,
 100, 102, 112, 115, 121
 Ideological 10, 23, 28, 35–6, 41–2, 44, 49–50, 54, 82,
 111, 120
 Imams 54
 Immigration 35–6
 Imperialism 33, 38, 41, 49, 53, 58, 69, 120, 127
 Impoverishment 42, 94
 Inculturation 80, 93–6, 100, 110, 114, 121
 Inda, Jonathan 8, 18
 India 10, 15–6, 21–2, 42, 46, 54–5, 61–2, 64, 93, 95,
 100, 102, 104–8
 Indigenization 76
 Individualism 33, 94
 Inequality 13, 49, 91, 94, 100
 Interfaith 54–5, 57
 Internationalization 31, 34–6, 109
 Internet 15, 42, 77, 82, 121, 124
 Interreligious 68, 70–1, 117
 Intolerance 30, 54, 68, 82
 Introigne, Massimo 79
 Islamization 65
 Isolationism 31, 35–6
 Israeli, Rafael 60
 Italy 60, 109
 Itoh, Mayumi 31, 35, 37
 Ivy, Marilyn 31, 35, 37
 Iyer, Pico 124–5
J
 Jakarta 25–7, 68, 104–5, 107–9, 111, 113, 115–6
 Jansen, M.B. 32
 Java 21–4, 29, 60–4, 66–7, 69, 72, 103, 106–7
 Jehovah 76
 Jemaah Islamiyah 68
 Fu Jen University 133
 Jenkins, Philip 125
 Jesuit 108, 122, 127
 Jesus 76, 94, 122, 124, 126
 Jews 54
 Jiang, Jieshi 44
 Jiang, Zemin 128
 Jin Dynasty 39–40
 Johnston, Chalmers 31
 Jordan, David 86, 88
 Justice 12, 23, 26, 44, 94, 113
K
Kaikoku 32
Kalam 65
Kami 75
Kannushi 75
 Kasimo, Ignasius 108
 Kasimo, I.J. 15 108
Komunitas Basis Gerejawi 114–5
Kebal 62
Kebatinan 24–5
Kebhinnekaan 24, 28, 70
 Keene, Donald 32
Kejawen 63, 69
 Kerr, Alex 36
 Khan, Jasim Uddin 10–1, 18
 Kisala, Robert 78
 Kissinger, Henry 9
 Kleden, Ignas 23, 29
 Kodithuwakku, Indunil 94, 99
 Koichi, Iwabuchi 35, 37
Kokusaiika 34
Kokutai 33
 Korea 76, 131

- Kubi, Ponon Paul 95
 Kuijs, Louis 46
 Kurth, J. 49
Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia 111
 Kōtama, Okada 77
 Lap-yan, Kung 128, 134
 Laskar Jihad 68
 Lazzarotto, Angelo 134
 Legitimization 40–1
 Leung, Ka-lun 134
 Lewis, Mark Edward 46
 Liao 39–40
 Liberalism 68
 Liturgy 95, 100, 110, 112, 124, 131
 Lévinas, Emmanuel 138
 Lu, Yunfeng 88
Ma, Huan 61
 Ma, Yingjiu 43, 130
 Madsen, Richard 88
 Maitreya 132
 Majapahit 21–2, 61
 Malacca 61, 103, 106
 Malaysia 22, 29, 35, 60, 81, 107
 Malik, Ibrahim 61
 Manchu Qing Dynasty 39–40, 44, 126–7
 Mandi 95
 Mansford, John 93–6, 99–100, 112
 Mao, maoist 88, 134
 Mardiatmadja, B.S. 103–4, 118
 Margana, A. 114, 118
 Marginalization 11, 50, 53, 55, 94, 96, 98, 120
 Marignolli, Mgr. 103
 Marxism 40, 42
 Mary Immaculate 102
 Masahisa, Goi 77
 Mataram Kingdom 61
Matsuri 123
 Matsushito, Yoshinobu 32
 Mckend, Steve 4
 McLuhan, Marshall 74
 McMullen, Alia 16, 19
 Mecca 59, 63–6, 71
 Media 15–6, 27, 38, 42–3, 45, 54, 74, 76–9, 81, 87, 113, 120–1, 137
 Medina 59, 63, 65–6, 71
 Meiji 32
 Menamparampil, Thomas 95, 100
 Mentawai 110, 113
Mep 106
 Michel, Thomas 63, 65–6, 72
 Migration 13, 15, 18–9, 22
 Milton, Friedman 26
 Minangkabau 66
 Mindanao 81
 Minority 55, 69, 81, 93, 96, 98
 Missions 39, 109, 127
 Moeslim, Abdurrahman 69, 72
 Moghul 65
 Mokichi, Okada 77
 Moluccas 25, 61, 103–4, 107–8, 110, 114
 Mongols 39–40
 Mormons 76
 Morton, William 46
 Muhammad 60, 67
 Muhammadiyah 66–7, 69, 71
 Mujahiddin 68
 Mulder, Niels 21–2, 24, 29, 63, 72
 Mullins, Mark 76, 78–9
 Murshed, Mansoob 57
 Muslim 25, 54–6, 59–71, 81, 93, 97–9, 103
 Mysticism 22, 24, 29, 62–3, 65, 72
 Myth 24, 36
 Müller, J. 112
Nadhatul Ulama 64, 66–7, 69, 71
 Najam, Adil 17, 19
 Nakahami, H. 76
 Nakasone, Yasuhiro 34–6
 Nationalism 23, 34, 43, 117
 Natives 103–4
 Nestorian 102
 Netherlands 22, 109–10
 Network 8, 54, 64, 76
 Nias 106, 108, 110, 114
Nihonjinron 123
 Nishitani, Keiji 122
 Nobusuke, Kishi 34
 Nuclear 15, 28
 Nurcholish, Madjid 64, 67, 72
Odorico da Pordenone 103
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 14
 Okakura, Kakuzo 33
Ōmotokyō 77
 Orru, Marco 58
 Overmyer, Daniel 86, 88
Padang 105, 107, 109
Padri 66
 Pagans 105–6
 Pakistan 9–10, 67
 Palmer, David 83, 88
 Pancasila 23–5, 28–9, 67, 69–70, 110–12
 Papua 20, 22, 25, 27, 107, 110

- Pas, Julian 88
 Pastoral 103, 105, 107, 110, 112–8, 124, 131
 Peace 17, 31, 34, 40, 53–5, 57, 60, 64, 67–8, 71, 76, 78, 98, 127, 130
Perfect Liberty Kyōdan 76
 Persecution 15, 43, 64, 104, 108, 127
 Persia 60, 62
Pesantren 22, 65–7
 Petras, James 58
 Philips, Gerardette 4
 Pilgrimage 63–4, 66, 84
 Pluralism 22, 28–9, 36, 67
 Pollution 12, 28
 Polo, Marco 60
 Portuguese 22, 31, 59, 61, 103–5
 Poverty 11, 27, 49, 51, 94, 100, 113, 132
Pribumi 22, 69, 72
 Pulcini, Eugenio 3
Q
 Qigong 83
 Quibria, M.G. 11, 19
Quran 56, 70
R
 Race 21, 33
 Radhakrishnan 49, 53, 55–8
Radikal 106–7
 Rahman, Anisur 10, 19, 51, 57–8
 Rahman, Atiur 19
 Rahman, Matiur 12, 14,
Ramadhan 63
 Rebecchi, Matteo 20, 59, 101, 137
 Recepcion, Andrew Gimenez 21, 29
 Reconciliation 99, 129, 139
 Redemptorists 109
 Relativism 68, 78, 92, 98
 Renaissance 66, 84, 88, 127
 Revolution 40–1, 49, 51–2, 68, 83, 106
 Reynolds, Brian 4
 Robertson, R. 74
 Rosaldo, Renato 8, 18
 Rothkopf, David 19
 Runnalls, David 19
S
 Sacred 75, 85, 95, 100, 107, 139
 Sadrel, Reza 11, 19
 Safavid 65
 Said, Iskandar 55
Sakoku 31–2, 35–7
 Salary 94, 105
 Salvation 4, 55, 101, 124, 139
Sangha 77
Sangka 114
Sara 25
Sarikat Islam 66–7
 Satō Eisaku 34
 Schiavone, Aldo 125
 Sectarianism 86, 88
Seichō no ie 77
Sekai kyūsei kyō 76–7
Selamatan 63
 Seminary 111, 133
Sharia 43, 56, 81
 Shaykh Siti Jenar 63–4
 Shen, Fuwei 88
Shinkō Shūkyō 75
 Shinto 75, 77, 123
 Shogun 32
Shōnin kokka 34
Sūkyō Mahikari 76–7
 Siddiqui, Tasneem 13, 19
 Sisters 98, 107, 132
 Smith, Huston 125
 Socialism 42, 128–9
 Soebardi, S. 60–3, 66–7, 72
 Soegijapranata, Albertus 108–11, 118
 Soekmono, R. 21–3, 29, 60, 72
 Solidarity 57, 94, 99, 113–4, 124
Sōka Gakkai 76
 Song Dynasty 39–40, 126
Sonnō jōi 32
 Souharto 110, 112
 Soukarno 23–4, 109–10
 Spain 81, 102, 104, 117
 Steger, Manfred 21
 Stiglitz, Joseph 37
 Subangun, Emmanuel 112, 118
 Sufism 22, 62–5, 70
 Suharto 24–6, 68
 Sumatra 21, 23–4, 60–1, 66–7, 102–3, 105–7, 109
 Sumtaki, Edy 69, 72
 Sunan, Kalijaga 62
 Sustainable 9, 11–3, 17–9
T
 Taishō 33
 Tang Dynasty 39–40, 126–7
 Taniguchi, Masaharu 77
 Taoist 76
 Targa, Sergio 3, 7, 49, 91
 Tatsuo, Kamei 36
 Technologic 40–1
 Terrorism 50, 56, 71
 Thailand 94, 96, 99
 Theology 21, 29, 65, 87, 116, 121, 125
 Thomas, Michel 62–3, 65–6, 72
 Timor 25, 68, 104–5, 107
 Toby, Ronald 31, 37
 Tokugawa 31–2, 37

- Tolerance 55, 60, 68, 70–1, 98–9, 122
 Tosolini, Fabrizio 38, 80, 126, 137
 Tosolini, Tiziano 30, 73, 119, 137
 Tourism 44, 87, 133
 Tradition 24, 39–45, 54, 56, 62, 69, 75, 77, 81–2, 84–8, 96, 114, 121, 127–8
 Tsai, Kellee 46
Tsunami 113
 Tullio-Altan, Carlo 79
 Tyranny 120, 125
- U**
Umma 54, 65
- V**
 Vadakumpadan, Paul 93, 95, 100
 Valente, Gianni 134
 Value 97, 119, 129
 Van Bragt, Jan 122
 Veltmeyer, Henry 49, 58
Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (voc) 104–17
 Vietnam 21, 131
 Violence 12, 15, 25, 33, 60, 68, 71, 78, 95
 Von Hayek 26
 Vrancken, Mgr. 107
- W**
 Wade, Robert Hunter 94, 100
Wahhabis 65
Wakon yōsai 32
Wali Sanga 61–4
 Watanabe, Manabu 77, 79
- West, Raymond 19
 Wilde, Oscar 73
 Willekens, Mgr. 109
 Winters, Alan 46
 Whyte, Bob 134
 Woodcroft-lee, C.P. 60–3, 66–7, 72
 World Buddhist Forum 85
 Worship 39, 62, 67–8, 93, 100, 106, 124, 130
Wujūdiyyah 63–4
- X**
 Xenophobia 30
- X**
 Xie, Zhibin 134
- Y**
 Yang, Huilin 112, 114, 134
 Yasukuni 34
 Yeung, Daniel 134
 Yu, Jianrong 130
 Yuan Dynasty 39–40, 86, 126–7
 Yusuf, Sahid 46
 Yoshida, Shigeru 34
 Young, Richard 79
- Z**
 Zakir, Naik 54
 Zemin, Jiang 128
 Zen 75
Zending 105–6
 Zia, Khaleida 9–10, 55
 Ziegler, Jean 16
 Žižek, Slavoj 123, 125